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The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment seeks to be a leader on issues 
related to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the global economy, paying special attention to the 
sustainability dimension of this investment. Its objectives are to analyze important topical policy-
oriented issues related to FDI, develop and disseminate practical approaches and solutions, and 
provide students with a challenging learning environment.  Founded in 2006 as the Columbia 
Program on International Investment, the Center became the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment (VCC) in 2008. 
 
The Center is a joint center of the Earth Institute and Columbia Law School.  It operates with 
diversified funding from a number of sources, including an operational grant from Vale S.A.  The 
idea for this report was conceived in discussions with Vale, and Vale provided the funding for travel, 
research and staff time for its production.  The report is entirely the independent work of the VCC, 
based on public information, with no access to confidential documents from companies, the 
Government of Mozambique, or other any other parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This consultative draft is meant to foster discussion and multi-stakeholder collaboration and 
engagement on how Mozambique’s natural resources can be leveraged for sustainable 
development in the region.  As such, it is a “living” draft and remains a work in progress. The 
VCC looks forward to continued discussion with all stakeholders in Mozambique on these 
issues, including further feedback and comments on this consultative draft. 
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Executive summary 
Mozambique’s natural resources can be highly profitable for both investors and Mozambique’s 
citizens.  The goal of all stakeholders is a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship, which enables 
the profitability of the industry as well as ensures that the investments translate into widespread 
development benefits for the population. In fact, ensuring that extractive activities contribute to 
sustainable and equitable development is in the mutual interest of governments and companies, 
both of which benefit from advances in development—at the community and national levels—over 
the long term.  
 
The challenge is therefore to develop and apply a framework to turn resource wealth into effective 
and sustained economic development that is inclusive and contributes to poverty reduction, 
including through infrastructure development, linkages with local industries, the transfer of capital 
and technology, job creation, and capacity building. That the resources are non-renewable puts a 
premium on developing such a strategy at the early stages of production. 
 
Resource-based development requires a complex cooperative network connecting governments, 
business, civil society, local communities, and international organizations and partners. However, 
even though all stakeholders have the same ultimate goal—namely, long-term sustainable 
development supported by profitable investments in the extractive sector—the practical 
approaches to achieve this end are complex and typically beyond the remit of any one partner. 
Moreover, the potential synergies between national or regional priorities and the companies’ 
investments are often missed, and there is rarely an assessment of the regional (trans-national) 
development potential of these massive investments, through regional integration, cross-border 
infrastructure developments, regional trade, and regional energy transmission.   
 
The African Union’s Mining Vision, adopted in 2009, aims to achieve “transparent, equitable and 
optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-
economic development.” 1  This Mining Vision outlines how natural resources can contribute 
meaningfully to concrete development outcomes in Africa by 2050. Implementing the African 
Mining Vision and ensuring that the extractive industry investments contribute to the economic 
diversification and long-term sustainable development of Mozambique is the goal of this report. 
Specifically, this report aims to support a mutually beneficial framework of common actions and 
purposes within which the long-term sustainable development process in Mozambique and the 
Lower Zambezi region can best proceed.   Each of the five chapters in this report identifies concrete 
actions and opportunities to realize the shared vision of resource-based development.  
 
Chapter 1 describes the needs and opportunities for investing in integrated regional development in 
the Zambezi Valley, including both Mozambique and Malawi, where more than 70% of the 
population is rural farming households, and the potentially transformative extractive industry is still 
a recent phenomenon. Without targeted investments in rural development, the urban-rural income 
divide will worsen and likely give rise to political and social unrest. Mining regions generally suffer 
from economic disruptions such as a surge in demand-driven prices and, especially, food prices that 
                                                 
1
 www.uneca.org/csd/.../AficanReviewReport-on-MiningSummary.pdf 
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can only be mitigated by increasing investments in agricultural production and raising the incomes 
of local communities. Chapter 1 focuses especially on rural communities in the Zambezi valley, as 
they represent a very large majority of the countries’ low-income households. Ensuring that the 
extractive industry investments in the Zambezi region benefit the region necessarily means scaled-
up investments in the development of these communities to ensure food security, reduced 
incidence of preventable diseases, and increased access to basic education and infrastructure. 
Chapter 1 recommends targeted public-private partnerships to scale-up development in these 
communities, including developing agro-business alliances, a regional agricultural research and 
development facility, improved soil and land information, and integrated rural development projects, 
drawing on the experience of Millennium Villages.  These recommendations aim to reinforce and 
expand multi-sector investments through the Government of Mozambique’s current approach of 
development corridors. 
 
Unleashing the agriculture productivity through this targeted public-private investment strategy will 
create a healthy productive base for the economy. Complementary investment in infrastructure and 
human capital are needed to ensure economic diversification and development.  This is the focus of 
Chapter 2. Currently, the lack of infrastructure—rail, roads, energy, water—and an underdeveloped 
workforce are limiting the ability of the country to reach its full potential.  Increased investments in 
both infrastructure and capacity building are necessary both for improved productivity on 
smallholder farms and for optimal operations of the mega-projects and mining investments. Chapter 
2 discusses how improved maintenance and expansion of crucial infrastructure and human capital 
along the Beira and Nacala corridors would help create upstream linkages (in the services industry 
and mining inputs) and downstream linkages (into mineral beneficiation) conducive to a diversified 
economy. A sound regulatory framework is necessary to oversee these investments, coordinate 
public and private actors, and ensure equal and fair treatment of all stakeholders and isolation from 
political interference. In the Nacala corridor, the requisite regulatory framework is complicated by 
cross-border infrastructure and trade arrangements. Multi-stakeholder cooperation in leveraging 
the resource sector for an improved regulatory framework and industrial development along the 
corridors is in the mutual interest of the individual stakeholders. Chapter 2 proposes specific 
activities for multi-stakeholder engagement, including building an aspirational infrastructure map 
and establishing a National Linkage Center, among other activities. 
 
Investments in mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and other economic activities necessarily present 
environmental risks that could result in long-term irreversible impacts without careful management. 
Chapter 3 discusses the particular challenges of environmental protection, risk mitigation, and 
climate change resilience, especially in the context of the impacts of mining, transportation, and 
other economic activities. While many countries have mine site or project-specific environmental 
impact assessments, the cumulative impacts may not be known. Chapter 3 proposes an 
environmental management system that includes cumulative risk assessments and mitigation 
strategies, considering the many competitive uses of land and water in the Zambezi Valley, their 
combined environmental impacts, and necessary corresponding policies to ensure environmental 
protection.  
 
The path to economic diversification will need to be embedded in a long-term development strategy 
for managing resource revenues, supported by multi-year planning and budgetary mechanisms. The 
extent to which both linkages and increased revenues will contribute to national development 
depends on Mozambique’s planning and financial institutions and capacity. Chapter 4 discusses how 
to approach a government strategy for managing resource revenues, including long-term 
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development planning tools that bring coherence to national and sector-specific plans; identifying 
public investment priorities; aligning the budget and budgetary mechanisms with the planning 
process and public investment plans; and designing a revenue management and allocation plan to 
support the national development strategy.  Chapter 4 discusses the value of a credible and 
comprehensive medium-term expenditure framework, financial models of anticipated resource 
revenues, and improving the coordination of the private sector and development partners with 
respect to the national development strategy. 
 
The extractive industries in Mozambique—including coal, natural gas, mineral sands, phosphates, 
and other natural resources—are expected to continue to grow in the near future. While early 
investments were considered risky in the years after Mozambique’s civil war, Mozambique is no 
longer an untested investment destination. Mozambique has proven itself stable for investments, 
and government institutions and the regulatory framework continue to improve. Companies can be 
profitable, and continued investments in infrastructure will continue to increase the profitability of 
investments. Mozambique’s legal framework and fiscal regime can and should reflect this improved 
investment climate, requiring more benefits from future investors, through revenues, infrastructure 
investments and corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments. Chapter 5 discusses how the 
government can design a progressive, transparent, and fair fiscal and regulatory framework for the 
extractive industries, as well as how the Mozambique Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(MEITI) presents an opportunity to establish rigorous operational and fiscal audits to monitor the 
implementation of contracts and enshrine transparency in the relevant institutions. 
 
While ambitious, with adequate support and pooled resources, many of these opportunities are 
indeed within reach. To support their implementation, the conclusion of this report contemplates 
establishing three structures to support and enable further progress: a Zambezi Valley Resource-
Based Development Coordinator, to support the relevant ministries and to connect and coordinate 
partners and institutions working toward sustainable and equitable resource-based development in 
the Zambezi region; an international Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, to assist in the 
planning and implementation of a resource-based development strategy; and a Zambezi Valley 
Resource Policy Forum, at which all stakeholders can assess needs and opportunities, monitor 
progress, and plan for the future. 
 
This draft is a consultative draft. Although every opportunity and idea in this report reflects 
conversations and information accessed in the region, the VCC will now consult widely with this 
report: (1) to seek guidance on whether this report accurately reflects the vision of the 
stakeholders, and (2) to work with stakeholders to develop a road map for implementation.  
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Summary of recommendations, by chapter 
 
Chapter One 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Unlocking the 
agriculture potential in 
the Beira and Nacala 
corridors 
 
Expanding rural roads network by prioritizing the most fertile regions, such as the highly untapped 
productive areas of Tete province where demand for food commodities is increasing rapidly 
 
Strengthening and scaling up rural finance institutions and initiatives, such as GAPI and the AGRA-MCA 
fund, drawing on successful recent financial leveraging experience from Nigeria and other countries, and 
possibly bundling with risk transfer instruments including index-based weather insurance 
 
Establishing the Zambezi Valley Agriculture Development Center (1) for smallholder-focused adaptive 
research (including climate risk management), seed multiplication, extension, and training throughout the 
region, 2) to be located in Tete and operate in a decentralized agro-ecosystem-based manner through 
existing government facilities)  
 
Adopting a voucher-based input subsidy program (1) focused on both productivity improvement and post-
harvest improvement, 2) with strong participation of agro-dealers, 3) drawing on experience of the region 
 
Assembling up-to-date, spatially referenced soil and climate information to support agriculture in the most 
agronomically suited regions of Beira and Nacala corridors by extending the work of AfSIS and linking with 
weather/climate monitoring efforts over a longer time scale 
 
Establishing the Agro-Business Alliance of Extractive, Agriculture, and Food Industries with the objective of 
supporting the commercialization of smallholder agriculture in the Zambezi Valley 
Min. of Public Works 
and Housing, Min. of 
Agriculture, MPD, 
MICOA 
Local Governors, 
National Road 
Authority (ANE), ,  
 
Central Soil 
Laboratory in 
Maputo, 
Extractives, 
Mosaic, Agrium, 
Walmart, AGRA, 
CGIAR 
National Institute 
of Meteorology 
(INAM) 
WB, 
AfDB,  
MCC/MCA, 
USAID, 
Embrapa, 
AGRA, 
CGIAR, 
BAGC, 
CEPAGRI, 
GAPI, 
IFDC, 
AfSIS, 
CIESIN, 
ICRAF, 
CIAT-TSBF, 
ISRIC, 
ILO,  
IRI,  
WMO, 
Columbia 
University 
Integrated Rural 
Development (IRDP) in 
the Beira and Nacala 
corridors 
 
Designing and implementing a network of IRDPs in the provinces of Tete, Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, 
Manica and Gaza provinces, to be informed by a study of existing MV and other rural development projects 
during June-August 2011, conducted by the MST and the Earth Institute at Columbia University.  
 
Establishing a National IRDP Policy Support Secretariat to facilitate inter-agency coordination, synthesize 
IRDP experience to inform national policy, and coordinate capacity building, monitoring and evaluation and 
resource mobilization for program expansion 
 
Supporting selected universities in Mozambique to develop and implement new undergraduate and 
master’s level programs in sustainable development practice 
Min. of Agriculture, 
Min. of Science and 
Technology (MST), 
MPD, Min. of Health, 
Min. of Education, Min 
of Labor, Min. of 
Public Works and 
Housing, Min. of 
Energy 
MST’s network of 
MV, 
University 
Eduardo 
Mondlane, 
University Lurio, 
Africare 
 
Earth 
Institute/ 
Columbia 
University, 
UNDP, 
USAID 
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Chapter Two 
Recommendation Main Features Led by   Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Aspirational 10- year map 
and comprehensive 
database 
Planning tool for Transport and Energy Sector (to identify potential for shared platforms with mega-
projects, to anticipate risks of congestion on corridors, to revive stalled projects, to invest in missing links) 
Backed by data survey and transport sector statistics  
 
Can motivate the creation of a fund to facilitate more investments in infrastructure and in operations and 
maintenance of it  
MTC, COCEP, 
MPD 
National Statistics 
Institute, 
Current and Future 
Investors in 
infrastructure 
WB,  
AfDB,  
GSDI 
Completing two key trunk 
infrastructure of the Beira 
Corridor  by leveraging 
partnership 
Renewing the Sena line concession arrangement by implementing the multi-user model, maximizing 
public interest and economic viability  
 
Renewing the corridor regulatory framework respecting 5 principles (1) 25-30 year- concession period, 2) 
non-discriminatory tariffs, 3) monitoring and auditing commission of multi-disciplinary experts to audit 
concession returns and applied tariffs, 4) coding regime into PPP legislation 5) strong independent 
regulatory body precluding political interference) 
 
Leveraging the partnership of the Sena Line put forth by the multi user model to ensure the completion of 
CESUL, Phase 2 
MTC, 
SDI Unit, 
CFM 
 
AMDCM, Coal Mining 
Companies   
IPPs, 
ESKOM 
AfDB,  
DFID 
European 
Investment 
Bank, 
WB 
 
Completing two key trunk 
infrastructure of the 
Nacala Corridor  by cross-
border integration 
Devising operational and binding cross-border arrangement  (1) integrated border and corridor 
management under a steering committee of SADC or COMESA, 2) consultation with stakeholders under a 
Corridor Logistic Initiative such as MCLI, 3) establishment of the binding nature of the cross-border 
agreements into the national law, 4) cross-border logistic solutions to enable shared platform with the rest 
of economy)  
 
Leveraging the cross-border approach of the Nacala Line to revive the Interconnector  (joint financing for 
each phase, SAPP project coordinator, pooled resources in designing a well-package project)  
MTC, SDI Unit 
CFM, CEAR 
Ministry of Energy, 
EDM, Local 
governors, 
ESCOM, 
SADC, SAPP 
Vale, CDN and other 
Minority 
Stakeholders, IFC 
MIGA 
 
 
African 
Union, 
DFID, WB, 
AfDB, 
JICA, 
Norway 
Embassy, 
Chinese EXIM 
Bank 
Public-private partnership 
for the diversification of 
the economy 
 
Strong industrial policy to lift inhibitors of value addition (1) targeting human resource constraints, 2) 
enabling the business environment, 3) shifting toward a value chain approach)  
 
Collaborative approach to set up a National Linkage Center (1) to identify the right value chains, 2) to 
monitor value-addition of linkage program, 3) to advise on suitable corporate polices, 4) to suggest public-
private sponsored initiatives)  
 
Collaborative approach to set up a competitiveness commission (1) to assess potential for downstream, 
and 2) its related fiscal and investment policy) 
Min. of Education, 
Min. of Labor, Min. 
of Science and 
Technology, 
COREP, Min. of 
Commerce and 
Industry, SDI 
 
IGM, Instituto 
Superior Politecnico, 
LEM, Don Bosco,  
UEM, Local Banks, 
IPEM, IPEX, ACIS, 
CTA, Megaprojects 
Italian 
Coopera-tion, 
Canadian 
Coopera-tion, 
WB, 
UNDP, 
Danida, GIZ 
IFC 
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Chapter Three 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Strategic cumulative 
impact assessment (CIA) 
study,  and monitoring 
program 
Joint initiative to assess cumulative environmental direct impacts of mining operations as actually 
experienced by local communities and stakeholders (water pollution and water resource 
management, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, soil and land degradation, and effects on 
biodiversity) 
Expanding the CIA to include competitive use of water and land to inform policy making related to 
water and land use, using GIS and to be coordinated at cross-border level, especially for cross-border 
warning system for flood alerts and integrated water resource management plan (IWRM) 
MICOA, MPD, Min. of 
Agriculture 
 
AMDCM, 
Mining 
Companies, 
SDI unit 
 
UNEP, 
UNIDO, 
WMO, 
GSDI, 
ACWR, 
Impacto, Consultec 
Strengthening 
environmental governance 
Investing in technical assistance for government employees involved in environmental assessment 
and licensing at national and local level 
Updating the legal and regulatory regime, maximizing environmental protection while promulgating 
realistic guidelines (1) establishment of stringent emission and pollution limitations, 2) assessment of 
water concession period and value of assurance bonds according to cumulative impacts of mines  
Designing enforcement mechanisms (1) audits before license renewal, 2) continuous monitoring of 
industrial activities, 3) applying significant penalties for environmental violations, 4) enshrining 
transparency in system and 5) ensuring better public participation and oversight)  
Adopting CIA at Ministry level (through an inter-ministerial unit in order to strengthen institutional 
linkage and assessment of environmental challenges as a cross-cutting issue) 
MICOA 
 
Industry, 
Government, Civil 
Society 
Organizations, 
National 
Universities 
UNDP, 
UNPEI, 
Earth Institute/ 
Columbia University 
Public-private cooperation 
to achieve climate-resilient 
development 
Mitigating climate risks and realize opportunities through 1) disaster risk reduction; 2) managing 
climate risks with systems reducing vulnerability, with an emphasis on strategies to reduce rainfall-
induced production variability; and 3) adaptation to climate change, with a focus on high-risk areas 
and sectors 
 
Building science, information systems and capacity with a focus on 1)  impacts of weather/climate 
on development; 2) climate processes and science, including forecasting; and 3) techniques for 
integrating climate information into decision and policy-making 
 
Making the climate risk and opportunity management approach an integral part of development 
policy, planning, and governance with an emphasis on public-private cooperation and multi-
stakeholder engagement 
 
Mitigating climate change by 1) pooling resources to fund improvements in the logistics of 
operations required by the implementation of REDD; and 2) GHG emissions standards enumeration 
by the government,  respected by mining companies (through technical solutions to incorporate 
green technology into activity industries or carbon-offsetting programs) 
MPD partnering with 
MICOA, 
INGC, 
Min. of Agriculture,  
National Institute 
of Meteorology 
(UNAM), NAPA, 
Other Ministries, 
Private sector 
(including 
insurance/finance 
industry, 
agriculture supply 
chain, etc.) 
REDD 
partnership, 
UEM, Civil Society 
Organizations 
UNFCC, 
AfDB, 
IIED, UNDP, , Earth 
Institute, the 
African Centre of 
Meteorological 
Applications for 
Development 
(ACMAD), WMO, 
IGAD Swiss Re, IFRC, 
WB, CLIM DEV, 
Forum for 
Agricultural 
Research in Africa 
(FARA), ENDA.   
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Chapter Four 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Planning for resource-
based development 
Medium-term development plans should include resource–based infrastructure, linkages, revenue 
management, domestic resource needs, and cumulative environmental risks 
 
Creating an inter-ministerial commission 1) to supervise the PIP, 2) to oversee statistical analysis, 3) to 
ensure consistency of planning tool, 4) to begin streamlining various development plans  
MPD Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments 
Development 
Partners 
 
Aligning and 
operationalizing key 
objectives, priorities and 
actions of development 
plans 
 
Streamlining central and sector planning documents to focus on priority issues in line with MDG targets  
 
Creating an institutional framework for engaging line ministries, donors, and private sector   
 
Designing a PIP to identify and cost strategic public investment projects and align with financing options 
 
Streamlining M&E indicators and processes, reducing redundant reporting and administration, and 
increasing rigor of statistical analysis.  
 
Convening a planning workshop  for MPD and line ministries 
MPD, 
Min. of Finance 
Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments, 
Private Sector 
Development 
Partners 
 
Preparing a robust MTEF Reconciling the budget process with the MTEF    
 
Aligning and costing key development priorities (such as the PIP) in the MTEF 
 
Modeling available resources (tax and other revenues, donor support, extra-budgetary funds and quasi-
fiscal activities, such as private-sector expenditures) 
MPD, 
Min. of Finance 
Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments 
IMF, WB 
 
Improving efficacy of 
donor support and private-
sector development 
activities 
 
Increasing the transparency and predictability of donor allocations over MTEF time horizon  
 
Coordinating donor support among the donors and around the government’s identified priorities 
 
Channeling more donor support through the government’s own systems and reporting all according to 
budget classification 
 
Aligning private-sector development activities with government’s priorities and systems 
 
MPD Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Private Sector 
Development  
Partners 
Monitoring the national 
development planning 
process 
 
Improving Budget Transparency (such as through enhanced MEITI)  
 
Supporting civil society and private-sector engagement in planning and monitoring processes 
MPD. 
Min. of Finance 
 
MEITI, 
Debt Group, 
FDC, 
CPI 
Development  
Partners, 
Private Sector 
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Chapter Five  
Recommendations Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
A commission to lead 
comprehensive review 
and updating of legal 
framework and assess 
grounds for upgrading 
contracts 
This commission could: 
 1) Review current contracts and legal framework, ensure lessons are learned and assess whether and 
how current contracts might merge into the new framework.  In particular, the commission could focus on 
reviewing the fiscal and non-fiscal benefits of existing legislation and contracts, and the possibilities for (1) 
implementing resource rent taxation, (2) implementing capital gains taxation, (3) clarifying the royalty 
base, (4) limiting the currently overly-broad stability guarantee, (5) reforming confidentiality provisions 
to reflect government policy of transparency, and (6) streamlining depreciation schedules and capital 
allowances. Other mineral policy aspects, not dealt with in this report, could also be included in the 
review, such as resettlement policies and artisanal and small-scale mining, among others, similar to the 
Tanzanian Bomani Commission. 
 
 2) Reflect the diversity of Mozambican society and include a wide-array of expertise to have 
international and national credibility.  It could also usefully rely on the many pro bono and international 
perspectives from SADC colleagues, the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, and others. 
 
 3) Provide updated Mining Laws and Regulations and an updated Model Contract  
 
 4) Plan for independent financial modeling to be conducted for all future contracts after the Commission 
has completed its work 
MIREM 
 
AMDCM, 
PPP, and 
Concession 
Holders, 
Civil Society 
Organizations 
(CSOs) 
World Bank, 
IMF, 
AfDB,  
UNDP,  
SADC,  
IFC,  
Academia 
 
Training scale-up for 
implementing 
institutions 
Building on trainings in contract negotiations from UNDP with deeper and longer trainings for all relevant 
ministries, with a focus on skill-building such as financial modeling and mock negotiations 
 
Scaling up auditing training, particularly if more complex taxation mechanisms are included in an updated 
law (like the suggested RRT) and/or model contract 
MIREM, 
Min. of Finance 
 
Min. of Finance, 
MPD, MTC, 
AMDCM, 
CSOs, Academia 
UNDP, AfDB, 
IMF, 
World Bank, 
Academia 
Deepened and 
strengthened EITI 
Deepening the EITI to include (1) more companies (2) financial, physical, and process audits (3) contract 
disclosure (4) infrastructure and CSR expenditures and audits and (5) link to budget transparency  
 
Using an EITI law to implement these innovations  
MIREM, MEITI  Multi-Stakeholder 
Groups 
World Bank Trust 
Fund for EITI, AfDB 
 
 
   
Introduction to the Lower Zambezi Basin and the VCC Five-Pillar 
Framework 
An area of enormous opportunity: the Lower Zambezi Basin 
The Lower Zambezi River basin in Mozambique is one of the world’s poorest regions, yet also one of 
tremendous highly diversified development potential. Not only does Mozambique have substantial 
untapped mineral resources—the major anchor of this particular study—the country also has 10 
million hectares of arable land; 2,500 kilometers of coastline with five ports; major transport corridors 
with the capacity to interconnect not only Mozambique’s populations, but also its land-locked 
neighbors of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; proximity to the South African economic market; and a 
large and young labor force.  
 
The coal sector in particular is set to boost Mozambique’s economy, with estimated resources of 
23,000Mt.2  The area is considered to be the largest untapped coal reserve in the world, with the 
capacity to drive the region’s growth for decades to come. In September 2010, the Deputy Minister of 
Mineral Resources announced that eight coal mines will be operating in Tete province by 2016, with a 
total output of 48Mt per annum by 2017 and 100 Mt per annum by 2025.3 Tete province also holds the 
bulk of the 12.5 gigawatts of power generation potential in Mozambique. Recent scholarly literature 
has emphasized that “Tete has unique attributes that make it ideal for development into the next 
regional industrial hub for Southern Africa.”4 In addition to the world-class deposits of coal in Tete 
Province, Mozambique has confirmed deposits of phosphates, natural gas, and substantial 
hydropower potential. Tete Province and Mozambique are well-positioned to benefit from the large 
investments in their natural resources. The challenge for the region is to harness its economic 
potential for regional integration, and sustainable, diversified and inclusive growth. 
 
Extractive industries can be important levers for long-term resource-based sustainable development, 
through revenue generation, infrastructure development, and technology and capital transfer, among 
other channels; however, the manner and extent to which these benefits actually accrue to host 
countries depend heavily on the policies and practices of host countries and extractive companies. The 
well-known “resource curse” can become a reality, in which the benefits of the mining sector are 
squandered through overvalued exchange rates and mismanagement of the revenues. Even in the 
absence of fiscal mismanagement or poor governance, there can be missed opportunities for 
leveraging large investments in extractive industries to maximize the development impact of the 
investments for current and future generations. Moreover, the potential negative environmental 
impacts caused by mining, transportation, agriculture, and other economic activities are numerous and, 
without careful environmental management, may be irreversible.   
 
Large multinational mining and oil corporations often invest substantial resources, hoping to be 
present in the host country for several decades. These investments may require rehabilitated or newly 
constructed infrastructure—ports, roads, rail, power—all of which can propel broader development 
when aligned with the infrastructure needs of the host country and communities. The companies will 
require skilled labor and strong supply chains, and investing early and carefully in vocational training 
                                                 
2
 “Mozambique: Going for growth,” Mining Journal, October 29, 2010. 
3
 Mining Journal, 29 Oct 2010 
4
 A. B. Sebitosi and A. da Graca “Cahora Bassa and Tete Province (Mozambique): A Great Potential for an industrial hub in 
Southern Africa,” A. B. Sebitosi and A. da Graca, in Energy Policy 37 (2009), pp. 2027-2032. 
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and business incubators can both increase human capital and decrease operational costs for the 
company over the long run. Resource processing and beneficiation industries can further multiply the 
benefits of the original investment by creating local employment and reducing the cost of products to 
local manufacturers and consumers. The large investors can also be effective partners in addressing 
and mitigating environmental risks by taking steps both to manage the impacts of the investments and 
to build resilience in the country to other environmental challenges, especially those stemming from 
global climate change. 
 
There is currently a vibrant dialogue in Mozambique about the future of the country and how the new 
mining boom can contribute not only to accelerated growth, but also to better distribution of the 
growth benefits among the population of the country and the larger SADC region, including by helping 
to realize the 12% poverty reduction by 2015 envisioned in the PARP.5 There is broad recognition that 
the country is at a pivotal moment.  Several megaprojects have been active for some time now, such 
as Mozal and Sasol.  A small number of mining companies are in production, while most are scheduled 
to begin production in 2011, including Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale.  Other companies have signed 
concession agreements and will begin production in the coming years.  And numerous exploration 
activities are proceeding in the country as well.  The expectations are high, though the concerns 
among all stakeholders are numerous as well. At first, the various interests may not seem aligned, and 
rumors and skepticism proliferate among diverse interests. Transparency, dialogue, and consultative 
planning can bridge this. Approaching resource-based development comprehensively, such as through 
the five-pillar approach outlined in this report, can help Mozambique and the region fulfill its 
development potential.  
 
Vast development needs that can be addressed by a resource-based development 
strategy 
Mozambique is one of the world's poorest countries with an estimated per capita gross national 
income (GNI) of $440 in 2009.6 Despite impressive economic growth rates (6-8%) and encouraging 
development progress made by the government in the last decade, poverty continues to be severe and 
widespread.7  
 
Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been strong; however, faster 
progress is needed to achieve them by 2015. The 2008/9 household budget survey, released recently 
by the Third National Poverty Assessment,8 provided evidence of significant progress across a range of 
non-monetary poverty indicators. There were large improvements in access to education (both 
primary and secondary); improved access to health services, particularly in rural areas; increases in 
asset ownership; and improvements in housing quality. At the same time, the 2008/9 measures of 
poverty based on consumption, particularly food consumption, did not decrease as expected. This was 
a disappointing and surprising outcome to many who expected the impressive economic growth rates 
to translate into improved development indicators. For instance, in Tete Province, the influx of 
investment in the energy and mining sectors, and associated growth in the services sector, have not 
                                                 
5
 From 54.7% in 2009 to 42% in 2014. (PARP 2010-2014). 
6
 http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/moz_aag.pdf 
7
 Ibid.  
8
 Poverty and Wellbeing in Mozambique: Third National Poverty Assessment, National Directorate of Studies and Policy 
Analysis, Ministry of Planning and Development, September 2010. 
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substantially improved development indicators; the largely rural population remains impoverished, 
with poor indicators in education, health, and agricultural productivity. 
 
To leverage the potential of the minerals sector for inclusive growth, South Africa and NEPAD 
recognized the potential of spatial development planning along several “corridors” that have been 
identified according to high-rent anchors, such as coal. The Government of Mozambique and the 
World Bank have adopted the spatial development corridor approach, identifying six spatial 
development corridors in Mozambique. The goal of the spatial development corridor approach is to 
leverage the anchor projects for more integrated growth along transport and service corridors, and to 
ensure that the benefits of the high-rent investments translate into widespread development 
outcomes. The strategy relies on strong planning mechanisms, including both inter-ministerial 
coordination to address complex development challenges and also opportunities to coordinate public 
investments with private investments located along the development corridors, to increase the 
opportunities for limited resources (both fiscal and infrastructure) to be used effectively, and to take 
advantage of cross-sector and even cross-border synergies.   
 
This is particularly true for coordinating with national resource investors—and especially the mining 
companies operating in Tete province—which rely on the Beira and potentially the Nacala corridors for 
the export of the raw material and therefore have a particular interest in building and upgrading the 
physical infrastructure as well as investing in the sustainable development of the populations along the 
corridors. The increased availability of public and private funds and interest along those two corridors 
has opened up an array of investment possibilities that, if coordinated, planned, and well-governed, 
provide the basis for unlocking the long-heralded agricultural potential and developing the 
infrastructure and the workforce, which will enable a shift away from resource-dependence toward 
economic diversification.  
 
This report aims to implement the African Mining Vision to ensure that the extractive industry 
investments contribute to economic diversification and long-term sustainable development of 
Mozambique. The approach of the report is a five-pillar framework for resource-based development, 
inspired by the African Mining Vision, and discussed in more depth below.  
 
Five-pillar framework for resource-based sustainable development 
We have approached the Zambezi Valley Development Study with a five-pillar framework for 
resource-based development to guide our inquiry and recommendations.   This framework is 
underpinned by the premise that responsible, long-term, sustainable investment leads to benefits for 
both the investors and the residents of the host countries and that sustainability is the mutual 
responsibility of both investors and governments. The five pillars of the framework are: 
 
1) Integrated Rural Development and Agriculture Scale-Up: An integrated strategy for targeted 
investments in agriculture and rural development, to ensure that communities in the region 
benefit from the presence of the extractive industries.  
2) Leverage Mining Investments: Leveraging the extractive industry investments in 
infrastructure, vocational training, upstream linkages (into mining capital goods and 
consumables) and downstream linkages (into mineral beneficiation) for national and regional 
development objectives.  
3) Environmental Protection: An environmental protection system that allows for multi-
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stakeholder management of the cumulative environmental risks and impacts associated with 
resource investments, their requisite infrastructure investments, and their impact on other 
regional environmental challenges, such as climate change resilience, water management, or 
deforestation. 
4) Long-term Planning and Revenue Management. An effective government strategy and 
capacity for leveraging the investments and for managing resource revenues, including 
national development planning, effective budgetary mechanisms and execution, and strategic 
allocation of resource revenues.  
5) Transparent and Mutually Beneficial Legal Framework. A transparent, legal framework for 
extractive investments, mutually beneficial to industry and the host country, that is 
implemented and monitored by strong governmental and societal institutions with the 
cooperation of industry.  
 
These five pillars aim to integrate the roles, responsibilities, and opportunities for governments, 
private sector, development partners, NGOs, and academia. The framework recognizes the value of an 
integrated approach to development—including infrastructure, business development, agriculture, 
health and environment—and identifies the entry-point for how natural resource assets can be 
leveraged for such an integrated approach to development. The framework covers all stages of the 
value-chain of natural resource extraction, from exploration, through contracting and contract 
implementation, to revenue collection, management, and spending.   
 
The chapters of this report follow each pillar, highlighting the specific opportunities in Mozambique for 
multi-stakeholder collaboration. They seek to highlight the roles that extractive companies, 
governments, communities, development partners, and civil society can play, and very often they 
stress the need for multi-stakeholder coordination to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes for industry 
and communities. While each stakeholder may be guided by different philosophies, goals, and 
objectives, there is a shared vision of economic development and broad-based and equitable 
prosperity.  The question is how to get there. The chapters identify concrete actions and opportunities 
to realize this shared vision. 
Methodology 
a. Senior guidance 
The project has been supervised by Dr. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia 
University. Dr. Sachs provided strategic direction and overall support to the project. He is personally 
familiar with the region and its development challenges, and has worked very closely over the years 
with the political leadership in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, as well as with other governments 
throughout the African continent. The project also greatly benefited from the guidance of Dr. Glenn 
Denning, Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia University’s School of International and Public 
Affairs and Director of the Earth Institute Center for Globalization and Sustainable Development. Until 
recently, Dr. Denning was the Director of the Earth Institute’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
Centre in Nairobi, which he helped found.  Dr. Denning has more than 30 years of experience in 
agriculture and rural development, including throughout the African continent. 
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b. Criteria for observations and recommendations 
The VCC has approached the Zambezi Valley Development Study with the five-pillar framework as 
guidance for our inquiry and recommendations. This report applies the five-pillar approach in a specific 
regional context, the Zambezi Valley, looking at the implications for Mozambique, private-sector 
investors (especially the mining sector), development partners (including regional development banks 
and international donors), local institutions including universities, national and international NGOs, 
and local communities. Therefore, the observations and recommendations throughout the chapters of 
this report track the Five Pillars discussed above and integrate the roles, responsibilities, and 
opportunities of each of the stakeholders. 
 
This report does not aim at comprehensiveness, but rather the recommendations presented are those 
that the VCC considers would: 
 
1) address a critical need, 
2) benefit from more coordinated attention and pooled resources, and 
3) encourage and deepen multi-stakeholder partnerships.  
The report is issue-based and solution oriented. It brings comparative international practices and 
analyzes their applicability in the context of Mozambique.  It focuses on positive opportunities for 
development through collaboration and innovation. 
 
Importantly, this report does not address several fundamental issues related to extractive industries 
and sustainable development, including human rights, gender issues, resettlement, land rights, 
artisanal mining, and specific environmental disruptions of mining and infrastructure. Nor does this 
report focus on mine-site development opportunities or CSR programs. This omission does not lessen 
the need for best practices and sustainable development at the mine site, nor for the consideration of 
other critical aspects of sustainable development. These issues are critical and should be considered by 
all stakeholders as integral to development planning. 
 
This report also does not directly address the growing hydrocarbon sector. It is particularly pressing to 
incorporate this new sector into the national and regional development strategy. Although many of 
the concepts discussed in this report are relevant for the hydrocarbon sector, there are unique 
characteristics of the sector that could be usefully considered in the development context that are not 
addressed in this report.   
 
Instead, the guiding premise of the report is that it is important to consider the regional impact and 
potential of resource-based development, which receives comparatively less attention, especially in a 
holistic framework that recognizes the interconnectedness of various sectors of the economy and 
public and private partners. That is the focus of this report, though we hope that the discussions that 
follow incorporate those aspects of development not specifically addressed herein. 
 
c. Sources of information 
Our information is based on extensive desk research and field research in the region during 2009-2011, 
including extensive meetings with government, industry, and local partners. From the central 
Government, the report benefited from meetings with the Ministries of Mineral Resources, Finance, 
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Planning, Science and Technology, Transportation and Communications, and Agriculture, as well as 
with the President’s office. In Tete Province, we met with the Provincial Directorates of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, Public Works, Agriculture, and Education. We also met with several public agencies, 
including CPI, GPZ,9 and EDM.  
 
From the business community, the report benefited from meetings with Vale, Riversdale, Rio Tinto, 
Mozal, Kenmare Mining, Banco Terra, ABC Bank, BCI, BOM, ProCredit, Standard Bank, Servo Catering 
Mozambique, CTA, ACIS, Finantia Consulting, and Yara. We also met with representatives of the Beira 
Agricultural Growth Corridor, a public-private initiative. 
 
From the donors and technical assistance community, we met with the World Bank, IFC, the African 
Development Bank, the UN Country Team, the European Union delegation, DFID, USAID, MCA, MCC, 
Norway Embassy, Danida, GIZ, the Italian and Canadian Cooperation, ADIPSA,10 Technoserve, and 
AGRA.  
 
We also met with several non-governmental organizations, including Africare, CPI, WWF, WorldVision, 
Village Reach, Care for Life, the Mozambican Debt Group, SEDE,11 FDC,12 and PSI.13 
 
From Academia and research institutes, we met with the Rector and several professors of the 
University Eduardo Mundlane, and with the IESE, IRRI,14 and IFDC. 
 
From the community of international experts who have worked with several countries to put in place 
resource-based development policies, we met with Paul Jourdan, Jeff Wood, James Otto, David Perkins, 
and Bo Giersing. 
 
Finally, we met with many other individuals and groups from other resource-rich countries to provide 
comparative perspective. We also met with stakeholders in Malawi (government officials, 
development partners, and civil society) to understand the shared interests, challenges, and 
opportunities along the Nacala corridor. 
 
We are deeply grateful for the insights and cooperation of all of these partners, and inspired by the 
immeasurable level of commitment to and confidence in the development of the Zambezi Valley. 
 
d. Why this report?  Why the Lower Zambezi Valley? 
While visiting Vale’s mine site at Moatize and hearing about the company’s regional infrastructure 
plans, Dr. Sachs suggested that the Moatize mine could be a game-changer if the public and private 
sector embraced an ambitious sustainable resource-based development strategy. At Dr. Sachs’ 
suggestion, Vale agreed to fund a study that would lead to this strategy. This report does not focus on 
Vale’s mine, nor does it address or comment on Vale’s corporate social responsibility policy in 
                                                 
9
 Zambezi Valley Planning Office. 
10
 ADIPSA, Apoio ao Desenvolvimento de Iniciativas Privadas no Sector Agrário, is a Danish-funded agriculture business 
development provider. 
11
 Saúde e Desenvolvimento Empresarial. 
12
 Community Development Foundation. 
13
 Population Services International. 
14
 International Rice Research Institute. 
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Mozambique or elsewhere. Although not addressed in this report, the VCC unequivocally believes that, 
at minimum, Vale and all other extractive industry companies should adhere to international law, host 
country law, and best practices in these areas; host governments and civil society should rigorously 
monitor and enforce these practices. Beyond these de minimus requirements, there are opportunities 
for companies to set higher standards as corporate citizens and development partners through their 
business practices and community engagements; though not discussed in this report, these aspects of 
a company's engagement at the mine site are integrally important to local development and to a 
company's social license to operate.  
 
The purpose of the report is to propose multi-stakeholder opportunities to implement a development 
strategy, taking as a premise that sustainable development is in the shared interest of all stakeholders 
and is therefore a shared responsibility. Our hope is that the Government will lead the implementation 
of the recommendations, and that Vale, as one of the largest investors in Mozambique, will be a 
catalyst towards the implementation of some of the recommendations, working in close coordination 
with other investors, the donor community, neighboring countries, non-governmental organizations, 
and most importantly, Mozambique’s citizens. We also hope that this report will be useful as a model 
for other regional resource-based development strategies. 
 
e. Next steps 
This first draft is the basis for discussion and consultation with the Government of Mozambique, Vale 
and all stakeholders in Mozambique and the region that we are hoping will continue to collaborate 
constructively to help implement the recommendations. In order to support the coordination of the 
stakeholders and the implementation of key initiatives, the report suggests the establishment of a 
Zambezi Valley Resource-Based Development Coordinator, an international Resource-Based 
Development Advisory Group, and a Zambezi Valley Resource Policy Forum. Each of these and the 
roles they could play are described in the conclusion. The VCC, The Earth Institute, Columbia Law 
School and the broader Columbia University community—all of which have contributed tremendously 
to this report—look forward to supporting these processes and our regional partners on an ongoing 
basis.  
 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011                                                                                             24 
 
 
Chapter One: Integrated Rural Development in the Zambezi Valley 
Introduction 
In 1910, R. C. F. Maugham, consul for Portuguese East Africa, wrote, “I am convinced that the future of 
Zambezia depends on the development of its agriculture, and that although doubtless valuable mineral 
resources exist, they will only form a weak second line in the movement that will sweep this district.”15 
One hundred years later, the global demand for energy has projected coal mining to prominence with 
the promise of vast revenues derived from investments in Tete Province. Together with Mozambique’s 
other mineral and energy resources, the increased availability of public and private funds has opened 
up an array of investment possibilities that may, ironically, provide the basis for unlocking the long-
heralded agricultural potential of the Zambezi Valley. 
 
This chapter discusses both the need and potential for investing in integrated rural development in the 
Zambezi Valley. In the context of this report, “integrated rural development” refers to sustainable 
multi-sectoral investments that address the specific needs and conditions of the rural communities 
living in the regions affected by the Zambezi Valley mining investments (including along transportation 
corridors). In the Zambezi Valley, this geographic scope includes all rural communities living in and 
between resource-rich Tete Province and the Nacala and Beira ports (i.e., along the Nacala and Beira 
corridors, respectively). Our goal is to maximize and expand the sustainable development impact of 
the large extractive investments in Tete Province along the two development corridors and even 
beyond.  
 
Low-income rural communities along the Beira and Nacala corridors comprise about 80% of the 
population.  Farming is the main source of food and income for most households; however, 
agricultural productivity remains very low. Therefore, this chapter focuses on opportunities for 
advancing smallholder agriculture, rather than the large-scale commercial estates.16  The latter are 
considered only in the context of the potential for implementing and strengthening out-grower 
schemes that could benefit smallholders. By focusing investments on smallholder agriculture, the dual 
objectives of food security and poverty reduction can be tackled for a large section of the population. 
Such investments are critical for enabling a more equitable sharing of benefits from extractive 
industries.  
 
After providing an overview of the specific needs and conditions of the communities along the Beira 
and Nacala corridors, this chapter explores practical investment opportunities to inclusive and 
diversified agriculture-led growth along the corridors, envisioning that its benefits will be spread 
beyond Mozambique to the entire Zambezi Valley.17 
 
                                                 
15
 Maugham, R.C.F. (1910) Zambezia : a general description of the valley of the Zambezi River, from its delta to the River 
Aroangwa, with its history, agriculture, flora, fauna, and ethnography. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028621641  
16
 Of the 1.5 million hectares of land under production in Mozambique, more than 98% is cultivated by smallholders. 
17
 As the Nacala corridor crosses through Malawi, consideration of southern Malawi is included in our analysis. In general, we 
propose closer collaboration between Mozambique and Malawi in implementing and assessing integrated rural development 
programs, given the mutual benefits of regional development and the shared agro-ecological profiles in the Zambezi Valley 
region. 
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1. Poverty along the Beira and Nacala corridors 
 
Despite impressive national economic growth rates (6-8%) and encouraging development progress 
made by Mozambican Government in recent years, poverty continues to be severe and widespread in 
the Zambezi Valley (See Table 1).18  
 
Mozambique’s 2008/09 household budget survey (known as IOF0819) provided evidence of significant 
progress across a range of non-monetary poverty indicators. There were large improvements in access 
to education (both primary and secondary); access to health services was improved, particularly in 
rural areas; asset ownership increased; and housing quality improved. However, the 2008/09 
measures of poverty based on consumption, particularly food consumption, did not decrease 
significantly. While consumption poverty fell significantly from 1996/07 to 2002/03, the IOF08 showed 
that consumption poverty at the national level stagnated at about 55% of the population.20 This was 
indeed a disappointing outcome that highlighted the challenge of achieving more inclusive and 
equitable growth in Mozambique. 
 
National statistics, though informative, hide distinct regional patterns of change in poverty levels 
(Table 2).  While the rural poverty rate worsened in the Zambezi Valley, it declined in the northern 
regions over the same period. Indeed, rural northern regions of the country showed the largest 
decreases in poverty: from 59% to 46% between 2002 and 2008. In the central region, corresponding 
in part with the Beira corridor, poverty surprisingly increased from 46% to 60%, in particular, in 
Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia provinces. In contrast, Tete province saw a decline in poverty from 60% 
to 42%.21 This is likely attributable to the economic growth associated with recent mining investments 
and its impact on service industries and employment in Tete town. 
 
                                                 
18
 Per capita gross national income (GNI) was $440 in 2009. In Malawi, per capita GNI was $280 in the same year. 
19
 Inquérito ao Orçamento Familiar 2008/09  
20
 Adapted from the IFAD Rural Poverty Portal: 
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/mozambique and the Third National Poverty Assessment 
(September 2010): 
http://aec.msu.edu/%5C/fs2/mozambique/caadp/THIRD_NATIONAL_POVERTY_ASSESSMENT_october1.pdf 
21
 Adapted from the IFAD Rural Poverty Portal: 
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/mozambique and the Third National Poverty Assessment 
(September 2010): 
http://aec.msu.edu/%5C/fs2/mozambique/caadp/THIRD_NATIONAL_POVERTY_ASSESSMENT_october1.pdf 
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Table 1. Snapshot of key poverty, agriculture, and nutrition indicators in the Beira and Nacala corridors
22
 
 
Key sectors Beira Corridor (Central Region) Nacala Corridor (Northern Region) National 
Poverty Central region poverty increased 
from 45% to 60% from 2002 to 
2008, in particular, in Manica, 
Sofala, and Zambezia 
Rural northern region showed the 
largest falls in poverty, from 59% to 
46% from 2002 to 2008 
55% in 2008/09, compared 
with 54% in 2002/03
23
 
Agricultural 
productivity 
 
From 2003 to 2008, per capita 
food crop production declined 
by: 
• 32% in Sofala 
• 19% in Zambezia
24
 
Average maize yield is less 
than 1 ton/ha 
Agricultural performance in the 
northern provinces was better than 
in the central provinces; the 
northern provinces benefited from 
gains in access to public services 
and infrastructure, and a more 
stable and higher rainfall in recent 
years 
 
Malnutrition (among 
under-five)
25
 
• 50% stunted (chronic 
malnutrition) 
• 21% underweight 
• 7% wasted (acute 
malnutrition) 
• 57% stunted (chronic 
malnutrition) 
• 23% underweight 
• 8% wasted (acute malnutrition) 
• 46% stunted (chronic 
malnutrition) 
• 19% underweight 
• 7% wasted (acute 
malnutrition) 
Under-five mortality 
rate 
 
152/1000  (Tete: 174/1000) 156/1000 138/1000 
HIV/AIDS Infection rate 
among women 15-49
26
 
14% (Tete: 8%) 4% 13% 
Access to improved 
water source 
38% (Tete: 34%) 43% 41% 
 
Access to sanitation  15% (Tete: 3.5%) 15% 20% 
Primary School: Net 
Attendance Rate 
79% (Tete: 69%) 76% 81.3% 
Primary School: Net 
Completion Rate 
10% (Tete: 5.5%) 8% 15% 
Access to the power 
grid
27
 
7% (Tete: 5%) 6% 14% 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Mozambique: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2008; Third National Poverty Assessment. 
23
 The increase was not statistically significant. 
24
 Such a fall in production and low productivity is likely due to more severe climatic shocks in these regions as well as lowest 
rates of access to inputs. In 2007 and 2008, flooding in the Zambezi river basin and rising water levels on the Búzi, Púngue, 
Save and Licungo rivers were so massive that the government declared red alert. 
25
 Poor nutrition increases children’s susceptibility to infectious illness and also reduces their cognitive potential, both of 
which have implications for the development of a healthy and productive workforce. 
26
 2009 Rates from INSIDA http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR179/SR179.pdf 
27
 Cuvilas CA, et al. Energy situation in Mozambique: A review. Renew Sustain Energy Rev (2010), 
doi:10.1016/j.rser.2010.02.002 
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Table 2. Poverty headcount trends at national, regional, and provincial levels 
 
 
Malnutrition levels have stagnated at the national level since 2002/03 and are particularly high along 
the Beira and Nacala corridors (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Moderate malnutrition, % infants by province 
 
 
This reflects low agricultural productivity due to inadequate rural transportation and energy 
infrastructure, coupled with the lack of access to education, clean water and sanitation, and basic 
health services. 
 
The infrastructure, health, and education constraints are similar in southern Malawi, which shares 
some of the agro-economic characteristics of northern and central Mozambique.  Southern Malawi is 
one of the most impoverished regions of Africa; unlike the sparsely populated northern provinces of 
Mozambique, southern Malawi is very densely populated, and an additional constraint to agricultural 
productivity is lack of access to land. Typically, the most vulnerable households have less than 
0.5 hectares of land to cultivate.  
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Like Mozambique, over 80% of the population in southern Malawi is engaged in agriculture, which is 
subject to rainfall variability that can be particularly damaging when there are short dry spells. This can 
lead to household food shortages for up to 9 months of the year. Despite tremendous progress made 
since 2006 in levels of food insecurity thanks to a national fertilizer subsidy, poverty remains in much 
of rural Malawi, and is most severe in the southern region of the country. Chronic malnutrition, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, substandard health services, and lack of clean drinking water have kept average 
life expectancy in Malawi low (54 years in 2009).  
 
In conclusion, the body of recent evidence indicates that progress towards reducing rural poverty and 
malnutrition has stagnated in the Zambezi Valley, along both the Beira and Nacala corridors. This 
reflects generally slow progress in improving agricultural productivity and wider lack of access to 
education and health services. Inadequate rural infrastructure, both roads and electrification, hamper 
improvements in agriculture, while poor access to clean drinking water and sanitation affect food 
utilization. To make progress in reducing rural poverty and malnutrition, it is therefore imperative to 
employ an integrated multi-sectoral approach to development. At the core of this approach should be 
public and private investments to achieve inclusive and diversified agriculture-led economic growth in 
the Beira and Nacala corridors. Through such investment, the transition from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture can be hastened as outlined in the following section. 
 
2. Smallholder agriculture: an engine of growth and poverty reduction28 
Agricultural productivity improvements have been a major driving force of social and economic change 
in human societies for millennia. The traditional production of crops and livestock has fulfilled 
household requirements for food, fiber, fuel, medicine, and other essential consumables. Surpluses 
and the income derived from them opened up opportunities for specialized roles for producers, 
processors, and traders of agricultural products, spreading benefits beyond farmers to the broader 
society. This evolution from subsistence to market-oriented commercial agriculture provided the 
foundation of a structural transformation: a dynamic process that ultimately leads to a relative decline 
of the agriculture sector and to a more diversified and productive economy dominated by 
manufacturing and services as observed throughout Europe, North America, and Japan, and more 
recently emerging in China and India.  
 
The most compelling evidence of agriculture-led poverty reduction and food security comes from Asia. 
During the past four decades, the region experienced unprecedented economic growth and structural 
transformation. Poverty declined from 50% in the 1970s to 18% in 2004, while hunger declined from 
30% to 16% over the same period. 
 
These successes are attributed largely to improved agricultural productivity as a consequence of 
technological change, market liberalization, and infrastructure investments – the Green Revolution. By 
combining modern agricultural science, sound policies, and political leadership, global average yields 
of Asia’s staples, rice and wheat, more than doubled. Hundreds of millions of small-scale farmers made 
                                                 
28 Adapted from Denning, G. (2007). Agriculture leads to the MDGs: Rural development in Africa.  UN Chronicle No. 4, 
available at: 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/cache/bypass/home/archive/issues2007/themdgsareweontrack/agriculturel
eadstothemdgsruraldevelopmentinafrica? 
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the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. These results of investment in smallholder 
agriculture provided a foundation for unprecedented economic growth in Asia. 
 
In contrast, agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa has not kept pace with population 
growth. The per capita growth rate of agricultural gross domestic product was negative during the 
1980s and 1990s, though improvements have been noted since 2000. Production growth of the major 
African (and Mozambican) food crops (maize and root crops), was based almost entirely on extending 
the cultivated area, with only minor contributions from yield growth. Poor infrastructure and related 
high transport costs (for both inputs and surplus production), inadequate institutional support (credit 
and extension), political instability, diverse agro-ecological complexities, low fertilizer use, and the 
limited availability of suitable high-yielding varieties have all contributed to low agricultural 
productivity growth in Africa. These circumstances were present in Mozambique, but exacerbated by 
civil war and social disruption. 
 
The good news is that chronic hunger in Africa, and specifically in Mozambique, can be ended within a 
few years with targeted investments based on our current knowledge. This was the unanimous 
conclusion of several recent expert reports, including those of the UN Millennium Project (2006), the 
Irish Hunger Task Force (2008), an independent advisory group to the Madrid Conference on Food 
Security (2009), and the UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis (2008–10). These reports, 
representing the analyses and conclusions of hundreds of scientists, practitioners, and policy experts 
from international organizations, governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector, 
concluded that small-scale farmers hold the key to ending hunger. The lessons from Asia and the 
adaptation of the Green Revolution to Africa, as recently illustrated in Malawi, can be applied 
successfully in Mozambique with full expectation of similar advances in food security and poverty 
reduction. Unlocking the potential of smallholder agriculture will, however, necessitate increased 
budgetary outlays to agriculture as well as complementary and targeted private investments. 
 
2.1 Scaling-up current and planned support to smallholder agriculture  
The Mozambican Government has been implementing a series of policies, strategies, and programs 
with the purpose of combating poverty, achieving food security, and promoting sustainable 
development. The framework is built on the guidelines contained in eight key documents: the 
Agricultural Policy and Implementation Strategy (PAEI); the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP 2010-
2014); the 5-Year Government Program 2010-2014; the Green Revolution Strategy; the Food 
Production Action Plan (PAPA); the Rural Development Strategy (EDR); the Food and Nutritional 
Security Strategy (ESAN), and the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA 2010-19).  
 
Public expenditure for agriculture in 2007 amounted to 4.6 percent of total expenditure. In spite of the 
plans to increase public spending to boost cereal production, the percentage of agriculture 
expenditure against the budget total remains small. If Mozambique were to comply with the declared 
African Union (AU) target of 10% of total budget expenditure toward agriculture, public expenditure in 
agriculture and fisheries would need to almost double.29  
 
                                                 
29
 World Bank (2011) Mozambique Analysis of Public Expenditure in Agriculture. Vol 1: Core Analysis. WB Report No. 59918-
MZ 
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2.2 Coordinated investments to unlock small-holder agriculture 
The World Bank Analysis of Public Expenditure in Agriculture also identified the need for improved 
“quality” of spending, particularly if public spending in agriculture is to be increased. Quality refers to 
the mix of public and private goods, but also to the relation between spending on agriculture and 
expenditure on complementary public services such as roads, storage facilities, markets, and rural 
finance. Thus, a more holistic value-chain approach is needed. This in turn requires a more coordinated 
approach to smallholder agricultural development that involves relevant government ministries 
(agriculture, health, education, infrastructure, commerce, environment, and trade), the private sector 
(international, national, and local), NGOs, and donors.  
 
Specifically, in order to raise smallholder productivity, complementary public and private investments 
are required in the following areas: 
1. Rural infrastructure: rural roads, electrification, and expanded ICT access 
2. Credit: new institutions and new credit products that benefit smallholders 
3. Research: introduction and adaptation of new technologies 
4. Extension advice and training: increasing modern ICT applications 
5. Access to inputs: targeted smart subsidy programs for seed and fertilizer30 
6. Access to improved weather and climate information 
7. Irrigation: expanded investment to improve yield and income stability31 
8. Appropriate mechanization of tillage, weeding, harvesting, and post-harvest processes to 
improve labor productivity 
9. Market information: access to current prices and market opportunities 
10. SMEs that serve smallholders (such as seed producers and agro-dealers) 
11. Storage facilities and innovative mechanisms aimed at reducing post-harvest losses 
12. Financial risk transfer mechanisms, including weather-based index insurance 
13. Nutrition improvements based on increased biodiversity and biofortification 
14. Business support for development of farmer associations, cooperatives, and out-grower 
schemes where appropriate 
15. Policy dialogue and changes to reduce the transaction costs of cross-border trade 
16. Complementary investments in health, education, safe water supply, and improved sanitation 
 
The following sections elaborate on several of these priority areas, focusing especially on the first five, 
and on the role of complementary investments in other sectors (number 16, above). A new Zambezi 
Valley Agri-Business Alliance (section 3.5) and pilot projects in integrated rural development (section 4) 
could help facilitate these public-private and multi-sectoral investments in the Zambezi Valley region. 
Chapter 2 describes how coordinated investments in electrification, rail, and ICT can further unlock the 
productive base, and Chapter 3 explores opportunities to increase the climate resilience of agricultural 
development.   
 
                                                 
30
 Adapting and learning from experience from Malawi, Tanzania, and others that have implemented subsidy programs over 
the past several years. 
31
 Despite recent progress, the area under irrigation in Mozambique is only 62,000 ha, which is only 2% of the estimated 
potential. On March 18, 2011, the World Bank announced an IDA credit of $70 million to support irrigation development in 
the three central provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia. 
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3. Improving smallholder productivity 
There is already strong interest from the Government, donors, and private investors to commercialize 
agriculture in Mozambique, especially along the Beira and Nacala corridors. But much of the focus 
appears to be on higher-value commercial commodities that show greatest potential for export. More 
attention needs to be given to the food security needs of smallholders who remain disconnected from 
the markets. Without investment in market access (including rural roads), rural finance, and improved 
technologies, the benefits of the progress agricultural growth may be limited to a relatively small 
number of producers with easier access to markets, infrastructure, and inputs. 
 
3.1 Improving access to markets through feeder roads 
The northern provinces of Mozambique are the most densely rural populated provinces, yet have the 
lowest share (33-35%)32 of the population within 2 km from any all-weather road. Preliminary 
estimates of the World Bank suggest that the existing road network could provide potential access 
(measured as those living within 2km of any road in the network) to around 41% of the nation’s rural 
population. However, because of the poor condition of the network, which is impassible in the rainy 
season, the percentage of the rural population that has reliable, all-year access is much smaller: 11% 
according to 2007 estimates.33 
 
Tertiary and vicinal roads are not asphalted and benefit from much less public and donor support than 
the main national road network. Trunk road infrastructure, as well as feeder roads, connecting villages 
to the main road network, have significant bearing on transport costs; the poor road network raises 
the costs of production and distribution, reduces the profit margin on produce sales, and limits 
production yields to levels below their potential, impeding the transition from subsistence to income-
producing agriculture.  For households facing transport costs of about $75 per ton, their non-farm 
earnings would increase by 50%34 if rural roads were constructed. Therefore, for poor remote 
households, investing in rural roads can have desirable income and equity effects.  
 
A high priority should be to identify the most fertile regions
35
 for phased financing and construction 
of feeder roads. For instance, such a strategy could prioritize feeder roads in the highly productive 
areas of Tsangano, Macanga, Chifunde, and Angonia districts (along Road 223) of Tete province, which 
remain largely underutilized, partly as a result of their inaccessibility to the main road network. 
Investing in rural roads in Tete province may be particularly important in light of the extractive 
industry investments; the increased demand from these investments has the potential to escalate food 
prices in the region. This pressure on prices can be alleviated by public and private investments in 
agricultural productivity in the region, including by expanding the feeder road network, thereby 
increasing access to markets to the rural high-producing areas. Moreover, the feeder roads, 
connecting to the regional trunk infrastructure, will also increase access to the planned rail 
investments, which would further unlock the agribusiness potential of the region and more extensive 
access to both inputs and markets (see Chapter 2). 
                                                 
32
 Uwe Deichmann, Use of GIS in Road Sector Analysis, DECRG, Transport Forum and Learning Week 2007, Transport 
Measurement Matters: Indicators of Performance and Impact, March 30, 2007. 
33 
2007 World Bank Proposal for Roads and Bridges Phase 2 
34 
Jacoby, Hanan G. & Minten, Bart, 2008.
"
On measuring the benefits of lower transport costs," Policy Research Working 
Paper Series 4484, The World Bank 
35
 The World Bank identified the following feeder roads along the Nacala Corridor: Angoche–Liupo–Monapo–Nacala; Lumbo–
Matibane–Nacala; Namialo–Nacaroa–Namapa–Pemba; Marrupa–Pemba; Mecula–Marrupa–Maua–Metarica; Nipepe–
Marrupa. (Project Appraisal Document for Spatial Development Planning Development Assistance) 
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In addition to increased budgetary outlays for rural infrastructure, which generates substantial returns 
in terms of productivity, income generation, and poverty alleviation, other development partners 
could usefully collaborate on expanding the infrastructure grid in highly fertile areas to increase access 
to markets. There are also examples of programs that hire local communities for basic construction 
work, which has the added benefit of skill-building and local employment. 36  
 
3.2 Improving access to rural finance 
In addition to expanding the road network and improving access to markets, scaled-up rural finance is 
similarly important in increasing input use for agricultural productivity improvement. Rural finance can 
also be deployed to promote diversification towards higher-value crops as well as to enhance product 
quality through post-harvest improvements.  
 
Microfinance has traditionally been concentrated in urban areas, and the products have not catered to 
the needs and realities of rural agricultural communities. However, several commercial microfinance 
institutions such as NovoBanco, SOCREMO and BOM, and Accumulative Savings and Credit Association 
(AKSM and ADEM, Amoder) are looking to increase their coverage in rural areas. It is likely that, at first, 
commercial products in rural areas will target “traders and farmers with sufficient guarantees and/or 
belonging to out-grower schemes,”37 rather than targeting smallholders. A survey undertaken by the 
Mozambique Microfinance Facility and the UNDP in 2006 cautioned that rural finance for smallholders 
was only realistic for the foreseeable future through the subsidization of operational costs, including 
by donors.38  
 
Strengthening and replicating initiatives such as Gabinete de Consultoria e Apoio à Pequena Indústria 
(GAPI) could have a major impact on increasing access to finance for rural farmers.  GAPI is a medium-
sized Mozambican non-bank financial institution that has been at the center of various successful 
initiatives of industrial development in rural areas.  GAPI mainly relies on lines of credits obtained from 
five lending agencies (KfW, USAID, Nordic Development Fund, The African Development Fund, and 
PODE,39 a World Bank project) and other donors (like the European Union, Danida, Ford Foundation, 
and others) who not only provide further finance for credit operations, but also fund GAPI’s related 
activities in business development services, training, and technical assistance for small farmers, 
retrenched workers, and others. 
 
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is promoting smallholder financing through loan 
guarantees to reduce lending risks of banks. AGRA and its partners have leveraged $160 million in 
affordable loans to commercial banks in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, and Mozambique. Through 
this initiative, low-interest loans are made available to associations of smallholder farmers, agro-
dealers, and SMEs that support smallholder agriculture. They support the entire value chain from farm 
production, to seed companies, to post-harvest operations and to trade in inputs and produce. 
                                                 
36 
For example, the International Labor Organization is working in Timor-Leste with the Ministry of Vocational Training and 
Employment on a project engaging the community to improve the country’s road network. 
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91149 
37
 Mozambique Microfinance Facility (MMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Microfinance in 
Mozambique: Achievements, Prospects & Challenges, June 2006 
38
 Ibid 
39
 World Bank Project for Entrepreneurial Development 
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Standard Bank (Africa’s largest bank) and Equity Bank (Kenya’s largest bank) have contributed $150 
million to this innovative financing initiative. An AGRA initiative partnering with the Central Bank of 
Nigeria will deploy $500 million to leverage $3 billion from commercial banks into Nigerian agriculture. 
In Mozambique, a fund of $2.5 million is being established by AGRA and the Millennium Challenge 
Account Mozambique. Once implemented and evaluated, this program has the potential to be scaled 
up throughout the Zambezi Valley drawing on the experience of Nigeria. 
 
When providing financing for smallholder rain-fed agriculture, the threat of crop failure can make 
opportunities less attractive for all parties.  A solution that has been evolving in recent years is the use 
of index-based weather insurance.  In these schemes, an insurance contract is structured based on a 
weather-related index (such as amount of rainfall).  By linking crop production with the weather index, 
farmers (or governments) receive a payout if the index suggests that crop production will fall 
significantly below an agreed upon amount.  The time lag between a weather/climate shock and 
payout in index insurance is far less than in traditional crop insurance schemes. Bundling index-based 
weather insurance with microfinance instruments offers the possibility for smoothing risk and 
increasing financial benefits. The private sector, donors, NGOs, and research institutes are already 
working with governments in Africa and Asia on index insurance solutions.  For example, the Earth 
Institute, the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group, Oxfam America, and Swiss Re have 
all supported projects in Eastern Africa (including Malawi and Ethiopia). 
 
3.3 Establishment of a Zambezi Valley Agricultural Development Center 
Spending on agricultural research (excluding research in fisheries) amounts to slightly below US$6 
million (MT140 million) per year, about 4.1 percent of recorded agriculture and fisheries public 
spending in Mozambique.40 Excluding large-scale irrigation projects and the local investment funds, 
agricultural research still amounts to only 6 percent of public spending in the sector. Research 
expenditure represents only 0.24 percent of agriculture’s contribution to GDP.   
 
The World Bank public expenditure report notes that the PAPA provisions for research are not likely to 
significantly change the spending on agriculture research.41 Although the PAPA makes provision for 
additional funds for agricultural research for each of the crops that it addresses, research expenditure 
is highly concentrated on two crops: rice and Irish potatoes. 
 
With growing interest of the Mozambican Government in a Green Revolution, and the increased 
interest of donors to support smallholder agriculture (e.g., the L’Aquila G8 Meeting and GAFSP42), 
there is an urgent need to establish a Center capable of undertaking smallholder-focused adaptive 
research (including climate risk management), seed multiplication, extension, and training throughout 
the Zambezi region. With headquarters in Tete province, the Center would operate in a decentralized 
agro-climatic or agro-ecosystem-based manner through existing government facilities in the region 
and would draw on the research undertaken at the zonal research centers in Sussungenda, Lichinga, 
and Nampula (see Map 1).  
                                                 
40
 World Bank, Mozambique Analysis of Public Expenditure in Agriculture. Vol 1: Core Analysis. WB Report No. 59918, 2011. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program. See http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/content/global-agriculture-and-food-
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Map 1. Main Agro-climatic Regions and 
Agricultural Research Stations, 2002 
 
The Center, to be led by the Mozambique 
Ministry of Agriculture, would seek a wide range 
of public and private-sector partnerships and 
sponsorships including with the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR), the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA), and private-sector firms. The 
location in Tete fills a gap in the national research 
center network43 and also provides a direct and 
visible focus for support by the extractive 
industries and related services that are located in 
Tete Province. In addition, with the support of 
additional partners in the region, this Center 
would be well positioned to meet the criteria for 
support from the Global Agriculture and Food 
Security Program (GAFSP). 
 
3.3 Increasing access to agricultural inputs 
Currently Mozambique’s fertilizer use is 4 kg/ha, less than the average on the continent of 10 kg/ha, 
and far below the 50 kg/ha objective set by African governments at the African Fertilizer Summit held 
in Abuja in 2006.44  Lower fertilizer use is a major constraint to development, keeping productivity and 
yields low, thereby limiting profit (and the means of purchasing additional inputs). 
 
Mozambique does not currently provide generalized subsidies on agricultural inputs, as some 
neighboring countries do. But the situation is anticipated to change in view of the targets of the PAPA, 
where the provision of subsidized inputs, particularly of seeds and fertilizer, is planned in order to 
accelerate the adoption of modern technologies.  
 
Indeed, there is considerable untapped potential for increased production through improvements in 
land and labor productivity. Cereal production per rural capita has remained essentially steady over 
the past 10 years, while use of improved technologies (chemical fertilizers, pesticides, animal or 
motorized traction, and irrigation) remained below regional averages. 
 
Mozambique is in an excellent position to adopt a voucher-based input subsidy program that draws 
lessons from the experience of its neighbors, particularly Malawi and Tanzania. In fact, the United 
Nations’ FAO recently awarded a grant to IFDC to assist the Government of Mozambique in the 
implementation of a fertilizer/seed voucher program pilot initially targeted 25,000 maize and rice 
farmers, and the program is expected to be scaled up.
45
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 Per discussions with IIAM, the national agricultural research agency. 
44
 “Mozambique: Memorandum Signed On Fertilizers and Soil Fertility”, www.AfricaFertilizer.org (15/02/11) 
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A Mozambique input subsidy program could invest in a range of crops, including legumes to promote 
diversification and income generation. The Mozambican program could also include a focus on post-
harvest improvements, including improved drying and storage of grain. At the outset, stronger 
participation of agro-dealers in the input supply chain should be encouraged in partnership with the 
AGRA/Standard Bank financing scheme outlined earlier. This program could build on the achievements 
of IFDC’s Mozambique Agro–Dealer Development project, promoting private-sector investment in 
agro-input technologies and improving farmers’ access to these technologies through competitive 
markets and stronger dealer networks.
46
  Given sufficient research and data, the input subsidy system 
could also be informed by climate information, especially at the seasonal time scale.  Using climate 
information, and possibly forecasts, in addition to market and soil considerations could help ensure 
the choice and spatial distribution of inputs is appropriate for expected future conditions.  
 
AGRA and the Earth Institute could support the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture to design and 
implement a national input subsidy program that would enhance smallholder productivity and 
diversification. The program would support partnership with the private sector, especially the seed 
and fertilizer sub-sectors. This program would also be usefully complemented by improved soil, land, 
and weather/climate information for agricultural planning and decision-making (see next section and 
Chapter 3). 
 
3.4 Improved soil and land information for agricultural planning and decision-making  
Because knowledge about the condition and trend of Mozambican soils is highly fragmented and 
dated, there is an urgent need for accurate, up-to-date, and spatially referenced soil information to 
support agriculture in Mozambique. This coincides with developments in technologies that allow for 
accurate collection and prediction of soil properties. 
 
The Globally Integrated Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS)47 is a large-scale, research-based project 
to develop a practical, timely, and cost-effective soil health surveillance service to map soil conditions, 
set a baseline for monitoring changes, and provide options for improved soil and land management in 
Africa. It is part of a wider, global effort to digitally map the world's soil resources. 
 
AfSIS is building on recent advances in digital soil mapping, infrared spectroscopy, remote sensing, 
statistics, and integrated soil fertility management to improve the way that soils are evaluated, 
mapped, and monitored, while significantly reducing the costs to do so. Innovative soil management 
methods, such as the combination of inorganic fertilizers with organic inputs that improve crop yields 
while enhancing the environment, are being tested and documented. The system is also facilitating the 
identification of areas at risk of soil degradation and corresponding preventive and rehabilitative soil 
management interventions based on an analysis of what works and what does not. 
 
Dissemination and training is making the project's outcomes accessible to farm communities, public 
and private extension services, national agricultural research and soil survey organizations, the 
fertilizer sector, project and local planners, national and regional policymakers, and scientists.  
AfSIS is led by CIAT-TSBF48 together with the Center for Tropical Agriculture and the Rural Environment 
(TropAg) and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at the Earth 
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 Ibid. 
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 For more information on AfSIS, see http://africasoils.net/  
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Institute of Columbia University, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), and ISRIC - World Soil 
Information. AfSIS has many partners in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and 
Mozambique. It also has a number of partners through the Global Soil Consortium in other regions 
around the world, including government research and academic institutions in East Asia, Europe, the 
Middle East, North America, Oceania, and South America. 
 
There are currently four sites in Mozambique where survey, sampling, and analysis have been 
completed in partnership with the Central Soil Laboratory in Maputo. Their locations were randomly 
located for continental mapping purposes and unfortunately not in agronomically important areas of 
Mozambique. However, with additional financial support, this work can be extended and intensified in 
the Beira and Nacala corridors and continue for the whole country. In the process, such a project could 
build national research and development capacity.  
 
AfSIS could produce a map of soil properties of Mozambique at the scale of 90m, with pixels of 0.8 
hectares. This high level of resolution can indicate nutrient response, particularly phosphorus, 
potassium, sulfur, and zinc, as well as those areas with high probability of dry spells during the rainy 
season, and crop suitability based on erodibility of soils and other factors. 
 
Based on estimates from existing work in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa, a digital map of 
Mozambique with these important functions could be produced within one year for approximately $1 
million. In the process, local capacity can be developed and the applications of the map can be 
undertaken entirely by national scientific staff at the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
The AfSIS project would provide valuable information in determining the potential market for different 
fertilizers in Mozambique and neighboring countries. This in turn would enable a more powerful 
feasibility assessment of potential investments for national fertilizer production and use.  The 
information collected and shared in the AfSIS project could also be combined with climate information, 
especially at longer time scales of 30 to 50 years, using the integrated platform to strengthen the 
knowledgebase for agriculture planning and related infrastructure design (see section 3). 
 
3.5 Agri-business development along the corridors 
Recognizing the vast agricultural potential of the Zambezi Valley, the Governments of Mozambique 
and Norway, along with several private investors and donors, have partnered to promote commercial 
agriculture along the Beira corridor through the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) initiative.49 
The main constraints to commercial agriculture in the region, as discussed above, are inadequate 
infrastructure (including roads, but also storage and processing facilities), lack of access to long-term 
financing, under-investments in agricultural research, and limited access to and use of improved inputs 
and technologies. The BAGC initiative aims to improve coordination of public and private investment 
along the agricultural value chain, specifically to leverage anchor investments in infrastructure, extend 
infrastructure to areas of high but untapped agricultural potential, and mobilize financing (including 
patient capital) for agricultural investment activities.  
 
Early initiatives of the BAGC have also highlighted the challenges of sustaining commercial agriculture, 
especially out-grower schemes. However, there have been some successes in scaling-up commercial 
agriculture. Recent private investments in maize processing facilities in Chimoio and Tete by Agriterra 
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have created a market for smallholders who are able to generate a surplus. The company provides 
maize meal to the regional market. With extensive milling and storage facilities, Agriterra is able to 
purchase from smallholders, with the World Food Program as a significant buyer of the maize meal. 
 
USAID is also supporting market-oriented agriculture aimed at reaching regional and international 
markets.50 Through a value-chain approach, USAID is building linkages and business partnerships 
between large US investors, other corporate investors, and local producers. Both staple foods and 
export crops are covered by program interventions that include: (1) development of infrastructure, (2) 
modern production, processing, and marketing, (3) partnerships with international research centers, 
(4) market intelligence, and (5) finance for farmers associations. The EMPRENDA Alliance brings 
together several US organizations, supported by USAID, that promote and catalyze agribusiness 
development, including ACDI-VOCA,51 CLUSA52, and TechnoServe. EMPRENDA operates in both the 
Beira and Nacala corridors.  
 
The early successes and also limitations of the BAGC and EMPRENDA initiatives underline the need to 
coordinate support for access to markets, finance, research, inputs, and technology. Moreover, greater 
attention could be paid to how such programs can be sustained and expanded. 
 
A specific high-priority initiative that could be undertaken immediately to support and scale up 
diversification along the Beira and Nacala corridors would be to establish a Zambezi Valley 
Agribusiness Alliance of Extractive, Agriculture, and Food Industries with the explicit objective of 
supporting the commercialization of smallholder agriculture in the Zambezi valley. There is an 
immediate opportunity to link smallholder farmers to markets through demand-driven linkages that 
meet local and regional food requirements. To this end, an alliance could be established that would 
involve a small number of committed private and public sector partners representing fertilizer, seed, 
processing, and food retail industries. In the first instance, a core group could include Vale, Mosaic, 
Agrium, Walmart, AGRA, CGIAR, and Columbia University, among others. The Alliance would aim to 
reinforce and augment the work of CEPAGRI and other groupings involved with the Beira and Nacala 
corridors. The distinguishing characteristic of the Alliance would be a sharp focus on smallholder 
agriculture and commitment to complementary social and infrastructure investments that are 
discussed in Section 4 of this chapter. 
 
4. Integrating agricultural investments with other sectors to reduce rural poverty 
Reducing rural poverty in the rural Zambezi Valley and achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) requires an integrated multi-sector approach.53 As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
rural communities are challenged with food insecurity, poor access to basic health and education 
services, inadequate access to clean drinking water and sanitation, limited electricity and 
telecommunications connectivity, poor transport access to markets, little or no access to affordable 
credit, and a lack of business enterprise opportunities. The Millennium Villages Project (MVP), 
described below, has demonstrated, over the past 5 years, the impact and cost-effectiveness of multi-
sector area development approach in a diversity of socio-economic and agro-ecological settings. The 
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 Information from the USAID Mozambique website (several documents): http://www.usaid.gov/mz/rural_income.htm  
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 Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance. 
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 Cooperative League of the USA. 
53
 Integrated rural development is one core component of an overall economic development strategy. The other core 
components include progress in urban areas, in the rollout of national-scale infrastructure (highways, ports, rail, power), and 
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design and implementation of integrated rural development projects (IRDPs) at strategic locations 
within the Nacala and Beira corridors could build on the lessons of the MVP, including successful 
implementation in Malawi and initial progress in Mozambique (5 locations). 
 
4.1 Integrated approaches to rural development: Millennium Villages54
 
Rural development requires community-based investments that empower local leadership in priority 
sectors including agriculture, health, education, water, transport infrastructure, energy services, 
business development, and the environment. It also requires effective community-level institutions 
that are capable of implementing and sustaining these investments.  
 
The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) is a partnership initiative designed to identify and scale-up 
solutions to the challenge of integrated rural development (IRD). The Project is divided into two five-
year phases, the first of which began in 2006, following initial pilots in Kenya and Ethiopia.55  The MVP 
is working with approximately half a million people living in communities across 14 sites (or “clusters”) 
in ten countries,56 with catchment areas reaching up to 70,000 people per site.  
 
The MVP highlights the value and feasibility of integrated community-based investments, rather than 
the one-by-one investment strategies too often deployed in rural areas. Because of budgetary 
limitations, governments, donors, and NGOs too often search for a single “highest-impact” or magic-
bullet initiative that will be most “cost effective”: girls’ education, safe water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS 
control, livestock support, and so forth. One, or maybe two, of these are commonly deployed in a 
village without the benefit of a more holistic strategy. The result, all too often, is the lack of 
sustainability of the individual investment, and the lack of an overall breakthrough out of extreme 
poverty. Such one- or two-dimensional strategies fail to reach threshold levels of community capital 
investment needed to break the poverty trap. 
 
There are two reasons for an integrated investment strategy. First, for multiple objectives (health, 
nutrition, poverty, disease control, safe water, etc.) we need multiple tools (such as community-based 
clinics, diversified local food production, commercial farming, malaria control, piped water, etc.). 
Second, these multiple tools are synergistic. While each is of merit in supporting a main target, each 
also contributes to progress on several or all of the goals. Access to safe drinking water, for example, 
supports health and educational outcomes. Moreover, after decades in which many analysts declared 
integrated rural development to be unmanageable (and perhaps unnecessary), the MVP and other 
projects are showing how IRD can indeed be accomplished using the stronger technologies, policies, 
information systems, macroeconomic environments, and institutional capacities now available, 
compared with the much weaker tools and context 30 years ago, when the last wave of integrated 
rural development was pursued.  
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 Adapted from “Harvests of Development in Rural Africa: The Millennium Villages after Three Years” The Earth Institute at 
Columbia University, Millennium Promise, and UNDP (2010): 
http://www.millenniumpromise.org/pdf/MVP_Midterm_Report.pdf  
55
 The very first Millennium Village was initiated as a pilot in Sauri, Kenya in late 2004, with main interventions beginning in 
2005. The second village in Koraro, Ethiopia was launched in 2005.  In mid-2006 these sites were both expanded to full 
“clusters” of more than 50,000 people, and the project was expanded to include clusters in eight other countries.  
56
 Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. Other countries (including 
Mozambique) have joined the project, but these are not yet fully integrated into the management structure of the first ten 
countries.  
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The MVP’s early results have already helped to highlight, at the national and international policy levels, 
several of the key—and until recently, neglected—investments needed for successful rural 
transformation. These include an African Green Revolution for higher agriculture productivity (mainly 
through improved inputs, diversification, agribusiness development, and agronomic practices); 
comprehensive malaria control (based on full coverage of all sleeping sites by long-lasting insecticide- 
treated bednets, improved case management, and deployment of community health workers); the 
expanded training and deployment of paid community health workers; the expansion of school meal 
programs using locally produced foods; and the creation of effective community-based institutions, 
such as a local MDG implementation team.  
 
Initially, total investments were estimated to cost $110 per villager per year, plus another $10 per 
villager per year for establishing, training, and paying local staff to lead the village-based systems. This 
costing was based on the MDG needs-assessment work of the UN Millennium Project and addressed 
core activities for agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, environment, and gender equality. 
Thus, the total cost per village was budgeted at $120 per person per year. Half of that is mobilized 
directly through the MV initiative, and the other half is to be mobilized through partners, including the 
community itself ($10), the national government ($30), and NGO partners ($20).  
 
The MVP aims to spur broad scaling-up of integrated rural investments for MDGs. This scale-up is only 
possible with increased public and private investment. The MVP is successful because: (1) it 
demonstrates the feasibility of integrated investments to achieve the MDGs in impoverished rural 
Africa; (2) it helps to create new models for community-based delivery, monitoring, and measurement; 
(3) it plays a constructive role in helping the global aid commitments come to pass by making the MVP 
lessons widely known within Africa and internationally; and (4) it helps to encourage increased global 
public financial flows towards more practical and effective development investments. The MVs 
emphasize practical mechanisms to foster: (1) local leadership and community participation; (2) long-
term institution building, including professional community-based management and staff; and (3) 
global multi-sector partnerships directly with the villages. 
 
4.2 Design and implementation of IRDPs in Mozambique 
The Government of Mozambique, the Earth Institute, Africare,57 Vale, and select other public and 
private organizations could partner to establish a network of IRDPs in the provinces of Tete, Niassa, 
Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, Manica, and Gaza. Each province would include 1-3 clusters of villages 
representing important socio-economic and agro-ecological zones.  
 
For example, in Tete, where the large rural population remains impoverished, education levels are low, 
levels of HIV/AIDS and malaria are high, and a small proportion of the population is benefiting from the 
energy and mining boom, it is proposed that village clusters would be strategically located in three 
zones (see Map 1, above): 
• Zone R6 Semi-arid (500-800 mm rainfall): low altitude zone (<200 m) with sorghum and millet 
the dominant crops; livestock rearing, especially cattle, is important. 
• Zone R7 Medium altitude (200-1,000 m) with higher rainfall than R6 allowing for maize 
production; sorghum, cassava, groundnuts and cowpeas also grown in this zone. 
                                                 
57
 Africare’s President, Dr. Darius Mans, and the Earth Institute’s Director, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, traveled to Mozambique January 
8-15, 2011, to discuss a possible partnership to support the Mozambican Government 's efforts to assist communities along 
the Nacala transportation corridor in the northern part of the country. During their trip, Mans and Sachs met with key 
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Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011                                                                                             40 
 
• Zone R10 high altitude (>1,000 m) with rainfall > 1,200 mm; maize, beans, and potatoes are 
common.  
 
In each of these zones, poverty and food insecurity are widespread. Yet, the knowledge to improve 
productivity and the broader market demand presents important opportunities for both public and 
private investment. Quick wins are likely through improvement in soil fertility and the use of higher- 
yielding varieties of food crops, especially in zones R7 and R10. This will open the possibilities for 
surpluses that could be marketed within Tete Province and even exported to Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Progress in Zone R6 will prove more challenging. However, the growing demand for beef may provide 
opportunities for investing in more efficient systems of husbandry, slaughtering, processing, and 
marketing. 
 
Existing Millennium Villages in Nampula and Gaza Provinces would be included in the network. Each 
cluster would comprise a minimum of 10,000 persons. The design of the IRDPs—priority interventions 
and implementation modalities—will be informed by a study of existing Millennium Villages and other 
rural development projects during June-August 2011, conducted by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and the Earth Institute at Columbia University. Subject to available funds, implementation 
should begin in at least two provinces by 2012, coinciding with the rainy season in this region. 
 
4.3 Support for a national IRDP policy support secretariat in Mozambique 
Experience from the MVP in several countries highlighted the need to better inform national policy 
makers and development partners. Too often the policy lessons and impact of the MVP were not 
known beyond those directly participating in the project. The creation of a Government-led national 
IRDP Secretariat would directly address this challenge by providing the following critical functions: 
• Facilitate inter-institutional support (government agencies, universities, development partners, 
private sector, NGOs, etc) for implementation of the IRDPs 
• Raise awareness within government, the development partners, and the general public about 
the IRDPs, including the organization of site visits and national and regional workshops 
• Synthesize IRDP experience to inform national policy 
• Coordinate monitoring and evaluation and impact assessment 
• Coordinate and implement training of IRDP staff 
• Mobilize funds for expansion to new locations and for scaling up 
  
5. Partnerships with universities to develop capacity in sustainable development 
practice 
A widely expressed concern in Mozambique is inadequate national capacity to plan and implement 
sustainable development programs, particularly where these require coordinated and integrated 
multi-sectoral approaches. Universities are an underutilized resource for sustainable development in 
Mozambique, as in several other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Many faculty members have 
excellent academic training and high commitment, but do not have the resources to undertake new 
field-oriented coursework that would support a new generation of development practitioners. With 
adequate support, select universities in Mozambique (e.g., Universidade Eduardo Mondlane and 
Universidade Lurio) could develop and implement new undergraduate and master’s level programs in 
sustainable development practice. An important part of this initiative would be extended internships 
of students to be located in IRDPs, including existing Millennium Villages in Mozambique and 
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neighboring countries. The Global Master’s in Development Practice Programs Network58 provides a 
suitable platform for mobilizing support. 
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 For details on the function of the Network and links to member institutions, see http://mdp.ei.columbia.edu/  
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6. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Unlocking the 
agriculture potential in 
the Beira and Nacala 
corridors 
 
Expanding rural roads network by prioritizing the most fertile regions, such as the highly untapped 
productive areas of Tete province where demand for food commodities is increasing rapidly 
 
Strengthening and scaling up rural finance institutions and initiatives, such as GAPI and the AGRA-MCA 
fund, drawing on successful recent financial leveraging experience from Nigeria and other countries, and 
possibly bundling with risk transfer instruments including index-based weather insurance 
 
Establishing the Zambezi Valley Agriculture Development Center (1) for smallholder-focused adaptive 
research (including climate risk management), seed multiplication, extension, and training throughout the 
region, 2) to be located in Tete and operate in a decentralized agro-ecosystem-based manner through 
existing government facilities)  
 
Adopting a voucher-based input subsidy program (1) focused on both productivity improvement and post-
harvest improvement, 2) with strong participation of agro-dealers, 3) drawing on experience of the region 
 
Assembling up-to-date, spatially referenced soil and climate information to support agriculture in the most 
agronomically suited regions of Beira and Nacala corridors by extending the work of AfSIS and linking with 
weather/climate monitoring efforts over a longer time scale 
 
Establishing the Agro-Business Alliance of Extractive, Agriculture, and Food Industries with the objective of 
supporting the commercialization of smallholder agriculture in the Zambezi Valley 
Min. of Public Works 
and Housing, Min. of 
Agriculture, MPD, 
MICOA 
Local Governors, 
National Road 
Authority (ANE), ,  
 
Central Soil 
Laboratory in 
Maputo, 
Extractives, 
Mosaic, Agrium, 
Walmart, AGRA, 
CGIAR 
National Institute 
of Meteorology 
(INAM) 
WB, 
AfDB,  
MCC/MCA, 
USAID, 
Embrapa, 
AGRA, 
CGIAR, 
BAGC, 
CEPAGRI, 
GAPI, 
IFDC, 
AfSIS, 
CIESIN, 
ICRAF, 
CIAT-TSBF, 
ISRIC, 
ILO,  
IRI,  
WMO, 
Columbia 
University 
Integrated Rural 
Development (IRDP) in 
the Beira and Nacala 
corridors 
 
Designing and implementing a network of IRDPs in the provinces of Tete, Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, 
Manica and Gaza provinces, to be informed by a study of existing MV and other rural development projects 
during June-August 2011, conducted by the MST and the Earth Institute at Columbia University.  
 
Establishing a National IRDP Policy Support Secretariat to facilitate inter-agency coordination, synthesize 
IRDP experience to inform national policy, and coordinate capacity building, monitoring and evaluation and 
resource mobilization for program expansion 
 
Supporting selected universities in Mozambique to develop and implement new undergraduate and 
master’s level programs in sustainable development practice 
Min. of Agriculture, 
Min. of Science and 
Technology (MST), 
MPD, Min. of Health, 
Min. of Education, Min 
of Labor, Min. of 
Public Works and 
Housing, Min. of 
Energy 
MST’s network of 
MV, 
University 
Eduardo 
Mondlane, 
University Lurio, 
Africare 
 
Earth 
Institute/ 
Columbia 
University, 
UNDP, 
USAID 
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Chapter Two: Leveraging the Mining Investments for Sustainable 
Development 
Introduction  
This chapter discusses the potential for leveraging extractive industry investments in the Zambezi Valley 
for regional economic development and diversification. Exploitation of Mozambique’s rich and diverse 
resource base, driven by strong global resources demand, can provide a unique opportunity to go 
beyond supplying raw materials to the world economy and create opportunities for resource-based 
development in Mozambique and the surrounding region. This opportunity will be realized if the natural 
resource sector is used as an anchor to establish the requisite economic infrastructure across the 
country and the region, creating the crucial resource sector linkages into the local and regional 
economies and embarking on an inclusive growth path. This “deepening” of the resource sector through 
upstream (resource supply/inputs sector), downstream (resource processing and beneficiation), and 
side-stream (human resource and infrastructure development) 59  linkages could form core 
industrialization dynamic for Mozambique and neighboring economies such as Malawi and Zambia. Over 
time, this deepening will diversify the economy: the increasing human resource development and skills 
formation will be conducive to a shift from a resource-dependent economy into resource-independent 
economic activities. The transformative impact of the natural resource sector on the development of the 
Zambezi Valley will be maximized if public and private partners pool their resources around concrete 
strategies and action items to leverage the major investments in the region.   
 
This chapter casts a light on those strategies and action items, leveraging the synergies with extractive 
industries; to that extent, it supports the implementation of the Spatial Development Initiative 
(described below).  
 
Leveraging the natural resource sector with the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) 
Natural resource concessionaires have traditionally adopted an enclave approach to infrastructure 
development, providing their own power and transportation services to ensure that the basic 
infrastructure needed for their operations are reliably available. This means that large investments in 
physical infrastructure (mainly power generation, rail, and ports) are often uncoordinated with national 
infrastructure development plans, missing the opportunity to take advantage of potential synergies and 
scale economies. Indeed, it remains the case that there is rarely, if ever, coordinated dialogue (among 
private investors, government, development partners, civil society, and other stakeholders) about how 
to maximize the synergies between the private sectors’ infrastructure and human capital needs and 
plans and those of the country.  If companies and governments consider the potential public use or 
expansion of the private sector’s planned investments at the design phase, and how the infrastructure 
can be expanded or built to meet local, national, and regional needs over time, then “the incremental 
capital cost could be minimal.”
60  
 
In part as a response to counter the enclave model, South Africa’s Spatial Development Initiative (SDI), 
subsequently supported by NEPAD,61  initiated the “spatial development program,” where spatial 
                                                 
59
 Jourdan Paul, The Utilization of Mineral Wealth for Development Purposes in South Africa, October 2010 
60
 McPhail in Richards, J.P. ed., Mining, Society and a Sustainable World (Springer, 2009)  
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development corridors are anchored around natural resource projects, and in particular, minerals 
characterized by high rent. The reason is that these high-rent minerals generate cash flows and cargo 
volumes large enough to finance the backbone infrastructure needed to create a development corridor 
involving lower rent activities with high development impact, such as agriculture. The SDI strategy is to 
coordinate the infrastructure development along these corridors (in power, roads, rail, ports, energy, 
and information and communication technology); to spread the reach of the corridor through 
supplemental “feeder” infrastructure (a process called “densification”) and by identifying upstream and 
downstream linkage opportunities with local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (a processed 
called “deepening”).  
 
The SDI unit of Mozambique’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MTC) is responsible for 
implementing the development corridor concept in Mozambique. In 2010, the WB launched a Spatial 
Development Planning Technical Assistance Project in Mozambique “to improve national social and 
economic development planning through the introduction, institutionalization, and mainstreaming of 
multi-sectoral spatial development planning methodologies and practice.”62  The MTC accordingly 
established the Coordination Commission for Studies and Projects (COCEP), an inter-ministerial 
commission to coordinate with the WB Spatial Development project. 
 
COCEP should coordinate all public and private investments along these corridors to ensure alignment 
between public investment priorities and private-sector plans, to increase the opportunities for limited 
resources (both fiscal and infrastructure) to be used effectively and to take advantage of cross-border 
synergies. Moreover, this coordinated approach can be incorporated into future agreements with new 
private-sector investors and other development partners in the region, further maximizing the use of 
public, private, and donor resources. The World Bank technical assistance project recognizes that “the 
need to step-up poverty reduction efforts in developing countries requires that the public and private 
sectors improve the design and coordination of their planning and investment work to maximize the 
economic and social benefits/outcomes of all investment programs and projects that are undertaken.”63 
This is discussed in more depth below. 
 
Coordination is also needed at the level of all the relevant stakeholders (government, private sector, 
donors, regional banks) to successfully implement the SDI. The first integrated corridor in Mozambique, 
the Maputo Development Corridor, benefited from the large Mozal and Sasol investments; however, the 
full extent of the anticipated benefits, which relied in part on densification and deepening, have 
remained limited, particularly on the Mozambican side. Various line ministries and agencies need to play 
a constructive role at the national and regional level to streamline planning efforts and to implement 
the needed public investments required to ensure densification and deepening of the corridor. 
 
Coordination along the Beira and Nacala corridors is both critical and timely, given the regulatory 
complexities of both corridors, the strategic importance of the transport routes for both mining and 
agricultural development, and the urgency of upgrading the infrastructure. DFID is currently in the 
process of designing a program, in partnership with the MTC and other stakeholders, to support 
development along these corridors. The emphasis of the program is likely to be on strengthening policy, 
planning and regulatory capacity; promoting infrastructure development; crowding-in investment along 
the corridors; and promoting stronger integration with neighboring countries. As the program develops, 
it could usefully engage a wider range of stakeholders to ensure a coordinated approach to 
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development.  This chapter supports implementation of the SDI along the Beira and Nacala corridors by 
identifying such opportunities and priorities for multi-stakeholder engagement.  
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1. Leveraging the natural resource sector for infrastructure development 
1.1 The Beira and Nacala corridors: a snapshot of their infrastructure 
 
Beira corridor 
Roads: Long unpaved sections
64
 despite the PRISE
65
 rehabilitation program 
The Beira Road Corridor serves: 1) Beira–Mutare–Harare–Chirundu–Lusaka Route, 2) the Beira–Tete–Blantyre Route (the 
“Tete Route”) and 3) the Beira–Nhamilabue–Nsanje–Blantyre Route (the “Sena Route”). 
The Tete and Sena routes suffer bottlenecks since most road traffic to and from Malawi uses these routes. The situation is 
eased now that Tete’s Zambezi River bridge has been rehabilitated and that another bridge is being built further downstream. 
 
Railways: Two rail lines of unequal quality and activity 
1) The 317km Machipanda line linking the Beira Port to the railway network in Zimbabwe 
at Mutare station;
 
and 2) the 670km Sena line including the link from Beira Port to the 
Moatize coal mines and the diverging branch from Dona Ana to the Malawi Border. The 
Sena line (excluding the branch from Dona Ana to Malawi ) has been under a 
rehabilitation plan with support from the World Bank and European Investment Bank for 
an upgrade up to 6 Mt per annum capacity by the end of 2011 (14% of Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale and Vale’s joint capacity) and 12 Mt per annum in 2014. The plan is now 
stalled for termination of the concession agreement. Concessionaire: The former CCFB 
concessionaire (joint venture between Companhia de Ferros de Mocambique (CFM) and 
the Indian RICON) was dismantled in March 2011 and as of this report, the concession 
arrangement has not been renewed.  
 
Port: Only small feeder vessels can enter the Port of Beira 
Nominal capacity: 5 to 6 Mt per annum; Throughput: traffic of 2.7 Mt per annum and 92,300 containers in 2009.66 
The Beira port is the hub of the corridor and serves as one of the world’s gateways to Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
and Zambia. Because of limited channel depth, currently only feeder services mainly from Durban are available at this 
port without any transshipment. Since May 2009, the Government of Mozambique, the European Investment Bank, and 
the Dutch and Danish Governments have invested in the development and dredging of the Beira port. Vale and Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale are rehabilitating the coal terminal (Quay 8)67 for US$34M. Concessionaire: Cornelder de Moçambique 
(joint venture between Dutch Cornelder Holding (67%) and CFM (33%)). The concession is for 25 years and started in 
1998 and does not include the oil and coal terminals.68 
 
Power: Extensive hydro and thermal potential, yet extremely low access to electricity 
The bulk of Mozambique’s generation capacity (the 2075MW Cahora Bassa Hydropower (CBH) station) and the bulk of 
the thermal and hydropower potential are in Tete province. Despite this potential, most of the households along the 
Beira corridor do not have access to electricity (access rates are 4.7% of the population in Tete, 10.2% in Sofala, and 
6.4% in Manica).69 The most significant project to realize this potential is the planned US$2.5bn Power Transmission 
System (CESUL).  
Nacala corridor 
                                                 
64
 Some segments of the N6 (during 40km after Dondo in the direction of Zimbabwe) and of the N7 (50km after Moatize up to the frontier)
64
 
remain in poor conditions despite their importance for the traffic as well as most feeder roads in Manica and Tete (Source: 
www.beiracorridor.com) 
65
 PRISE: 5-year master plan for roads, known as the integrated Road Sector Program a donor contributed sector-wide initiative for developing the 
national road network (See in the partner section). 
66
 http://ports.co.za/beira.php 
67
 http://www.coalservices.com/ICCCDownloads/L%20Hendrikz%20%20H%20Pinheiro%20J%20Jonker%20ICCCForum%202010.pdf 
68
 To our knowledge, the oil terminal is owned by CFM and the coal terminal concession arrangement is about to be finalized between CFM and the 
private investors of the terminal (Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale). 
69
 Cuvilas CA, et al. Energy situation in Mozambique: A review. Renew Sustain Energy Rev (2010), doi:10.1016/j.rser.2010.02.002 
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Roads: The trunk route to the port currently serves low traffic volumes 
Roads cover over 1,700 km and two one-stop border posts connecting the Nacala port with Malawi and Zambia through 
Nacala–Nampula–Cuamba–Mandimba/Chiponde–Mongochi–Liwonde–Dedza–Lilongwe–Mchinji/Chipata–Luangwa–
Lusaka. The route is not currently functional especially because of the poor condition of the Mozambican road sections 
from Nampula to inland countries. Malawi trunk roads are in much better conditions.70 Under the Nacala Road Corridor 
Project, AfDB and MCC are funding rehabilitation work. 
 
 
Railways: Low railway operation speed and capacity due to track deterioration 
The Nacala Rail Corridor encompasses the Nacala–Nkaya–Chipata and 
Blantyre–Nkaya lines. 
The potential throughput is 1 Mt per annum, but the average throughput is 
250,000 tpa, mostly because of the poor condition of the tracks; 70% of the 
current cargo going through the line belongs to Malawi, and the Malawi 
government subsidizes passenger rail service thrice weekly in both directions 
from Blantyre to Nayuchi.  Vale, as a majority owner of SCDN (see below) has 
a plan to invest US$2bn in upgrading 906 km of the corridor, including 
construction of a new railway link from Moatize to the border of Malawi, 
rehabilitation of the railway link in Malawi and the existing railway link from 
the Malawi border to Nacala. As a result, the expected capacity is 18 Mt per annum, and the work should be completed 
by 2014/2015 according to Vale’s current plans. 
 
Port: The traffic at the port is expected to increase rapidly beyond its current capacity 
The Nacala port is a natural deep-water port with a depth of 15 meters, not necessitating regular dredging, and with 
potential handling capacity beyond the expected future coal exports of 48 Mt per annum by 2017.71 The port is currently 
used mostly for international trade to and from Mozambique with a relatively low volume of transit cargo (950,000 tpa) 
due to the undeveloped road corridor and inefficient railway.72 The Government of Japan has funded a feasibility study 
for the rehabilitation of the Port and its integration with the Nacala railway (feasibility study and funding). 
 
Rail and ports concessionaire:  In September 2010, Vale became the majority shareholder (51%) of the private investors’ 
share of the Sociedad de Desenvolvimento de Corridor de Norte (SDCN), the consortium holding 51% of the 
Mozambican Nacala port and railway concessionaire (Corredor de Desenvolvimento do Norte (CDN)), and the Malawian 
railway concessionaire (Central East African Railways (CEAR)). 73 With CFM, holding 49% of CDN, SCDN has the seamless 
concession for both the Nacala port and Nacala railways up to the Zambian border.   
 
Power: Aging transmission line and very low access to electricity along the corridor 
Urban areas are connected to Mozambique’s national grid via aging 220 kV and 110 kV lines that are connected to CBH 
located in Tete province.  In Malawi, run-of-river hydropower projects on the Shire River generate 98.5% of the 
electricity utilized in the entire country and are highly vulnerable to climate change. Only 4.9% of the population in 
Niassa, 7.2% in Nampula, and 6.0% in Malawi are connected. The most critical project affecting energy supply in the 
region is the proposed Malawi-Mozambique Interconnector project. 
 
 
                                                 
70
 45% of the road network, as opposed to 18.5% for Mozambique (AICD Country Report) 
71
 www.portodenacala.co.mz/eng/index.php. 
72
 It takes about 25 days on average from the arrival at the port to arrival in Malawi, due to the inefficiency of transshipment from sea transport to 
railway. 
73
 CDN has been the 15-year concessionaire since 2005, and CEAR has been the 25-year concessionaire since 1999. 
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Internet and telecommunications spotty along both corridors: 
Since the liberalization of the ICT sector, three companies are now operating in Mozambique. Mobile services have far 
outgrown the fixed-line network, reaching more than 6 million subscribers in 2009,74 up from 12,000 in 1999. The global 
system for mobile communications (GSM) voice signal covers most of the stretch from Nampula to Nacala on the Nacala 
corridor and the main cities on the main roads of the Beira corridor. In Malawi, the private sector has single-handedly 
brought GSM to the entire nation, without any subsidy.75 GSM geographically covers 93% of the Malawian population 
(versus 55% in Mozambique)—one of the highest on the continent. However, only 5%76 (versus 26% in Mozambique) of 
the country subscribes to mobile services, which are still considered unaffordable in Malawi.  As opposed to 
Mozambique, Malawi is not connected to submarine cables. Prices for Internet and international calls could drop 
significantly if Malawi could extend the fiber-optic cables from Malawi to the coast along the Nacala corridor. This 
connection would also help Mozambique, since the only links to the 1280 gigabits Seacom and 4720 gigabits Eassy 
cables are in Maputo.77 
The Internet user rate is very low (0.15% for Malawi and 0.9% for Mozambique), and the international Internet 
bandwidth is very slow (0.19 Mbp/capita as opposed to 5.8 Mbp/capital in other low income countries).78 Service quality 
for telecoms and Internet is overall weak in Mozambique outside Maputo.
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 http://www.audiencescapes.org/country-profiles/mozambique-who-and-what-mobile-phone-market-mozambique-mcel-vodacom-SMS-tariff-
profile 
75
 About one third of the average across other low-income countries in Africa (Malawi country report, AICD, World Bank) 
76
 Malawi country report, AICD, World Bank 
77
 http://manypossibilities.net/african-undersea-cables/ 
78
 International Telecommunications Union, African Telecommunication Indicators, 2007 
   
1.2 Long-term planning of the corridor and coordination of players  
COCEP should play a coordinating role among the various stakeholders to realize the development 
potential along both the Beira and Nacala corridors. The cornerstone of such coordination should be a 
detailed, aspirational, ambitious, long-term infrastructure map for transportation, energy and 
information and communication technology (ICT), coordinating and guiding public and private 
infrastructure investments. 
 
In order to be a meaningful tool for long-term infrastructure development along the corridors, the map 
should be an aspirational 10-year plan, indicating all of the infrastructure necessary for national 
development by 2020 (including power, roads, rail, energy, ports, fiber-optic cables, and mobile 
telephone networks). This map would indicate how the various infrastructure networks (transport, ICT, 
energy), overseen by different ministries, interact to promote corridor development. To that extent, 
this map should be a common undertaking of the MTC, the Ministry of Public Works (responsible for 
road development) and the Ministry of Energy, under the supervision of COCEP. 
 
A clear understanding of the spatial distribution of current and potential economic activity
79 as well as 
of the geographic and demographic features along the corridor can strategically inform infrastructure 
priorities and guide the three ministries in their discussion with donors, regional banks, and the private 
sector. Such an exercise will rely on digital mapping and Geographical Information System (GIS) and 
could usefully draw on the experiences of other countries using these tools, such as Nigeria, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia.80 The Global Spatial Data Infrastructure Association (GSDI),81 which supports best practice and 
methodology sharing among its members, could support this undertaking. 
 
This policy instrument would help identify the potential for shared infrastructure platforms between 
natural resource concessionaires and other users; identifying shared infrastructure platforms can 
promote economies of scale, potentially reduce environmental disruption,82 and create the basis for 
engaging other partners, designing cost-sharing arrangements or informing policy. A 10-year ambitious 
plan might lead to the constitution of a special fund to facilitate more investment in rail, roads, ports, 
and other critical infrastructure to support the workforce and jobs in regional and mining communities, 
and along transport corridors.  
 
The map would also help anticipate the demand for various forms of infrastructure along the corridors, 
by assessing the potential economic activity and its related potential infrastructure demands. 
Anticipating necessary infrastructure upgrades before reaching capacity gridlocks83 can help to ensure 
that capacity constraints do not block potential growth. For instance, eight coal mines are expected to 
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 Carruthers, Robin, Ranga Rajan Krishnamani, and Siobhan Murray, “Improving Connectivity: Investing in Transport 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa”, AICD Background Paper 7, Africa Region, World Bank.  
80
 The Nigeria Government uses GIS to map Lagos and anticipate future infrastructure needs; the Second General Congress of 
the Geographic Information Society of Ethiopia (GISSE) was held on 22 March 2011 in Addis Ababa, attracting 300 policymakers, 
geoscientists, educators, researchers and various experts in GIS; and the University of Helsinki has opened a research station in 
the Taita Taveta county of Kenya and established an agreement of collaboration with the University of Nairobi to use 
geographic information systems for mapping, modeling, analyzing the landscape changes. GSDI Africa Newsletter, April 2011. 
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 The purpose of the GSDI organization is to promote international cooperation and collaboration in support of local, national, 
and international spatial data infrastructure developments that will allow nations to better address social, economic, and 
environmental issues of pressing importance. www.gsdi.org 
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 Compared to developing two parallel systems. 
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be operating by 2016 with a total output of 48 Mt per annum by 201784 and 100 Mt per annum by 
2025.85 But coal production is conditioned by coal export capacity, which means that adequate 
transportation solutions need to be devised to realize the forecast production. At present, the capacity 
envisioned for the Sena line and Nacala line is insufficient to meet these levels of production. The 
proposed solutions of barging the Zambezi River or using a slurry pipeline have been approached 
cautiously, given their environmental risks.  A new high-capacity dedicated coal line from Moatize to a 
new port at Savane is also in discussion but is not planned as a shared platform for the rest of the 
economy. Given the timeline for scaled-up production of the coal mines, evaluating the transportation 
options, including both their risks and potential spill-over benefits for the rest of the economy, is a 
priority. The Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of the report, 
could usefully help in this undertaking. 
 
Finally, the map would help identify the projects that, although critical for the development, are stalled 
or neglected for various reasons, including disagreements between stakeholders or lack of financing.  
 
The map should be accompanied by a comprehensive database of public, donor-funded, bank-funded, 
and privately-funded infrastructure development plans, including details of: 
- terms for third-party access for railways and terminals   
- multi-modal capacity and reliability for terminals and ports (transport cost, transport time, 
reduction of risks) 
- costed plans for the operations and maintenance of each project 
- project timelines (including delays), and 
- general transport sector statistics, backed by regular data surveys, conducted by the MTC and the 
Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD). 
 
In the medium to long term, strategic planning for the corridors would improve efficiency and reliability 
of exports and imports on rail transport to the ports of Nacala and Beira, increase access of rural 
communities to major trading centers and national transport networks, and unlock basic constraints to 
development including rural electrification, telecommunication access, and feeder roads (as discussed in 
Chapter 1). In turn, these fundamental improvements should be supported by further investments in 
other supporting infrastructure for agriculture and industries whose potential will be unlocked by 
efficient infrastructure networks.  
 
However, in the short term, to enable this strategic planning, clarification and adjustments to the 
regulatory framework of the Beira and Nacala rail corridors are much needed and demanded by all of 
the stakeholders with an interest in those corridors. This framework should reestablish trust among 
the actors and enable progress on stalled, delayed, or uncertain infrastructure projects along the 
corridors.  
 
The following sections elaborate on important aspects of the regulatory framework that would underpin 
strategic planning and project development along the corridors. 
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1.3 Beira corridor/Sena line: a new concessional arrangement and an opportunity for 
development 
1.3.1 The Sena line completion is stalled 
Along the Beira corridor, the Sena railway stopped operating for more than 20 years during the civil war, 
but the line regained attention with the mining potential arising in Tete and the project to connect the 
Beira port to southern Malawi. In 2002, CCFB, a joint venture between state-owned Companhia de 
Ferros de Mocambique (CFM) and RICON, an Indian consortium (49%/51%), was awarded the 25-year 
concession of the Beira corridor railways (both the Sena line and the Beira-Zimbabwe line). In that 
capacity, the concessionaire planned to rehabilitate and reconstruct the 575km Sena line, linking Beira 
port to the Moatize coalfields, with financial support from the World Bank and European Investment 
Bank. The Sena railway was scheduled to reopen in October 2010, after completion of the rail track 
adjustment to realign the tracks.86  The objective was to rehabilitate the line for US$260M87 to an initial 
handling capacity of 6 Mt per annum88 that Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale would share in 2011 when 
they would each begin production. Thereafter, CCFP would ramp up this capacity to 12Mt per annum by 
2014.89 
 
After multiple delays in construction attributed to the lack of investment by the Indian consortium, the 
concession agreement was cancelled in March 2011. Pressured by the production timeline of the mining 
companies in Moatize (Vale and Rio Tinto/ Riversdale), MTC and CFM are looking for a new concessional 
arrangement for the Beira corridor. The first trainloads of coal exports from Moatize are expected to 
travel down the Sena line to Beira in September 2011. If operational, the Sena line will be the only non-
road transport solution to accommodate the 2011 Moatize production as well as the next 3 years’ 
production. 90 
 
The success of this new concession agreement is fundamental to unlock the mineral potential of Tete, to 
reinstate trust between the Government and private investors, and to prove the political will to lift the 
major infrastructure roadblocks. In fact, in the Moatize mining framework agreement with Vale, the 
Government of Mozambique committed to use its best efforts to authorize the granting of and entering 
into of all agreements and concessions, in connection with any required project-related infrastructure 
for the mine project. Failure of the Government to fulfil its obligations in this respect is cause for 
termination and compensation of all costs incurred by Vale, including the bid payment.91 
 
The need for reassigning the concessional agreement on the Beira corridor presents the opportunity to 
establish a sound regulatory framework that avoids the pitfalls of the old enclave model of exclusive 
access railways and therefore enables the contribution of the corridors to the development of the 
country. This is discussed in the following section. 
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 Railroad Development Corporation: http://www.rrdc.com/ 
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 http://portal.eiu.com.libproxy-wb.imf.org/report_dl.asp?issue_id=103114595&mode=pdf 
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 6Mtpa represents 14% of coal production at full capacity of Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale together. The scope of the Sena 
line refurbishment plan was designed before the actual potential of Moatize coalfields was fully assessed. 
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 www.railwaysafrica.com/blog/2011/02/sena-line-further-upgrade 
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 A Nacala line capable of hauling 18 Mtpa of coal will take 3-4 more years to become operational according to Vale’s plans 
(Environmental Impact Assessment Presentation). 
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 Isabel Marques de Sa, N. P. (2006). “Strike while the coal is hot!” – a Public Private Partnership approach to the development 
of the Moatize Coal Deposit. International Finance Corporation REVIEW 2005/2006. Euromoney Yearbooks 
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1.3.2 Rail concessions and the risk of exclusive access 
Rail concessions in Mozambique, as throughout southern Africa,92 have been vertically integrated: they 
include both the infrastructure and the operations, and they include commitments for investment in 
upgrading, operations and maintenance to be financed by the concessionaire, even though the 
government remains the owner of the tracks. Importantly, rail concessions exhibit natural monopoly 
features: the production technology involves high fixed costs, which are usually sunk, and there are 
relatively low operating costs, as a result of which long-run average total cost and marginal cost decline 
as output expands.93 In this situation, competition will be wasteful if duplicative facilities are constructed 
and the lowest possible average cost cannot be achieved. In other words, it is most efficient for one firm 
to supply all of the market’s demand.94 Under such circumstances, however, a policy of awarding a 
monopoly concession in order to minimize costs may result in exclusive access or monopoly pricing for 
railway access, especially if the concession is awarded to a mining company. 
 
Mines use rail and ports as part of an integrated mine-rail-port production system in which reliability 
and flexibility are essential; third-party access to the rail line is seen by mining companies as presenting 
a risk of interference with the performance of the logistic chain of the mine95 and is therefore generally 
avoided by mining companies.  This has been recently recognized by the Chairman of CFM in an 
interview given to the independent daily, O Pais, about a new concessional arrangement. The Chairman 
“ruled out leasing the line to any of the companies mining coal in the Moatize basin, on the grounds that 
this might lead to a conflict of interests between the company given the lease and the other mining 
companies.”96 
 
1.3.3 A new concessional model: multi-user and promoting open access 
A possible solution, already discussed by the Mozambican Association for Mineral Coal Development 
(AMDCM)97 and the MTC, could be to establish a concession where the ownership of the line and the 
allocation of the responsibility for capital expenditure are granted to coal companies according to their 
tonnage allocation (See Figure 2). Under that model, also valid for a port concession, each coal company 
funds a capacity slot on the line according to two criteria: (1) its anticipated production and (2) an 
additional margin decided by the regulatory power to be allocated to other bulk users who cannot 
afford the weighty investments in the railway infrastructure, such as the agriculture and forestry sectors. 
The state-owned company, CFM, would hold a share98 in the multi-user model to ensure that open 
access to the line for other bulk users is enforced. CFM and companies would need to devise a solution 
as to who would provide the engines, rolling stock and crews for the low-rent, non-coal traffic 
(agriculture and forestry). One option would be for the multi-user concession to contract a conventional 
railroad operator for this purpose.  
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 www.northsouthcorridor.org/media/090330_full_final_report_-_formatted_2_english.pdf 
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 Higher costs will result if more than one producer supplies the market, as each producer will have to spread its fixed costs 
over smaller output volumes. 
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 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2010/2.html 
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 As seen recently in the case of Forstescue vs Rio Tinto and BHP in the Pilbara Basin, Australia: 
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/fortescue-opens-the-worlds-heaviest-haul-railway.html. 
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 http://newsmoz.blogspot.com/2011/02/sena-line-not-single-kilometre-in-good.html 
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 The AMDCM is the coal mining company association in Mozambique. 
98
 Per interview, this share could be about 30-35%, and as an owner, CFM would be paid user charges by the other shareholder 
companies; these charges would be set at a level low enough to account for their capital investments in the line. 
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Figure 2.  Multi-User Model for Rail and Ports 
  
 
 
This open access is of critical importance to guarantee that this corridor is also a catalyst for economic 
diversification along the corridor. In addition to coal cargo, general bulk cargo should be carried on 
the line without presenting a risk to the logistic chain of the mining companies. The case of state-
owned Transnet Freight Rail in South Africa, , operating under a common carrier regime, reveals that 
hosting general cargo on a heavy haul coal line is possible and economically rational, and the Richard 
Bay Terminal, where the rail terminates, is an example of a successful multi-shareholder ownership 
model (see box). 
 
Transnet Freight Rail: a common carrier regime,
99
 and Richard Bay Coal Terminal: a multi-user 
ownership model 
Transnet Freight Rail's core business lies in freight logistics solutions designed for industries such as 
mining and heavy and light manufacturing. On the Mpumalanga to Richards Bay line, minerals, grain, 
and fuel are transported. Starting at Mpumalanga’s 44 coal-rich mines, the 580km double rail line 
descends from the Highveld through rural KwaZulu-Natal and terminates at Richards Bay Coal 
Terminal.100 The private terminal is owned by Anglo Coal, Xstrata Coal, Eyesizwe, Ingwe, Kangra Coal, 
Sasol, and Total Coal South Africa, and is about to be expanded into the largest single coal export 
terminal in the world.101 
 
This multi-user model for the management of the concession relies on extraordinary coordination of all 
the stakeholders of the line, especially when the railways approach capacity. 
 
Coordination costs when the railways approach capacity 
The example of the British rail provider, Railtrack, suggests that problems of coordination increase 
rapidly as the railways approach capacity and when access users vary in their requirements due to: 
• an increased need for maintenance with a consequent risk for disruption of services,  
• an urgency to establish incentives for the provider to invest in added capacity, 
• difficulty in reaching a consensus about how the scarce remaining capacity should be allocated, 
or which investments are most needed.102 
   
The engineering, technological solutions, and public-private partnership that will be required to 
operationalize this concessional arrangement would implement a best practice model that too few 
                                                 
99
 Derailments on the Transnet lines in recent months have raised doubts about the capacity of the line to be optimal as an 
export coal line, but experts agree that these problems are due to mismanagement and poor anticipation of the operator.  
100
 www.railway-technology.com/projects/richardsbay-coaline 
101
 http://www.miningweekly.com/article/tender-process-under-way-for-part-in-worlds-largest-coal-terminal-2006-09-15 
102
 Ibid 
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countries in Africa have applied so far. To ensure its success, this arrangement needs to be 
accompanied by a revised best practice regulatory framework relying on 5 fundamental principles, laid 
out below. 
 
1.3.4 A best practice regulatory framework: 5 principles 
1)  Sufficiently long concession period 
Given the substantial investment costs that each concessionaire shareholder will incur, a suitable 
concession period has been internationally assessed to be typically between 25 and 30 years.103 In that 
context, for instance, if the agreement renewal is not implemented, the current 15-year CDN concession 
of the Nacala corridor is too short to ensure the amortization of the large necessary investments.   
 
2) Track user charges at non-discriminatory rates 
Requiring open access to the line needs to be paired with the stipulation that access “shall be given 
upon reasonable and commercial terms without any discrimination,” as is the case in Mozambique’s 
petroleum pipeline regulations.   
Regulators typically allow the train operator and rail provider to negotiate the tariffs, with the regulator 
ready to intervene in the event of an impasse. However, pre-established rules to set up tariffs are a 
better guarantee that non-discriminatory tariffs will be applied.  
 
International best practice suggests that non-discriminatory tariffs should be a fair return above 
operating and financial costs104 and scalable to reflect the likely different levels of traffic brought by 
multiple users to the line. A fair return on infrastructure starts at 12%, according to the Morgan Stanley 
Global Infrastructure Index.105  Therefore the law or concessional contract would establish that third- 
party access will be given at “Costs + 12%” for example. To make economic sense for bulk commodity 
farmers, this tariff should be below the truck tariff106 of US 5 cents/ ton-km. 
 
3) Monitoring committee with audit capacity 
Ensuring that the tariff applied by the concessionaire is non-discriminatory is critically important. It is a 
complex task that requires a great deal of information if it is to be done well. The regulated enterprises 
often have better information concerning their operations than do the regulators, and they may use the 
control of information strategically to try to influence the regulatory outcome.  For this reason, a 
monitoring committee with audit capacity is needed. 
 
The regulatory authority could usefully appoint a strong consortium of expert economists, geologists, 
engineers, computer simulation experts, rail modelers, train schedulers, quantity surveyors, 
metallurgists, bankers and environmental scientists to be in charge of independently auditing the 
concession’s yearly rate of return on equity and fixed assets, as well as its economic rate of return. The 
outcome of this audit would allow post-contract management and, importantly, assessments of what 
the non-discriminatory tariffs should be for other mines seeking access to the line, as well as for 
farmers and other users. This expert consortium could be convened under the auspices of the 
                                                 
103
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTINFRANDLAW/0,,contentMDK:21729743~menuP
K:5099971~pagePK:4710368~piPK:64860384~theSitePK:4817374,00.html#examples 
104
 For example, as stipulated in Brazil regulations (http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/documents/215.pdf) 
105
 http://beta.dcgulf.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Morgan-Stanley-Global-Infrastructure.pdf  
106
 Republic of Malawi Ministry of Transport and Public Infrastructure, Data Analysis on Intermodal Corridors for Malawi, Safege 
Consultants for the European Union and the World Bank, June 2010 
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University Eduardo Mundlane, for instance, with the support of the AfDB, and could include members 
from the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of this report. 
 
4) Definition of the regulatory regime in the legal framework 
In the absence of relevant legislation, concessions depend on contract language to govern concession 
obligations. 107  The open access regime should be set in legislation, defining the roles and 
responsibilities of the concessionaire and government as they relate to infrastructure maintenance, 
rehabilitation, and investment. Arbitration procedures should also be established in the legislation, to 
ensure enforcement mechanisms and enable the regulatory agency to intervene in case the parties fail 
to reach an amicable agreement.  
 
Establishing access in Australian legislation 
The Australian legislation sets out three methods for ensuring open access for users:108 
1) The infrastructure provider voluntarily suggesting access terms, that are then reviewed and approved 
by Australia’s main antitrust agency  
2) State governments proposing an access regime then approved by the National Competition Council 
(NCC) 
3) The access seeker petitioning the NCC to “declare” a facility open for access 
The NCC's main function is then to make recommendations to the relevant ministries on the regulation 
of third party access to services provided by monopoly infrastructure. 
 
5) A role distinction between regulator and operator precluding political interference 
The lack of a role distinction between regulator and operator presents a serious conflict of interest when 
the regulator cannot be objective about grievances of access given its status as an interested party to 
the conflict. An independent regulator is necessary to protect the concessionaire from government 
whims, to ensure fair and equal treatment of all the users and to ensure that the concessionaire’s 
financial objectives are aligned with the long-term economic objectives of the government’s plans. CFM 
is currently both the operator and regulator; Mozambique would gain in both transparency and 
efficiency if a regulator would be established as a separate authority from CFM. 
 
Furthermore, to confirm the neutrality of the regulator, a force majeure provision is generally included 
in the concession contract that affords protection to the concessionaire against political actions that 
may have a materially adverse effect on the project.  Private investors can resort to the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)’s political risk insurance109 or other forms of political risk 
insurance to ensure this protection. 
 
Resolving the regulatory framework of the Beira corridor by leveraging the partnership between 
companies and public authorities would send a strong signal to donors and investors interested in other 
infrastructure projects along the corridor such as the US$2.5bn planned Power Transmission System 
(CESUL). This strong signal would cast a light on the capacity of the government to plan, regulate, and 
coordinate the stakeholders who are key to the success of the corridors’ development.  
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 http://www.northsouthcorridor.org/media/090330_full_final_report_-_formatted_2_english.pdf 
108
 J-A. Gómez-Ibáñez  (2010), Coordination vs. Cooperation: The Simple Analytics of Open Access with Illustrations from 
Railroads, Harvard Kennedy School 
109
 www.miga.org/sectors/index_sv.cfm?stid=1534 
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1.3.5 Spillover benefits from the completion of the CESUL Energy Project 
The CESUL power project plans to connect the high 
power generation potential in Tete province with 
the load-prevalent southern provinces, while 
increasing power availability in the central regions.  
 
The backbone project is divided into two phases. 
The first phase (Phase 1) is the construction of a 
1,240km long DC 800kV line for the bulk of the 
North-South transfer, along with an AC 400kV line 
that will provide a series of urban centers along the 
route110 with reliable and low-cost electricity. The 
total proposed transfer capacity of both lines will 
be 3,100 MW. The second phase (Phase 2) will 
double the DC line, bringing the capacity to 
6000MW.111 (See Figure 3) 
 
Phase 1 of CESUL,112 anchored on the 2,075MW 
Cahora Bassa Hydropower (CBH) station and the US$2.9Bn113 1,500 MW Mphanda Nakuwa (HMNK) 
hydroelectric dam,114 will proceed as anticipated after the finalization of the feasibility study due in 
August 2011. Funding has been secured with the World Bank, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Agence 
Française de Dévelopment (AFD) to support the 51% EDM share in the project. The other 49% share will 
be granted to a private partner once the results of the feasibility study revealing the economic viability 
of the project are released. The negotiation with Eskom, the State-owned South African utility, which is 
expected to off-take part of the power generated, has also been finalized. The donors, the government, 
and EDM are confident that Phase 1 will be implemented.115  
 
However, the situation is not as certain for the realization of Phase 2 of CESUL, for which the anchors 
are the coal-fired power plants developed by Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale to use their discarded low-
quality thermal coal.116 Although the existing 220kV transmission line to the Matambo substation and on 
to Bindura (Zimbabawe) and Apollo (South Africa) is sufficient to transmit the power generated by the 
initial phase of the power plants (300MW for Vale and 250MW for Rio Tinto/Riversdale),117 the 
completion of both phases of CESUL is necessary to fully exploit the potential of the power plants that 
                                                 
110
 Dondo, Vilanculos, Chibuto, Maputo, Marracuene, according to SAPP documentation. 
111
 EDM Presentation, Mozambique Transmission Backbone, September 2010 
112
 Single DC 800kV line along with an AC 400kV line 
113
 SAPP Documentation, Mphanda Nkuwa  
114
 61 km downstream from CBH 
115
 Based on interviews with the World Bank, the National Directorate of Energy and EdM 
116
 The plan is for independent power producers (IPP) to own the power plants and for Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale to enter 
into a power purchase agreement with the IPP, which would use the companies’ discard coal as fuel. While Vale and Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale had no intention of entering the business of power generation, security of supply of electricity is crucial to the 
companies, and selling the surplus power not used by the mine to the local and South African markets is another potential 
profit opportunity.  
117
 The plan for Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale is to respectively produce 600 MW of power (2 x 300MW with net capacity equal 
to 540 MW) and 500MW (2x 250MW or 4x125MW) before ramping up to 2,400MW for Vale and 2,000MW for Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale. Half of the initial phase needs the completion of CESUL phase 1 to be transmitted. The ramped up production 
needs Phase 2. (Source: EdM, SAPP, Vale) 
Figure 3. Mozambique Transmission 
Backbone- CESUL- Source: EDM 
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can ramp up to 2,400 MW for Vale and 2,000 MW for Rio Tinto/Riversdale. Likewise, CESUL phase 2 will 
not be completed if its anchors, the power plants, are not developed and ramped up to a high capacity.  
 
Public private coordination and adequate coordination between CESUL and the development of the 
generation projects in Mozambique is critical to the success of this backbone project. Though 
completing Phase 1 of CESUL will be a substantial achievement for Mozambique, completing Phase 2 will 
still be necessary, as the current availability of electricity in the country is so low (14.3%118), which is a 
major constraint to sustainable development in the country. Phase 2 will support the Government’s goal 
to achieve a 20% electrification rate by 2020. 
 
While the success of integrated development along the Beira corridor relies on the coordination of 
public and private players within Mozambique, the success of the Nacala corridor, running from 
Mozambique to Zambia through Malawi, is also dependent on the successful creation and operation of 
critical cross-border partnerships.  The following section focuses on the additional complexity the cross 
border issues place on corridor planning, regulation and coordination. 
 
1.4 Overcoming the cross-border challenge of the Nacala corridor 
Historically, there has been a 
flow of goods and services by 
rail from the Mozambican ports 
to Blantyre and Lilongwe in 
Malawi and the eastern and 
northern provinces of Zambia. 
However, shortages of 
locomotives, unreliable 
operating procedures on the 
Mozambican portion due to 
floods 119  and frequent wash-
aways on the lines in Malawi 
have affected service delivery 
and created negative customer 
perception of the route.120 The 
situation forced a shift away 
from rail transportation to road, 
involving much longer distances 
and a reliance on the ports of 
South Africa and Tanzania. This 
has increased transportation 
costs in the region. About 55%121 
of production cost is driven by 
transport cost in Malawi compared to an average of 17% in less-developed countries.122 
                                                 
118
 EdM Presentation on CESUL 
119
 The 77km stretch between Entrelagos and Cuamba wrecked by 2001 floods has been particularly adversely affected. 
120
 World Bank – Trade and Transport- Facilitation Audit- 2004 
121
 www.ifrtd.org/en/regions/country_pages/Malawi.php 
122
 Once the required rehabilitation is undertaken, a train would only take 38 hours to travel between Nacala and Limbe at an 
average speed of 50 to 70 km/hour, compared to the present travel time of 5 to 7 days, at 15 to 20 km/hour. 
Map 2.  Expected traffic on corridors in 2020  
Source: Ministry of Transportation of Malawi 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
58 
 
A successful Nacala rail corridor would unlock the tremendous economic potential in the region. 
Provided that a proper regulatory and operational framework is put in place, the railway line can 
significantly lower the cost of transportation for several bulk commodities of the region for which the 
shortest route to the sea is the Nacala line. These include:  
 
- the expected 324,000 tpa sugar production of Luchenga and the unexploited Mulanje bauxite 
potential (580,000 tpa) 123 of Malawi  (See Map 2) 
- the high-value Chipata gem and stone mines already linked to the western branch of CEAR 
- the nascent but promising forestry industry developing in the Nampula, Niassa, and Zambezia 
provinces of Mozambique (220,000 ha in Nampula have been granted to Lurio Green resources, 
450,000 ha in Niassa have been granted to  New Forestry, Chikwete Forestry Norway’s Tree Farm 
and Floresta do Niassa and 140,000 ha have been granted to Tectona and Ntacua in Zambezia).124  
- the potential biofuel industry of the Mozambican northern provinces, which is likely to take off if 
transport along the Nacala corridor becomes available.125  
 
 
The current regulatory and operational framework of the Nacala corridor, however, is shrouded in 
confusion that currently blocks further development along the corridor. Resolving the regulatory and 
operational arrangements is therefore an urgent priority. 
 
1.4.1 Current regulatory and operational arrangements for the Nacala rail corridor 
In 2000, Mozambique and Malawi signed the 
Nacala Development Corridor Agreement, a 
bilateral agreement confirming their common 
understanding for a cross-border operational 
framework. In 2003, Zambia joined and signed a 
tripartite agreement with the two countries, 
therefore ensuring the three contiguous countries 
affected by the Nacala line are aligned in principle. 
 
In September 2010, Vale became the majority 
shareholder (51%) of the private investors’ share of 
the consortium, Sociedad de Desenvolvimento de 
Corridor de Norte (SDCN). The consortium holds 
51% of the Mozambican Nacala port and railway 
concessionaire (the Corredor de Desenvolvimento 
do Norte (CDN)), 126  and the Malawian railway 
                                                 
123
 Republic of Malawi Ministry of Transport and Public Infrastructure, Data Analysis on Intermodal Corridors for Malawi, Safege 
Consultants for the European Union and the World Bank, June 2010 
124
 Synopsis of Mozambique forestry sector issues and opportunities for SDI program support, Technoserve, March 2011 
125
 Energy Policy Journal, 2009, Marc Schut, Maja Slingerland, Anna Locke. Most of the projects are now in Sofala and Manica 
provinces, close to the Beira corridor. One of the exceptions is AVIAM ‘s 20.1M in Jatropha production but it is at the port city, 
Nacala-a-Velha. 
126
 CDN is a 25-year concession that was awarded in 2005 and is renewable for 15 years. 
Source: Vale EIAs  
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concessionaire (the Central East African Railways (CEAR))127. CFM holds 49% of CDN. SCDN has the 
official seamless concession for both the Nacala port and Nacala railways up to the Zambian border. In 
April 2011, Vale signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Malawi for use of Malawi’s rail 
system as part of the construction of a railway to transport coal mined in Moatize. This MOU echoes the 
one signed in November 2009. 
 
Though SCDN officially owns the continuous concession and despite the tripartite agreement on the 
operational framework for the corridor, there remain, in fact, disagreements about sovereignty, 
customs, and borders issues between Mozambique and Malawi, and consequently the concession is still 
divided between CDN and CEAR; crews, cars, and services change at the border between the countries. 
Thus, the functionality of the Nacala rail corridor remains limited.  
 
In addition, Vale and the minority shareholders are divided on issues such as access to finance, freight 
rates, the sharing of costs, and the allocation of profits. The disagreement, which appears to have 
stagnated developments even among the shareholders, has resulted in skepticism and rumors about the 
economic feasibility of Vale’s plans to rehabilitate the rail. Specifically, some economists and engineers 
analyzing Vale’s proposed US$2bn investment to rehabilitate the escarped and high gradient 906 km 
Moatize-Nacala line and build a new coal terminal in Nacala-a-Velha believe that the rehabilitation is not 
economically justified when the company could invest the same amount to drastically upgrade the much 
shorter 575km128 Sena line from Moatize to Beira and dredge the Beira port to the required capacity.129 
Those economists and engineers argue that Moatize’s coal deposit is therefore not the right anchor for 
the Nacala Corridor, as such a large investment will preclude low-cost access to the line for farmers 
unless the investment is shared by several investors or the farmers’ access to the line is subsidized.  
 
With or without Vale’s investment, the impact that the Nacala Corridor could have on the development 
of the region is clear to all stakeholders.  Backed by a bankable feasibility study, the Nacala rail corridor 
could attract other investors such as, IFC, the China and Indian EXIM banks, or other experienced train 
operators. 
 
Even with the viability and investors resolved, however, the cross-border regulatory and operational 
framework to ensure continuous rail traffic between Mozambique and Malawi must be resolved in 
advance of a functional investment along the route. Moreover, such a cross-border agreement could 
serve as a basis for the other critical cross-border infrastructure projects in the same corridor, such as 
the power interconnector, which is discussed below in section 1.4.3. With the support of the African 
Development Bank, the cross-border Nacala road corridor130 is about to become a reality. The road 
network should provide the momentum for completing the cross-border infrastructure of the corridor, 
including the rail and power networks. 
 
                                                 
127
 CEAR is a 15-year concession that was awarded in 1999 and is renewable for 5 years.  
128
 http://www.bulkmaterialsinternational.com/htm/w20100316.346481.htm 
129
 The main disadvantage of the Nacala route is the additional distance of 330km over the Beira route. This could translate into 
an additional US$120M per year for 18 Mtpa in variable transportation costs (US 0.02cents/ton-km) in addition to the upfront 
capital costs incurred to upgrade the railways.  
130
 www.afdb.org/.../Multinational%20-%20REV%20AR%20Nacala%20Road%20II.pdf 
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1.4.2 Implementing a seamless cross-border framework 
The tripartite agreement signed in 2000 by Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia laid the foundation to 
implement the cross-border operational framework and harmonize the legal and logistical aspects of the 
rail; however, further steps are still needed. 
 
1) Integrated border and corridor management is necessary to ensure “the process of 
modernization, simplification, further promotion of international harmonization of border crossing 
procedures, and increasing transparency of rules and regulations.”131  This could be naturally done under 
the auspices of the regional associations: COMESA,132 which works toward harmonization of border 
crossing and customs procedures, and SADC, which promotes structural cooperation with border 
agencies of neighboring countries.  
 
As expressed by the European Parliament and Council, another transnational entity dedicated to the 
integration of cross-border territories, about the EU context, “problems affecting the railway sector 
involve transnational aspects that require action to be taken at EU level. The lack of coordination in the 
relationships between Member States and other actors reduces the efficiency of international rail 
transport, risking a shift from rail traffic to road transport which would result in increased congestion 
and pollution. Clarification of the regulatory framework for rail market access in order to facilitate 
market entry and competition as well as to develop rail service markets, including those linked to rail 
transport provision, can be better achieved by the Union than by Member States individually.”133 
 
To achieve integrated border and corridor management, the Nacala road corridor project can usefully 
serve as a model. Mainly funded by the African Development Bank, the project is coordinated by a 
Steering Committee (SC), under the Chairmanship of the Director of Infrastructure and Services at the 
SADC Secretariat. The SC, meeting at least bi-annually, provides a forum where the responsible 
Ministries for transport infrastructure in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, the Road Agencies, the SADC 
Secretariat and the financiers can discuss and coordinate road project activities relating to the Nacala 
corridor,134 as well as resolve disputes.  
 
2) In addition to coordination and regular meetings at the public authority level, consultations 
with stakeholders are important to ensure transparency associated with costs and procedures in 
transport and trade.  Setting up a group of stakeholders similar to the Maputo Corridor Logistics 
Initiative (MCLI) could serve this purpose. MCLI is a group of infrastructure investors, service providers, 
and users from South Africa and Mozambique that cooperates closely with organized business, 
engages with relevant authorities, and represents the combined views of all users of the corridor and all 
parties involved in the provision of services in the corridor.135 
 
3) Moreover, in order to ensure proper enforcement of the tri-partite agreement, it could be 
necessary to establish the binding nature of the Tripartite Agreement's provisions, including the 
principle of freedom of transit of cargo and open access, both under international law and domestic law. 
This option was adopted by the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Oil Pipeline and was considered to 
encourage the enforcement of the law (see box).  
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 However, Mozambique would need to re-join COMESA. 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm. Emphasis added. 
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Azerbaijan- Georgia-Turkey Oil Pipeline 
The three countries signed a treaty that overturns domestic legislation by binding each government to 
make the Agreement “effective under its Constitution as the prevailing legal regime of such State in 
respect of the project under its domestic law and a binding obligation under international law.”(Article II) 
Further, each State agrees that if its actions interrupt or otherwise impede, or threaten to interrupt or 
impede the Project, including the flow of cargo, “such State shall use all lawful and reasonable 
endeavors, taking into account democratic, economic, and commercial principles, to eliminate the threat 
and rectify any interruption or impediment and promote restoration of all Project activities at the earliest 
opportunity.”(Article VII, 4)136 
 
4) Finally, the Governments of Mozambique and Malawi  (and later Zambia) need to jointly devise 
the logistics solutions enabling corridor development along the railways while ensuring the economic 
viability of the investment in the infrastructure. Those solutions would call for:    
 
- First, a clear analysis about which commodities should be transported by railways as opposed to 
roads. Generally, the non-time-sensitive bulk commodities such as sugar, cotton, or fertilizers are 
suitable for rail. The distance and the existing complementing infrastructure are also factors. Thus, 
the JICA study for the Nacala Port considers that the Mozambican products should be transported 
by trucks via highways, while containers from Malawi should be transported by railway. Moreover, 
the forestry potential of Niassa and Zambezia would benefit from access to the Nacala port by 
railway but it would necessitate the rehabilitation of the Lichinga-Cuamba 267km line and the 
construction of railroad between Gurue and Cuamba.137 
 
- Second, the formations of clusters that will generate enough traffic to justify multiple carload 
shipments from points on the line. Scattered carloads complicate the economics of the rail. 
Individual carloads bound for Nacala could be delivered to and consigned at locations where they 
could be assembled onto trains so that they only proceed to Nacala when they constitute a full train. 
The operational concerns are then reduced to two issues: 1) a unit train capacity issue, meaning that 
the Nacala concessionaire will have to reserve more capacity for this traffic, and 2) the construction 
of dry ports and parallel roads to the railways to ensure smooth intermodal capacity.  
 
- Third, an efficient signaling system at the crossing of roads and railways to avoid truck and train 
accidents as well as a scalable, cheaper wireless signaling system to ensure fluid traffic management 
along the full rail line. 
 
A renewed agreement on the Nacala corridor by Mozambique and Malawi, and later Zambia, would 
facilitate the critical cross-border arrangements and logistics. Planned infrastructure projects will also 
benefit. For instance, the Malawi export market could also tremendously benefit from connecting the 
existing Malawi rail system through Nsanje and Bangula to the extension spur of the Sena line, which 
would give Malawi a direct rail link to Beira, reducing the current transport costs of US$79/ton138 on the 
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 Abigail S. Reyes, Protecting the Freedom of transit of petroleum: transnational lawyers making up international law in the 
Caspian, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, 24.3, p.p. 842 
137
 Synopsis of Mozambique forestry sector issues and opportunities for SDI program support, Technoserve, March 2011 
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 Republic of Malawi Ministry of Transport and Public Infrastructure, Data Analysis on Intermodal Corridors for Malawi, Safege 
Consultants for the European Union and the World Bank, June 2010 
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parallel road network. For Mozambique, this North-South link will contribute to better regional 
integration and will act as a feeder route to the Nacala corridor. 
 
Reviving cross-border negotiations on logistics and operations could also benefit the stalled power 
interconnector project, which would run along the Nacala corridor, and would multiply the development 
benefits of the increased investments of the transport infrastructure. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
1.4.3 Reviving the regional power interconnector along the Nacala corridor 
 “Returns to cross-border transmission can be as high as 120 percent for the Southern African Power 
Pool.”139  
The regional interconnector would provide a critical link between the power generation in Tete Province 
and the economic potential of the northern provinces along the Nacala corridor, where the current 
demand is the lowest in the country (59MW140 in 2008) due to the limited power distribution. The 
interconnector would complement the North-South CESUL line with West-East transmission. The 
shortest and most logical route for the interconnector passes through Malawi, providing the 
additional benefit of connecting Malawi’s resources with the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) grid 
(Map 3).  The interconnector is thus mutually beneficial for both countries. 
 
 
For Mozambique, availability of electricity should be viewed from a regional perspective. Mozambique’s 
current maximum energy demands are about 1,300 MW annually141 (including Mozal), whereas South 
Africa consumes 40,000 MW,142 including 80% of the current capacity of CBH. There is thus an 
opportunity cost of increased local consumption in Mozambique given that the South African market is 
so captive, the cost recovery of EDM is negative,143 and more funds are needed for increasing power 
generation capacity and distribution. In this situation, regional power off-take, such as the 
interconnector with Malawi and the SAPP in general, provides the incentives to ensure that installed 
power generation is scaled up to its potential.  
 
In addition, the alternative to the trans-border interconnector is more costly for Mozambique. Since the 
lapse of the interconnector discussions, Mozambique has received a new line of credit to assess the 
feasibility of a transmission line that goes around southern Malawi, to be financed by Mozambique 
alone. This indirect route would be both more costly (due to the added distance) and would not include 
any cost-sharing from Malawi. 
 
For Malawi, the proposed new 220Kv transmission line would be able to transmit at least 200 MW144 in 
the long run to stabilize Malawi’s power supply, increasing its electricity capacity from 285 MW to 485 
MW,145 supporting economic growth and increasing revenue collection for the Electricity Corporation of 
                                                 
139
 Ibid 
140
 A Renewable Energy Plan for Mozambique, Mark Hankins, September 2009 
141
 With insufficient supply and long power outages common in the region, many firms use generators to supplement their 
electricity supply. 
142
 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports/12550249-en-Mozambique-Electricity-II.pdf 
143
 The current national average tariff is US 8 cents/MWh, whereas the long-term marginal cost tariff is US 9.1 cents/MWh. 
144
 In the short run, the Interconnector would supply a consistent 50MW of electricity. Prospects for Growth Poles in 
Mozambique August 2010, The World Bank, Finance & Private Sector Development, Africa Region. 
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Malawi (ESCOM), the state utility. Indeed, Malawi suffers from a serious power shortfall. 95% of 
Malawi's power supply presently comes from a series of hydroelectric power plants located on the Shire 
River for an installed hydro-generation capacity of 282.5MW,146 but this output can be tremendously 
limited by several factors. These hydro plants are run-of-the-river generating stations and are highly 
vulnerable to rainfall fluctuations and drought.147 Malawi is discussing the construction of new hydro-
electric power stations with donors, including Kapichira II, which could put the country in a position to 
export power to the rest of southern Africa. This option will not however solve Malawi’s vulnerability 
and need for power diversification to ensure power supply stability. 
 
In recognition of this situation, the World Bank has committed US$200M to a project that connects 
Malawi to Mozambique and thus to the SAPP, enabling power to be shared across the sub-region. 
However, the division of the financing of this project into two phases—the first of which brought the 
power to Malawi and the second of which would connect from Malawi to Nampula, Mozambique—
appears to have contributed to the failure of the project. Neither Malawi nor Mozambique stood to gain 
adequately from the completion of one phase by itself. The proposed project has also been raising 
concerns in Malawi’s Parliament; in the absence of a plan for the country to meet its financial 
contributions to Mozambique for the first phase of the interconnector, there is strong political 
skepticism, especially since the Government has a shortage of foreign exchange. The 2007 power 
interconnection agreement between ESCOM and its Mozambican counterpart, EDM, commits the 
Malawi government to paying a fixed charge of US$480,000148 per month for 20 years that would be 
cancelled out by payments from EDM to ESCOM when the second phase is built.  
 
Reviving the interconnector project 
Malawi’s interconnection to the regional electricity grid would be beneficial not only to Malawi and 
Mozambique, but to the whole Southern Africa Development Community. Transmission interconnectors 
relieve congestion on the SAPP grid; new transmission interconnectors evacuate power from generating 
stations to load centers. Moreover, “[p]ooling energy resources through regional power trade promises 
to reduce power costs. If pursued to their full economic potential, regional trade could reduce the annual 
costs of power system operation and development by US$2bn per year (about 5 percent of total power 
system costs).”149 There are several examples of successful cross-border interconnector projects (see 
box) that could usefully underscore the potential of the Mozambique-Malawi interconnector. 
Other successful and potentially successful regional interconnectors 
Caprivi Interconnector:150 In November 2010, the US$3.2bn, 300MW, high voltage Caprivi connection 
between Zambia and Namibia was officially inaugurated by the Presidents of Namibia, Zambia, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe. This will reinforce electricity transmission between Zambia, Namibia, and 
South Africa, linking northern and western parts of the SAPP.  The Caprivi Interconnector has been 
financed through long-term funding by the European Investment Bank, AFD, and Germany’s KfW, with 
each institution providing EUR 35M support, and an additional EUR 15M interest rate subsidy from the 
EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund. This subsidy reduces the overall cost of the loans from the three 
financing institutions for Namibia and is motivated by the significant regional benefits of the project, 
which should not be met by the Namibian tax payer alone, according to the fund. 
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 Heavy floods along the Shire can damage a plant as happened to the Nkula B station in 2003. 
148
 World Bank Interconnector, Facts and Figures and allafrica.com/stories/201103010030.html 
149
 V. Forester, C. Briceno-Garmendia,  Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation, 2010, World Bank and AFD 
150
 http://www.eib.org/projects/press/2010/2010-196-southern-africa-electricity-cooperation-boosted-through-european-
funded-950km-caprivi-interconnector-inaugurated-today.htm 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
64 
ZIZABONA Interconnector:151 Following the successful commissioning of the Caprivi Interconnector, 
utilities of the four countries, namely, Zimbabwe’s Electricity Supply Authority, Zambia’s Electricity 
Supply Corporation, Botswana’s Power Corporation and Namibia's Nampower have embarked on a 
US$300M regional transmission project. A special purpose vehicle will be created to house the regional 
transmission company and all four utilities would be able to register the joint venture company in their 
respective countries. Private investors would also be able to take up equity in the regional transmission 
network.  Norconsult, a Norwegian consultancy has been appointed to recommend a specific framework 
to be used by the four utilities. The AfDB, Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and the World Bank 
have indicated their willingness to bankroll the transmission project. 
 
Given the regional importance of the interconnector, it is in Malawi and Mozambique’s interest to 
revisit the proposed project, and to find terms that are mutually agreeable. It appears that funding 
remains available to support the project, including from the World Bank and from Norway. 
Some elements of a renewed negotiation could include: 
1) treating the financing of the interconnector as a single project: each phase of the project would be 
supported by a common enterprise (such as a joint venture between utilities), supported by 
development partners and the EU-Africa trust fund.  
2) getting the support of SADC heads of state, in order for SAPP to take on a coordinating role. For 
instance the SAPP coordination center has been appointed as project coordinator of the promising 
ZIZABONA and is a convener of the heads of states of the relevant countries. 
3) a well-packaged project, balanced from the viewpoint of both utilities, that can be used to attract 
equity and development banks, as with ZIZABONA. The African Development Bank152 and the African 
Union are the natural organizations to take the lead on the initiative. The Norwegian Embassy, 
endorsing the interconnector, could transfer the experience of the Norwegian consultancy advising 
on ZIZABONA.  
4) a clear explanation for the public about the mutual benefits of an interconnector to both 
Mozambique and Malawi. 
5) exploring complementary internal transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
 
The packaged project would have to resolve how to rehabilitate and expand cross-border transmission 
infrastructure, harmonize regulations and system operating agreements, and create a market that 
enables appropriate pricing of excess energy. The cost of such preparations can be up to 10% of the 
project according to the World Bank’s Infrastructure team, but is a critical step to enabling regional 
trade and sustainability of power generation development.153 
 
1.4.4 Call for connecting the Nacala corridor to the SEACOM and EASSy submarine cables 
Rail and power network intensification, which are key to an enabling business environment, should be 
complemented by the connection of the Nacala corridor to the SEACOM and EASSy submarine cables 
whose landing points are currently only in Maputo, imposing a constraint on business development 
along the corridor. 
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the Bank’s vast experience in implementing multinational projects on the continent. (Source: AfdB) 
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Through its landing point in Maputo, Mozambique is connected to two fiber optic cables: 
- SEACOM, the first broadband submarine cable system along the eastern and southern African 
coastlines, bringing high quality and affordable Internet. SEACOM connects Mozambique with South 
Africa, Tanzania and Kenya; it is privately funded, and it is assisting communication carriers in south 
and east Africa through the sale of wholesale international capacity to global networks via India and 
Europe.154 
- EASSy, a 10,000km submarine 4.72Tbps fibre-optic cable system deployed along the east and south 
coast of Africa to service the voice, data, video, and Internet needs of the region. It links South Africa 
with Sudan via landing points in Mozambique, Madagascar, the Comoros, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, 
and Djibouti. The system is owned and operated by a group of 16 African (92%) and international 
(8%) telecommunications operators and service providers.155  
Connecting the country to these two fiber optic cables enabling equal and open access to inexpensive 
bandwidth is integral to the country economic growth. The development of the Nacala corridor would 
be bolstered by another landing point in Nacala, as well as by the construction of terrestrial fiber 
backhauls to link Malawi and Zambia to the cable.156  Resources are needed to support this expansion. 
 
2. Leveraging the natural resource sector for economic diversification 
Inadequate investment in the long-term maintenance and expansion of crucial infrastructure in sub-
Saharan Africa has been a major obstacle for unlocking and expanding mineral-based linkages across the 
continent.  Focusing the efforts of the public and private players to solve the infrastructure issues 
described above is a prerequisite to enable the path to a diversified economy. 
 
The geographic location of Mozambique, the infrastructure potential as well as its mineral wealth puts 
Mozambique in a unique position to accelerate the path to economic diversification and growth. 
Contributing to the transformation of a natural resource-based economy to a diversified economy is in 
the mutual interest of mining investors and governments. The emergence and increased sophistication 
of local businesses widens the scope for local procurement, allowing a mining firm to reduce costs157 
and increase flexibility.  This is particularly true as local businesses move into higher-skilled activities and 
begin to compete with one another.   
 
To optimize mega-project investment, emphasis must be given to improving the capacity of the supply 
chain and of local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to source goods and services locally.158  
Prakash Ratilal, president of Moza Banco, commented that industries should “give priority to the micro-
economy, make use of natural resources and locally available capabilities, and promote national 
initiatives,” and that “small and medium projects must be pushed forward with the support of the state 
and the donors.”159 
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The Mozal linkage program has presented some successful indicators, such as that annual local 
purchasing from Mozal-affiliated SMEs increased from US$5M to $22M from 2002 to 2009, and 72 
companies were trained and received a supplier contract.160 However, without more sustained support, 
subsequent linkage development that could occur between the first level of suppliers supporting the 
mine directly and the suppliers supporting them has not been realized.  
 
Indeed, achieving economic diversification through upstream and downstream linkages requires an 
industrial policy focused on investing in human resources (see 2.1.1) and improving the investment 
climate (see 2.1.2). The policy should be based on a value-chain approach (see 2.1.3), and constantly 
engaging with the mega-projects on possible collaborative actions such as jointly setting up a National 
Linkage Center to monitor the developmental impact of the upstream linkage program (see 2.2) and a 
Competitiveness Commission to explore downstream opportunities (see 2.3). Ensuring the multiplier 
effect of the extractive industry on the rest of the economy necessitates a strong political will to build 
the sustainable entrepreneurial base to service local, regional, and export markets that the extractive 
industry can create if the public institutions and business-enabling environment are in place. 
 
2.1 Necessary industrial policies to unlock the inhibitors of value addition, diversification, and 
inclusive growth 
2.1.1 Targeting the human resource constraints 
The new mineral sector in Mozambique presents opportunities to improve vocational training through 
public-private partnerships. Historically, Mozambique has had low funding levels161 in vocational training, 
leading to the skill deficit the country faces today. Nearly 80% of the workforce has not completed 
upper primary school. In addition, the generally weak management capacity at vocational and training 
schools162 contributes to the inefficient use of resources and limits public training providers from 
responding to the needs of the local economic environment.  
 
The Technical Education and Vocational Training (TVET) system, which is responsible for shaping the 
skills profile in the labor market, has been slow to respond to changing labor market demands. Thus, 
despite the economic potential of the country, and in particular along the Nacala and Beira corridors, 
the national official163 unemployment rate remains high at 21%,164 and many of the 300,000165 young 
people entering the labor market annually enter the informal market.  
 
In 2006, in response to the inefficiency of the technical training structures, the government launched a 
reform to bring vocational training programs under a single planning framework, as opposed to distinct 
ministries’ plans. This reform, led by the National Public-Private Commission for TVET Reform (COREP), 
is committed to transforming its current curriculum-based TVET system into a system based on 
occupational standards to ensure that the private sector influences the definition of competencies and 
training content. 
                                                 
160 Jaspers Frans-Jozef, Shira Mehta Developing SME through Business Linkages- the Mozlink Experience- IFC, 2007 
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 The budget for vocational training in 2011 is one-third of the budget for vocational training in 2010. 
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Given current limitations and the underfunding of the public system, as well as the incorporation of the 
private sector in the reform, mining and energy investors have an opportunity to have a significant 
impact in the improvement of the TVET system, using their expertise to develop key skills for the regions. 
Vocational training in geology, mining, minerals processing, and extractive metallurgy could broaden the 
potential for upstream and downstream linkages from the extractive industries, develop the aptitude of 
the local labor force, and ensure further diversification and growth of the economy. 
 
A constructive long-term engagement with the extractive industries to ensure their contribution to TVET 
necessitates strong coordination between the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM), the Ministry of 
Education, and the Ministry of Labor. Under a coherent policy framework and strong public leadership, 
the support of the companies can extend beyond bringing short-term financial resources (such as for the 
rehabilitation of school infrastructure). Indeed, companies cannot replace local institutions. Therefore 
such a policy framework could seek: 
 
- clear and transparent guidelines for implementation of the reform at the local level; 
- a sustainable funding strategy for TVET, to address the decrease in the budget allocated to 
vocational training; this strategy could be inspired by, for instance, Malawi’s TVET fund, based on 
TVET levies imposed on public and private employers166;  
- an ambitious plan for the training of professors,167 funded by pooled public, private, and donor 
resources;  
- a strong and long-term involvement of the mining companies in the management council of the 
existing TVET colleges and in the design of their curricula;  
- a synergy and mobility between the existing initiatives and institutions related to the extractive 
sector and the related sectors, to broaden the scope of curricula and expertise available to students. 
For instance, collaboration could be fostered among: 
o The Instituto de Geología e Minas (IGM)168   
o The Institute Superior Politecnico of Tete developing courses in mining 
o The Master in Geology at The University of Eduardo Mundlane  
o The training program in geology and mining for civil servants that MIREM is designing 
o The Engineering Laboratory of Mozambique (LEM) 
- a knowledge-sharing forum to share best practices from programs throughout Mozambique, in 
order to incorporate and expand on the lessons learned from initiatives of the national reform effort 
as well as from corporate initiatives, such as the Ayr-Petro Nacala Project169 and Lurio Green 
Resources in Niassa, which plan to invest in the training of their local staff through an ancillary 
training school.  Chiquita Brands is investing US$55M in Nampula and developing a specialized agro-
training center in the Nacala corridor.170 
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 In Malawi, the TVET fund subsidizes the public TVET programs; as a result, there has been some success at integrating more 
students from poor districts in the recent years.  The income of the fund has more than tripled in the past five years; in 2008, 
550 companies had contributed to the levy. For Malawi, this levy has been a way to leverage the private sector to ensure 
sustainability of the TVET system. “The Education System in Malawi” World Bank Working Paper Nº182. 2010. 
167
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168
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Furthermore, the Nacala corridor presents an opportunity for cross-border harmonization and best 
practice sharing in terms of vocational training. An increased and harmonized level in vocational training 
between Mozambique and Malawi, along the Nacala corridor, could contribute to the integration of the 
sub-region job market where professional opportunities are different and complementary. For instance, 
while Tete and Nampula offer a large resource-based supply chain market, Blantyre offers a wide range 
of services that do not exist in Tete, such as business consultancy and training services, several programs 
focused on building SME capacity, well-established commercial banks and several export-oriented 
textile, chemical, plastic, and metal product firms. 
 
2.1.2 Enabling the business environment 
Mozambique has undertaken much-needed legislative and administrative reforms easing business, 
protecting investors, and adding flexibility to labor regulations.  Yet, Mozambique’s business 
environment remains restrictive with a global ranking of 126th out of 183 (in terms of ease of doing 
business) and a regional ranking within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of 11th 
out of 14th in the 2011 Doing Business Indicators.171 Insufficient capital, shortage of qualified personnel, 
delays in exporting/importing goods and high transport and power costs cause serious inefficiencies in 
the private sector.172 The investment climate is still a bottleneck for entrepreneurs and the particularly 
high cost of doing business in the formal sector has triggered a large informal sector.   
 
Most firms, especially SMEs, cite access to finance as the heaviest constraint to business growth in a 
2007 World Bank Survey.173The banking sector is only slowly extending the branch network beyond the 
capital to the northern and central regions.174 According to the AfDB, in the Mozambican traditional 
financial system, “the rates are only bearable for short-term, high margin trade operations—not for 
agriculture and industry.”175 The banks enjoy these wide margins,176 owing to limited access and high 
exposure to credit risk determined by a poor domestic lending environment. 
 
2.1.3 Shifting toward a value-chain approach 
The business community in Mozambique as well as the literature about private-sector development in 
the country177 often laments the absence of “a sense of the need to think in terms of value chain, 
training, etc.”178 Since the remarkable success of the government’s 2001 policy to support the entire 
value chain of cashew nut production, including strong substantial technical and business support for 
new processing factories and restrictions on exporting unprocessed nuts, there has not been a similar 
initiative in other SME value-chain development.  
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Currently, the growth of SMEs depends on distinct, fragmented programs, pursued by government, 
donors, NGOs, and international organizations; however, there is a substantial opportunity to build an 
SME-based resource linkage industrial cluster around the mega-projects in the Zambezi Valley. To 
maximize the opportunities presented by the mega projects, a clearer policy for SME development179 
could usefully be formulated alongside structural reforms for the business environment, to support 
value-chain and industrial clusters rather than individual projects; this would help to achieve more 
sustainable business growth and enhanced economies of scale.  
 
2.2 Collaborative approach through a National Linkage Center 
A clear, coherent policy for SME development could be assessed by a National Linkage Center led by 
Mozambique’s Institute for the Promotion of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (IPEME), the Institute 
for Export Promotion (IPEX), supporting export-oriented SMEs, and/or the Center for Investment 
Promotion (CPI). This consortium would be composed of research institutes and universities, which 
could assess the needs and potential for regional SME-development; government agencies, which could 
set national priorities for local content requirements, SME output and priority sectors; and the private 
sector, which could contribute a sensitive diagnostic of cost-effective local industrial procurement over 
time.180 The Center could build on the database created and maintained by CPI of 200 SMEs based in 
Tete. The Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of the report, could 
provide comparative analysis and technical expertise.  
 
The objectives of this consortium could address the following four aspects of SME development: 
identifying the right value chains (see 2.2.1), measuring the value-addition (see 2.2.2), setting up 
corporate procurement policies (see 2.2.3), and promoting public-private funded initiatives (see 2.2.4). 
 
2.2.1 Identifying the right value chains 
Extractive companies generally fulfill their “local content” requirements by investing in local markets 
and businesses that already exist; in which technological and capital equipment requirements are low 
and/or are labor intensive; and in which operational risks associated with the procured goods or services 
are low.  Typically, this means that companies often invest in services (e.g catering and security), 
maintenance (e.g. air conditioning and small vehicles maintenance), and distribution (food supplies and 
uniforms).  
 
Although they contribute to local employment, these local investments do not contribute to any 
diversification of the economy and constitution of value chain of linkages. These low-skilled services 
generally do not necessitate a chain of suppliers to support them, and thus do not have any multiplier 
effect on economic development.  
 
One potential area of upstream linkage development is in the field of light engineering.  With the 
proper training and policy support, there are various mining-related opportunities for value-chain 
development and manufacturing skills-building that can leverage the industry and build capacity in the 
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Mozambican workforce; opportunities include welding; the production of tools and light equipment like 
pipes, pots, and spare parts; waste management; housing and road construction; and explosives.  For 
instance, South African BME181 is building plants in sub-Saharan African countries for the manufacturing 
of emulsion explosives, used in floor blasting for coal exploration.182 
 
2.2.2 Measuring the value addition  
The consortium could develop clear local content milestones (5-, 10-, 15-year targets) for all mining 
concession contracts in order to maximize local value addition,183 a key contribution of the mega 
projects to local development. 
 
Due to policies such as those of Mozal and Vale, which require that for some contracts tendered, only 
firms established and registered in Mozambique are allowed to bid, South African headquartered 
companies have established subsidiaries in Mozambique to capture these contracts. As the Governor of 
the Central Bank of Mozambique noted, “some South African companies had set up establishments in 
Mozambique that simply exist to sell South African goods.”184 In the case of Mozal, on average, about 
two-thirds of expenditure spent on “Mozambican” companies has gone into imports of raw materials 
and intermediate goods, spare parts, equipment, energy, and fuel from South Africa.185 In these cases, 
local value addition was lower than anticipated. 
 
Looking at the total added value to the economy over the life of the project, and how companies’ 
procurement policies affect those goals, will help guide public and private policies to promote local 
value addition. A complementary solution may be to establish import duties on consumables inexistent 
in Mozambique, which can act as an industrial development instrument. Although exemptions for 
capital equipment may be justified, they can impede upstream linkages when they are applied to 
consumables.  
 
2.2.3 Setting up corporate procurement practices 
What appears to be a condition sine qua non of a successful corporate linkage policy is an adjustment 
to complex procurement policies
186 that can deter small local firms from bidding for work contracts; 
amended policies might include:  1) longer contract periods to enable emerging businesses to justify the 
acquisition of capital equipment, 2) simplification and translation of tender procedures and contracts 
into the local language, 3) unbundling contracts in smaller packages to increase the likelihood of local 
enterprises being able to bid successfully for the work and reserve some capacity for other contract 
providers, and 4) requiring subcontractors to engage local firms in their supply chain and thus 
transferring and promoting the responsibility of local content further down the supply chain.  
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Amending the procurement policies as well as planning the value-addition strategy, as discussed above, 
need to be envisioned before the construction phase starts, as the construction phase is the most labor-
intensive phase of the life of a mine. 
 
2.2.4 Promoting public-private-funded initiatives 
1) Enterprise Centers, Center for Knowledge Transfer and Business Incubators: a number of extractive 
industry firms187 have used enterprise centers or business incubator models to provide one-stop shops 
for SMEs to access contract opportunities, e-procurement systems, training courses, information and 
communications technology tools, and business development services. These centers can also serve as a 
business incubator for micro-entrepreneurs. Such a business incubator already exists in Mozambique, 
hosted by the University of Eduardo Mundlane (called MICTI188), and could be usefully expanded, 
especially in Tete, where the resource sector will provide a number of opportunities for SME contracts. 
 
The Ministry of Science and Technology invited the University of Eduardo Mundlane business incubator 
(MICTI) to share its experience and to provide assistance to two new government-sponsored incubators 
in Chockwe and Lichinga. An extension of the business incubator model in Tete could be supported by 
UNDP’s Local Economic Development Agencies Network, which promotes economic development at the 
local level, with private-sector support from the mega projects operating in the region. In fact, Mark 
Davies, Founder of Ghana’s BusyInternet incubation model, who developed a feasibility study for a 
business incubator in Maputo, assessed that an incubator would cost as much as $4.9M.189 Business 
incubators would therefore benefit from pooled financing from various private-sector companies and 
development partners engaged in Tete. 
 
2) Structured SME collaboration:  A long-term integrated government policy and collaboration among 
the private sector are critical for ensuring the sustainability of skill-building and supply-chain 
development; “building national capacity requires collaboration, even between competing companies, 
in marketing, research and development, and other areas.”190 For example, despite Mozal’s investments 
in SME development, the available contracts were too short-term for the firms to be willing to upgrade 
and modernize.191 Moreover, there were no other buyers other than Mozal to sustain the demand for 
the high-quality products. As a result, many of the upgraded capacities were lost after the end of 
individual contracts, and benefits to the local workforce were not sustained. Therefore, firms and the 
government should strategize about a mutually beneficial industrial strategy that coordinates skills-
training with demand over time.192 This structured collaboration could be facilitated by the business 
associations, CTA and ACIS, and might benefit from the experience of Malawi and South Africa’s SBP 
Business bridge program (see box). 
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Malawi and South Africa’s SBP
193 business bridge program provides a forum where members network 
with, learn from, and mentor their peers; share sector-specific information on administrative and 
logistical issues; and identify opportunities for members of sector-specific groups.194  
 
3) Joint-Financing Mechanisms: The above-mentioned consortium of government, investors, and 
academia could also partner with local financial institutions to promote access to finance for the 
SMEs.195 Mining companies would be especially encouraged to create a Supplier Finance Facility, 
whereby loans are made out of the bank’s own capital, and the bank takes responsibility for monitoring 
the performance of its clients (the suppliers contracted by the mines) and ensuring that they make 
timely repayments. The bank’s administrative costs, as well as the bank’s needs for guarantee, are met 
by the facility so that 1) the loans can be provided at an affordable interest rate (lower than the current 
excessively high rates), and 2) the contracts with the mines serve as a guarantee or collateral.196   
 
Another interesting and related solution is creating joint-ventures between mining companies and local 
SMEs such as done in South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago.197 
 
Anglo American’s Zimele program:  improving access to finance and business management 
In South Africa, this program holds minority stakes in local black-owned enterprises and influences their 
strategic direction via its board representation. In addition to equity investing, the program facilitates 
the provision of loan to meet companies’ additional financial needs. It has invested in roughly 150 
enterprises that have employed over 2200 people. The survival rate of these companies is 72%.198 
2.3 Exploring downstream linkages  
Mineral-based intermediate and finished products generally provide a more stable economic base than 
raw materials, as they are not as vulnerable to terms of trade decline and price volatility.199 Moreover, a 
SADC study showed that the value of the mineral/element contained in downstream products relative to 
the raw mineral is 400 times, on average: 8 times for coking coal into steel, 38 times for iron in 
fabricated tanks, 117 times for copper in cathode copper and 5000 times per carat in a polished 
diamond.200 Therefore, it is advisable to explore the potential of downstream linkages with the mining 
industry in Mozambique, focusing particularly on intermediate products (which are less capital intensive 
than finished products. 
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However, there are a number of challenges to downstream development for both host countries and 
companies. Indeed, “the challenge for bulk commodity beneficiation is the pricing of intermediate 
products (coke, steel) which challenges final fabrication (steel wire, gas bottles…) rather than the actual 
mined commodity prices.”201 Therefore, the production of intermediate products will only take place if 
they can be manufactured cost-effectively, hence the fundamental need to invest in skill-building and 
human capital. 
 
The importance of investing in human capital is increased by the fact that the coal mining companies in 
Tete are closely integrated with their clients, and switching to new processes can be costly for a 
company.202  For instance, Vale is an important shareholder of several of their clients (steel producers) in 
Brazil. In such closely integrated metallurgical value chains, intermediate products such as coke are 
made at the clients’ site, which leaves few opportunities for Mozambique to enter this value chain. 
 
Nevertheless, opportunities are presenting themselves for possible downstream development. 
Australia-based Baobab Resources Ltd. expects to confirm by mid-2011 that its exploration concession in 
Tete will present about 500 million tons in proven resources of magnetite iron ore.203 Baobab, which is 
7% owned by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), could contemplate processing or beneficiating 
the iron ore on site and even building a steel plant. Cheap hydroelectricity, coking coal, and proximity to 
two railway lines appear to be encouraging factors for beneficiation. Smelting the iron ore into steel 
could cost up to US$4bn according to Baobab, which is still awaiting the final conclusions of the 
feasibility study. The managing director of the company has said, "a lot of companies our size wouldn't 
look at smelting but because of the IFC and our long term view of Tete, we can as a viable possibility." 
 
2.3.1 Collaborative approach for a competitiveness commission 
The potential for Tete to become the host of an industrial cluster based on the steel value-chain merits 
the formation of a government-led commission to assess the competitiveness of the value-chain, the 
potential for beneficiation in Tete, and necessary public and private policies to support such 
downstream development, if feasible. This commission, hosted at MIREM, could emulate the South 
African Beneficiation Economics Directorate.204 It could:  
• leverage Baobab’s declared intention to embark on value added activities; 
• require and review feasibility studies from the companies mining coking coal and iron ore for 
downstream development, coking plants and ferroalloys, cement or aluminum smelter plants; 
• commission an independent expert to conduct a feasibility study to identify the potential for 
value-added activities by analyzing the synergy of costs and revenues from all of the mining 
projects in Tete province; and 
• convene all the mining companies of the steel value-chain from Tete to establish dialogue and 
engagement to align public and private expectations. 
 
This commission, with support from the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group (discussed in the 
conclusion of the report), could also conduct feasibility studies to put in place the right fiscal and 
investment policy to support downstream development. From a fiscal point of view, the government 
could assess the usefulness and desirability of tax incentives, such as high royalties on ore or lower 
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royalties on concentrates and metals, or tax disincentives, such as export taxes on coking coals similar to 
the one imposed in Zimbabwe on chrome ore,205 to encourage value-added processing in Mozambique.  
 
In order to adequately prepare for the potential of downstream development, the commission could 
inform broader multi-sector policies to lay the necessary foundation for eventual downstream 
development, such as prioritizing skills-building and infrastructure development. Indonesia’s recent 
experience promoting beneficiation reveals that a scheduled approach to building a downstream 
industry must focus first on investment in infrastructure and human capital (see box).  
 
Indonesia: the Beneficiation Law is not enough 
The 2009 Minerals and Coal Law stipulates that all mining companies are obliged to process and 
beneficiate their mining products in the country by no later than 2014. Despite this law, the Association 
of Indonesian Mining Professionals declared recently that few companies would comply with the law 
because the government was not seeking the best way to develop the capacity of upstream industries in 
supplying raw materials for downstream industries and was not accelerating the development of energy 
and transport infrastructure. In addition, a working group from the association is currently assisting the 
Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry in deliberating a new ministerial decree on detailed rules and 
strategies to develop mining downstream industries. 
 
This scheduled approach should be articulated in a long-term development strategy for the country, as 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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3. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Recommendation Main Features Led by   Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Aspirational 10- year map 
and comprehensive 
database 
Planning tool for Transport and Energy Sector (to identify potential for shared platforms with mega-
projects, to anticipate risks of congestion on corridors, to revive stalled projects, to invest in missing links) 
Backed by data survey and transport sector statistics  
 
Can motivate the creation of a fund to facilitate more investments in infrastructure and in operations and 
maintenance of it  
MTC, COCEP, 
MPD 
National Statistics 
Institute 
Current and Future 
Investors in 
infrastructure 
WB,  
AfDB,  
GSDI 
Completing two key trunk 
infrastructure of the Beira 
Corridor  by leveraging 
partnership 
Renewing the Sena line concession arrangement by implementing the multi-user model, maximizing 
public interest and economic viability  
 
Renewing the corridor regulatory framework respecting 5 principles (1) 25-30 year- concession period, 2) 
non-discriminatory tariffs, 3) monitoring and auditing commission of multi-disciplinary experts to audit 
concession returns and applied tariffs, 4) coding regime into PPP legislation 5) strong independent 
regulatory body precluding political interference) 
 
Leveraging the partnership of the Sena Line put forth by the multi user model to ensure the completion of 
CESUL, Phase 2 
MTC, 
SDI Unit, 
CFM 
 
AMDCM, Coal Mining 
Companies   
IPPs, 
ESKOM 
AfDB  
DFID, 
European 
Investment 
Bank, 
WB 
 
Completing two key trunk 
infrastructure of the 
Nacala Corridor  by cross-
border integration 
Devising operational and binding cross-border arrangement  (1) integrated border and corridor 
management under a steering committee of SADC or COMESA, 2) consultation with stakeholders under a 
Corridor Logistic Initiative such as MCLI, 3) establishment of the binding nature of the cross-border 
agreements into the national law, 4) cross-border logistic solutions to enable shared platform with the rest 
of economy)  
 
Leveraging the cross-border approach of the Nacala Line to revive the Interconnector  (joint financing for 
each phase, SAPP project coordinator, pooled resources in designing a well-package project)  
MTC, SDI Unit 
CFM, CEAR 
Ministry of Energy, 
EDM, Local 
governors, 
ESCOM, 
SADC, SAPP 
Vale, CDN and other 
Minority 
Stakeholders, IFC 
MIGA 
 
 
African 
Union, 
DFID,WB, 
AfDB, 
JICA, 
Norway 
Embassy, 
Chinese 
EXIM Bank 
Public-private partnership 
for the diversification of 
the economy 
 
Strong industrial policy to lift inhibitors of value addition (1) targeting human resource constraints, 2) 
enabling the business environment, 3) shifting toward a value chain approach)  
 
Collaborative approach to set up a National Linkage Center (1) to identify the right value chains, 2) to 
monitor value-addition of linkage program, 3) to advise on suitable corporate polices, 4) to suggest public-
private sponsored initiatives)  
 
Collaborative approach to set up a competitiveness commission (1) to assess potential for downstream, 
and 2) its related fiscal and investment policy) 
Min. of Education, 
Min. of Labor, Min. 
of Science and 
Technology, 
COREP, Min. of 
Commerce and 
Industry, SDI 
 
IGM, Instituto 
Superior Politecnico, 
LEM, Don Bosco,  
UEM, Local Banks, 
IPEM, IPEX, ACIS, 
CTA, Megaprojects 
Italian 
Coopera-
tion, 
Canadian 
Coopera-
tion, 
WB, 
UNDP 
Danida, GIZ, 
IFC 
 
   
Chapter Three: Managing the Environment and Climate Risks for 
Development in the Zambezi Valley 
Introduction 
The mining boom in Tete presents enormous opportunities for poverty reduction and the economic 
development of the country, as the other four chapters of the report detail. Importantly, sustainable 
development also necessitates the protection of other natural resources of great value to the society 
and the development of the country.  Thus, this chapter is dedicated to environmental protection, 
damage mitigation, and management of risks and opportunities from climate variability and change. 
 
Careful prevention, assessment, and mitigation of the environmental impacts of development are in the 
mutual interest of all public and private stakeholders in the region and require a partnership and 
coordinated actions.   The environmental impacts caused by mining, transportation, agriculture, and 
other economic activities are diverse and, without careful environmental management, may be 
irreversible.   
 
An environmental management system that allows for the exploitation of natural resources while 
minimizing negative environmental effects provides the best guarantee of sustainable growth.  Such a 
system would consider a phased cumulative environmental impact assessment encompassing all 
megaprojects and infrastructure projects in the region.    
 
In addition to strengthening the framework for environmental protection and sustainability, 
Mozambique and the Zambezi Valley could significantly benefit from improved management of 
climate-related risks and opportunities.  The risks for the region include disasters such as droughts, 
floods, and cyclones, as well as the impacts of climate variability (e.g., a drier than normal rainy 
season followed by much wetter seasons).  Integrating climate information and a risk-based 
approach into decision-making and planning across sectors and temporal scales could make 
development gains more climate-resilient.   
1. Assessing cumulative environmental impacts in the Zambezi Valley 
Mining poses a variety of direct and indirect risks to the environment.  These risks can be minimized and 
mitigated by strict compliance with environmental legislation, regulation, and best practices.  Yet even 
with strict adherence to the highest standards by all companies, damage could be done if the cumulative 
impacts of related or unrelated projects are not considered and likewise mitigated as the mining 
industry grows in Mozambique.  A cumulative environmental impact approach recognizes that no 
environmental impact occurs in a vacuum; rather, it is part of a wider network of causal relationships.   
 
Cumulative impact assessment requires broadening the scope of inquiry to take into account wider 
geographical and temporal considerations, interactions among impact sources and causal pathways.  For 
example, while any one mine site can monitor dust, smoke, and other sources of air pollution emitted 
during its operation and ensure that these are kept below legal limits, if several mines operating in a 
given region emit this same amount, local communities may be exposed to emissions far surpassing 
legal limits.   Likewise, the size of water concessions granted to mining operations drawing water from a 
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specific water source must take into account all of the entities that use that source, as well as the 
projected future water use of those entities.   
 
Managing site-specific impacts and cumulative impacts involve different levels of stakeholder 
involvement.  For example, managing for water quality on-site may involve setting discharge limits, 
meeting license conditions, and completing site-specific mitigation efforts.  On the other hand, 
managing for water quality on a cumulative scale may involve jointly funded research into waterway and 
catchment capacities, engaging local mines and regulators in a process to establish standards for 
regulating water discharges, and establishing a regional collaborative mechanism to oversee and 
monitor the adaptation of these standards.    
 
Using this collective approach, the first priority of stakeholders in the region could be the completion of 
a cumulative environmental impact assessment report encompassing all of the extractive 
megaprojects in Tete Province.  Since coal mining is the largest sector, this could possibly be a project 
led by the Mozambican Association for Mineral Coal Development (AMDCM) with the strong support of 
Vale, Rio Tinto/ Riversdale, a consortium of environmental NGOs, and the Ministry of Coordination of 
Environmental Affairs (MICOA).  This initiative would be a pilot for cumulative environmental impact 
management in the region and could possibly have positive spillover effects on the other mines of the 
region and country (in gold, copper, and iron-ore). In the medium term, all the impact assessments of 
the mining sector could be consolidated to prepare for the production phase that the Vale and Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale mines will soon be entering.  Such undertakings could be inspired by the industry 
group’s initiative in Alberta, Canada.  
 
Alberta, Canada: Industry support to government planning and impact preparedness 
In Alberta, Canada, the industry organization, the Oil Sands Developers Group, in addition to its 
traditional collective representation role, "commissions industry forecasting surveys to assist the 
government/industry planning of social and physical infrastructure development and to anticipate and 
respond to social, economic, and environmental impacts."  It began by working at the regional scale by 
forming committees to respond to priority issues (for example, regional environmental, and regulatory 
affairs).  The Group emerged out of a relatively informal group of companies who all had a vested 
interest in aggregating data. Now it is a requirement of membership to provide data during surveying.  
Data is publicly reported in an anonymous and aggregated form.
206
 
Impacts can accumulate not just at the mine site, but with the ancillary infrastructure that will be 
needed to support these industries, such as rail, roads, and power transmission.  The second step of a 
cumulative impact approach could then focus on the cumulative impacts of the other uses of land and 
water, including not just infrastructure but also agriculture, aquaculture, and other uses. Such an 
assessment would strengthen the planning of the multi-modal capacity of regional development 
corridors and help balance the needs in terms of land and water use for each sector and geographic area. 
 
The study should both monitor actual impacts as well as identify likely impacts.  The results of the study 
would be most useful if they are made publicly available and allow for citizen monitoring.  Many 
interviewed for this report thought that more environmental auditing would be a positive 
development—including companies who want their efforts known and recognized.  Citizen monitoring 
groups can expand the reach of the government monitoring efforts, which are still growing. 
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Sections 1 and 2 in this chapter identify major environmental concerns in the local (Tete) and regional 
(Zambezi Valley) environment, using the cumulative impact approach. They assess the direct impacts of 
mining operations, the impacts from the construction of transportation and utility infrastructure, and 
identify the broader concerns affecting the entire Lower Zambezi Region. Section 3 of the chapter 
discusses the challenges to development posed by climate variability and climate change in the region 
and the steps that can be taken to address these risks and take advantage of climate-related 
opportunities.   
 
1.1 Cumulative direct impacts of mining operations in Tete 
Environmental concerns are implicated at every stage of the mining process from site selection to 
reclamation. It is difficult to obtain a complete view of the environmental concerns emerging from 
mining practices in isolation from other issues, such as societal health and development.207  However, 
among the many concerns, certain major issues can be identified.    
 
1.1.1 Water pollution and water resource management  
“Understanding the risk posed by contaminants in water in our environment involves 
viewing the environment as a whole: the physical, chemical, biological, social, cultural, 
and economic conditions with which human beings interact... A ‘safe’ level in one of 
these exposures may combine to produce toxic effects if multiple exposures are involved. 
The risk is much greater if health is already compromised by malnutrition, poverty and 
poor sanitation.”208  -World Health Organization, 2001 
 
Water resource management emerged as one of the greatest concerns of stakeholders in Tete. Because 
it is a scarce resource, access to fresh water can be a constraint on development.209 Strategic water 
management is essential to environmental and economic sustainability in Tete Province. Poor water 
management can threaten industry reputation and therefore future access to land and water.  
 
Minimizing the water needed for operations 
Vale’s Moatize mine offers a good example of a comprehensive water plan that seeks to minimize the 
amount of water needed for operation.  The mine site obtains water from aquifers located on the Rio 
Tinto/Riversdale concession, which in turn draws water from the Revuboe tributary.  Hydrological 
studies commissioned by Vale show that the mine will have no impact on the Revuboe.  In the first year, 
the mine will take a significant amount of water; however once the water system’s pipes are full, 
approximately 90% of all water will be recycled.  The only additional water that will then be needed will 
be a small amount to compensate for evaporation. This is beneficial for the local ecosystems, because it 
minimizes the amount of water used for the mine, and optimal for Vale, because the company will pay 
fewer water rents.  Such practices are valuable and can be replicated in the region when geologically 
possible. 
 
 
Minimizing the water effluent from the mine 
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Mining operations generate a range of waste products, such as sulfuric acid and radioactive heavy 
metals, which may leach into local water sources. Unless carefully contained, the leached water can 
move into waterways, acidifying the water and killing fish, plants, and other aquatic life that is sensitive 
to shifts in water pH, and rendering water sources unsuitable for agriculture and consumption.210 This is 
of particular concern to inhabitants surrounding the Moatize mine, since most residents of the area 
depend on these aquifers for their daily water use and consumption.   The risk of leaching is exacerbated 
by flooding, and Tete is especially prone to flooding because of its low-lying topography.  A climate risk 
management approach (see Section 3 below) could help address some of the concerns associated with 
flooding, which may increase due to climate change.   
 
According to Vale’s environmental experts, overflow water effluent from the Moatize mine will be 
minimal, probably only occurring in the event of a flood, and this effluent will be directed towards a 
high-volume segment of the Revuboe where any contaminants that happen to remain in the treated 
water will be diluted.   This is similar in theory to the method developed by the Water Research Institute 
at West Virginia University and implemented in Monongahela River, whereby wastewater was pumped 
out only when the river flow was high, from December through June, in an attempt to keep the level of 
total dissolved solids in the water low.211  Given predictions for shifting rainfall patterns and changing 
flood frequency and intensity due to climate change, there is a need for further study and assessment of 
possible risks.   
 
Water resource management strategies should be part of cumulative impact management 
Water resource management strategies should be integrated into the cumulative impact assessment 
and management strategies, such as done in Queensland Australia (see box).  Optimal strategies for 
environmental conservation require interaction among individual initiatives, collective quantification, 
and coordination.  
 
Cumulative impact assessment in Queensland, Australia 
In Queensland, Australia BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance and Anglo American collaborated to conduct a 
voluntary impact assessment on the cumulative impacts of coal mining on a 100km stretch of the Isaac 
River.  The Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management was also a major 
stakeholder. The assessment sought to identify the impacts of mining on the river and provide 
recommendations for mine planning and operations that would ensure the best future outcomes for the 
health of the river system.  Part of the reasoning behind the assessment was that to understand such a 
large and complex river system, an assessment was needed that "exceeds the scale of individual mine 
leases."  This assessment goes beyond the companies' legal requirements.
212
   
 
There is a need for companies to monitor the pollution of the waters collectively and continuously, as 
well as to establish a coordinated emergency response plan in the event that aquifers become 
contaminated.  Since companies such as Vale have developed emergency plans for the construction 
phase and operation phase of the mine, these plans would be substantially more useful and effective if 
the standards triggering an emergency response were established collectively in the mining region. 
                                                 
210
Surface Mining of non-Coal Minerals: a Study of Mineral Mining From the Perspective of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977: A Report, National Research Council (U.S.) on Surface Mining and Reclamation, (1979) (hereinafter the 
'1979 Report') 
211
Project controls coal mine water pollution, WVU says, Associated Press, February 18, 2011, available at:  
http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201102181334. 
212
 D. Franks, D. Brereton, C. Moran, T. Sarker, T. Cohen, 2010, Cumulative Impacts, A good practice guide for the Australian 
Coal Industry, University of Queensland, SMI 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
80 
 
Such a coordinated plan could be done under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which are working on a project to 
rehabilitate and improve the network for monitoring water quality within the Zambezi basin, with data 
used to develop measures to control pollution.213 
 
1.1.2 Air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions 
Dust 
Large quantities of dust are raised through the open-pit mining process, which primarily utilizes heavy 
machinery. Dust, often containing coal and silica, can carry into surrounding areas and can lead to 
asthma problems, severe headaches, mouth blisters, constant runny noses, nausea, and even kidney 
and cardiac diseases.214 The level of dust generated by a coal mine is substantial but can be mitigated. 
For instance, Vale will be using water from the Moatize mine’s return water pond for dust suppression.  
 
A fact-finding survey conducted at a large Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) project in India revealed 
that the mine was generating 936 tons of dust per day. 215 Watering disturbed areas or using chemical 
stabilizers can help control the spread of fugitive dust.  Moreover, the mine created a detailed strategy 
of using trees to control pollution, especially dust.216  
Acquiring land surrounding the mining area to act as a buffer zone can have multiple benefits. Trees can 
be planted in this area. This will reduce the effects of pollution and dust and will help mitigate the visual 
impact of the mine.  
 
Hazardous gases 
The mining process often releases pockets of hazardous gases that may be a source of air pollution. In 
particular, carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane are hazardous gases that are also greenhouse gases that 
contribute to climate change.  Coal generates more carbon emissions than gas as a power-sector 
feedstock.217 Coal mining also produces methane, which can explode even after mining production ends 
if not properly drained from the mine.  In addition to this hazard, methane can be over 20 times more 
potent than carbon dioxide (CO2) in trapping heat in the atmosphere as a greenhouse gas (EPA, 2010
218). 
By contributing to climate change, these greenhouse gases are not only hazardous in the short-term but 
also play a role in very significant climate-related consequences over the coming decades (see Section 3 
of this chapter).  One promising solution is to capture methane and use it as an energy source.  
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The Moura mine in Central Queensland, Australia has a commercial coal mine methane business 
alongside its mining operations. This business has the potential to make GHG emission savings 
equivalent to 2.8 million tons of CO2 per year.  
 
The feasibility of this type of project at an open-pit mine such as Moatize is unclear.  A feasibility study could 
determine if collective or individual mines could collect methane on a commercial scale. 
 
Calculating and managing cumulative impacts are particularly important with air pollution: if more than 
one mine is operating in a given area, the compounded effects of emissions and dust must be taken into 
consideration.  This is especially true in Tete Province, where the abundance of coal and multiple 
projects in the region guarantee multiple sources of emissions.   
 
1.1.3 Soil degradation  
One of the major direct environmental and societal impacts of mining is land degradation. Since the 
operations leading to open-pit mining occur directly at the surface, the blasting from explosives and 
subsequent earth movement can render the surrounding areas uninhabitable and unfit for productive 
use.  Removal of overburden for the purposes of mining results in the loss of topsoil, creating infertile 
land.  Once the overburden is removed, the land will not be able to support most wildlife and very few 
plants.  Without reclamation it takes many years, and likely decades, for the land to return to its original 
state.   Vale utilizes a strip-mining technique, under which rehabilitation for mined land begins as soon 
as mining operations move on to the next strip of land.   
 
Cumulative effects of changes deep into the earth’s surface may not be known without cumulative 
impact assessments.  The water table, for example, may be affected by large numbers of new 
displacements of the earth, among other effects.  Given how critical water is generally but particularly 
for arid regions, close attention to soil degradation and the macro-effects of multiple mining projects on 
other activities, like agriculture, could be key to ensuring mining does not undermine other industries 
and the well-being of Tete citizens. 
 
1.1.4 Effect on biodiversity 
Mining operations can have substantial impacts on wildlife habitats, affecting the biodiversity in the 
region and the stability of local species. Particularly in the case of open-pit mining, full biodiversity 
restoration may not even be possible.219  Migration of flora and fauna may change as well as mines 
develop. 
 
Moatize mining project, inclusive of the planned use of the Beira and Nacala corridors for transportation, 
intersects with two of World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) priority areas for conservation,220 the Miombo 
Woodlands and Coastal East Africa. These also contain two of Conservation International’s biodiversity 
hotspots,221 the Eastern Afromontane and Coastal Forests of Eastern Africa.  The WWF is especially 
interested in gathering support for creating and managing protected areas throughout the country and 
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therefore would be an excellent partner in developing a plan for minimizing the mine’s impact on 
biodiversity as well as ensuring long-term preservation and restoration. The WWF has already 
established the Lake Niassa Reserve and is seeking to create a protected area to be made available for 
tourism investment.222  The WWF’s Miombo Ecoregion Conservation Program Works to combat poverty 
and preserve threatened species by creating the basis for a sustainable management of natural 
resources in the area.223  
 
Tracking the impacts of the mining operations on wildlife habitats can provide an ongoing picture of 
mining effects on biodiversity, both in official conservation areas and the general biodiversity of the 
Zambezi Valley region. Cooperation and collaboration among partners in the region is practically 
imperative for generating this complete picture of the effects on biodiversity and for developing a plan 
to mitigate impacts, given the roaming and sprawling abilities of both flora and fauna. Lessons for 
reducing biodiversity impacts of coal mining can also be learned from other coal mining projects. 
 
The Bowen Basin open-pit mines in Queensland, Australia, have been in operation in some capacity for 
over a century, and past reports on preserving regional biodiversity have been produced. 224  Reports 
suggest the use of ecosystem offsets—actions which provide compensatory mitigation for irreparable 
damage to diversity —as a way of maintaining the net biodiversity of the region, or nation.  
 
The Bowen Basin approach is also supported by the WWF.  Such offset frameworks should be explored 
as a second option after direct mitigation of damages through efforts such as restoration or 
rehabilitation of the land.  Rio Tinto is one of several mining company members of the Biodiversity and 
Business Offset Program (BBOP) Advisory Group, a partnership between companies, governments, and 
conservation experts to explore biodiversity offsets, and would presumably partner in promoting 
biodiversity conservation in the Zambezi Valley.  
1. 2.  Expanding cumulative mining impact assessment to other land and water uses 
1.2.1 Informing policy making related to land and water use 
Beyond assessing the cumulative impacts of mines, depicting an integrated picture of all the activities 
affecting the environment will complement the integrated planning that the SDI unit is putting in place 
(see Chapter 2 for more on the SDI unit). Understanding the cumulative impact of all the major activities 
should usefully inform policy options and mitigation strategies. 
 
Cumulative impact study of the Upper Hunter Valley region in Australia  
During the 1990's, the New South Wales government in Australia conducted a cumulative impact study 
of the Upper Hunter Valley region, focusing on coal mining and taking into account "strategic land use 
and development planning at both the local and regional levels."  All possible relationships between 
land uses and development were examined, and data was collected regarding air quality, water 
quality, etc.  Following this, a strategic assessment took place to determine the coal mining potential of 
the region, taking into account "coal resources, mine development potential, surface and 
groundwater, social and amenity issues, natural and cultural heritage, land and agriculture."
225 
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Such a cumulative assessment would build on the findings of the United Nations Poverty-Environment 
Initiative’s study identifying a number of recommendations on how agriculture, energy, health, mining, 
public works, tourism, and fisheries sectors can improve environmental mainstreaming.226 In that sense, 
the cumulative assessment strategy will look at the competitive uses of land and water and their 
combined environmental impact and inform polices seeking environmental net benefits. 
  
One of the most important sectors to add in terms of assessing cumulative impacts is that of 
infrastructure. All forms of infrastructure (e.g., transportation, including roads, rail, and ports; water and 
sanitation; the electrical grid and telecommunications) have environmental impacts, and understanding 
the cumulative impacts of resource extraction with the various means of anticipated transportation 
provides a more complete environmental assessment of impacts and can guide policy in terms of 
prioritization and design of infrastructure along the corridors.  
 
In the Zambezi Valley, there has been intensification of road development and of rail and port 
construction and rehabilitation, and serious consideration of expanding river transportation. 227 Each of 
the above has serious environmental implications: travel by road produces greenhouse-gas emissions, 
which contribute to climate change; rail development would cause fewer emissions, though the specific 
type and quantity would depend on the technology used; the Shire-Zambezi plan would require 
dredging and channelization, which can have substantial impacts on riverbanks, fisheries, downstream 
soil fertility, downstream flooding, changes in water temperature, and even the likelihood of 
downstream disease vectors, including parasites and water-born diseases (such as malaria, urinary 
schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, intestinal parasitic diseases, and intestinal schistosomiasis).   
 
On the other hand, improvements in transportation systems can significantly improve mobility and 
resilience in the case of severe weather events. Once trade-offs between the benefits of infrastructure 
and the impacts on the environment are recognized, efforts to mitigate specific harms could be 
undertaken.  Where environmental harms are irreversible or cannot be mitigated, conservation projects 
could be undertaken to offset the environmental harms. For example, where an ecosystem is negatively 
impacted by road construction, a conservation area nearby or in a similar ecosystem should be 
established. 
 
Likewise, dam construction, such as the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam, can damage terrestrial and aquatic 
ecosystems through upstream inundation as well as by altering the freshwater aquatic ecosystems. 
However, dams can also serve as multi-purpose reservoirs for seasonal water supply, which can be 
critical in a region like the Zambezi Valley; the current storage is 5% of the annual runoff (excluding the 
Cahora Bassa Dam, which is a single-purpose hydropower dam), whereas minimum suggested storage is 
40%.228 Dams should therefore be constructed as multipurpose dams, including considerations of 
hydraulic structures and local scale hydropower units, irrigation, flood prevention and water resources 
protection, and pollution prevention. In contrast, single-purpose dams have limited capacity to serve 
other economic and social needs, and their investments often have higher opportunity costs. For 
instance, during the floods of 2000, the Cahora Bassa Dam, which was constructed only for hydropower, 
could have played an important flood mitigation role, but its operational rules do not permit use of 
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storage capacity to mitigate water shocks.229 
 
Finally, even power and information and communication technology (ICT) transmission line installation 
can have environmental impacts such as increasing erosion, interfering with local drainage patterns, 
threats to fauna of electric shock, etc. However, once again, ICT and power are obviously critical to 
development and, in particular, can be instrumental to managing risks from climate variability and 
extremes. Therefore, where installation is deemed essential, mitigation efforts and other methods of 
offsetting environmental harm should be undertaken. 
 
Overall, policy related to infrastructure development—including the use of specific technologies, spatial 
design of infrastructure, and determining tradeoffs of various forms of infrastructure—would benefit 
tremendously from a cumulative impact assessment and the development of effective policy tools to 
both mitigate negative impacts and improve resilience and adaptability to environmental shocks. 
 
1.2.2 Supporting cumulative impact assessment with use of Geographic Information System  
The cumulative impact assessment would be facilitated by use of Geographic Information System (GIS), 
which enables production, management, dissemination and use of spatial data at regional and national 
levels.  GIS, although still not used extensively in Africa, can be useful to analyze impacts of economic 
activities on land and water use, land degradation, and livelihoods of local communities. GIS can serve as 
a multi-layered and dynamic natural resources information system230 that provides basic land and water 
management and planning information, thereby enabling decision-makers to manage industrial 
development and “land cover change.” The Kenyan Neo geospatial research station offers an example of 
the technology involved and its related usefulness (see box). 
 
Neo-geospatial research station of Taita Hills, Kenya 
231
 
The research station in the Taita Taveta county of Kenya, established as a joint venture between the 
University of Nairobi and the University of Helsinki is studying land-cover and land-use change, 
fragmentation of indigenous cloud forests, land degradation, land-use conflicts, and livelihoods of local 
communities in the Taita Hills and surrounding plains. The main research data and methods have been 
remote sensing with airborne and satellite imagery, and the use of geographic information systems for 
mapping, modeling, and analyzing the landscape changes. The geospatial data is stored in geographic 
databases for further use and collaboration. The Taita Taveta area is especially well-suited for research 
on the interaction between land-cover changes and regional climate change issues.  
 
1.2.3 Cumulative impacts needs also to be conducted at cross-border level  
“A key lifeline for eight states, the Zambezi must be managed effectively to mitigate the effects on water 
supply of increased population, industrial and mining development, and greater irrigated food 
production.”232 
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Activity at upstream dams in Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe has effects in Mozambique, as it is the last 
country to receive waters from the many major and minor rivers that discharge into the Indian Ocean.  
These countries often do not warn Mozambique when they will be opening their dams, and therefore 
Tete Province sometimes suffers from an unexpected deluge of water. This can be exacerbated by 
variability in weather patterns in the region. Communication with neighboring countries must be 
improved to prevent and control flooding and improve cross-border water management.  Similarly, if 
mining companies located in Tete, Mozambique, decide to construct a trans-border hydroway (the 
Shire-Zambezi waterway), the risks posed by the design, construction, and operation of the project will 
be borne by both Mozambique and Malawi.   
With the cumulative perspective, an integrated water resource management plan (IWRM) should be 
developed to help limit the damage suffered from upstream water use. The government of Mozambique 
has committed to developing an IWRM and has begun updating the political and legal frameworks.233  It 
would be useful for the IWRM to articulate specific policies for drought mitigation, flood management, 
irrigation development, and rural water supplies, similar to that done in the Fergana Valley.  These 
policies in the context of an IWRM plan could help in the management of risks and opportunities due to 
existing climate variability and climate change.  Benefits accrue not only to the agricultural sector, but 
also hydropower, urban centers and industries. 
 
Integrated water resource management in the Fergana Valley  
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, with assistance from the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, led the implementation of an IWRM plan in the Fergana Valley where 
Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan share territorial boundaries and water is scarce. The program 
provides 80,000 people with safe drinking water, decreasing the occurrence of waterborne diseases and 
virtually eradicating infant mortality.  It resulted in an “expansion of improved irrigation practices as well 
as innovative solutions for irrigation canal management and sustainable water-user associations, in 
addition to sustainable financing at canal, water-user association, and farm level.”234 
 
A fully developed IWRM could benefit from UN agencies involved in the water sector that are currently 
working to compile information on all current and planned projects in the Zambezi basin area for 
inclusion in a UN Environment Program (UNEP) data base.235 
 
There is currently an IWRM training program for Zambezi Basin countries taking place in South Africa 
and hosted by Romboll Natura, an international consulting company focused on sustainable 
development of natural resources.236  This could be an important resource for all of the regional 
governments, including Mozambique.  Other possible regional partners are International Rivers, 
Wetlands International, WaterNet, a southern-Africa based network of researchers dedicated to 
capacity building for water resource management in the region; and the African Centre for Water 
Research (ACWR), a legal, policy, and capacity building consultancy focused on water resource 
management in Africa.237  
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Trans-border initiatives require strategic assessment of land-use potential and environmental 
constraints under all nations’ environmental protection laws and policies.  Infrastructure, industrial 
development, and management of water resources can significantly affect environmental and economic 
stability all along the Zambezi Valley; thus increased cross-border communication would be beneficial 
for all governments and populations.  
 
2. Strengthening the environmental governance 
Mozambique’s environmental law framework is clear, comprehensive, and widely respected among 
stakeholders.  It meets international best practice standards and, in some respects, even surpasses them. 
Many Mozambican laws were made with reference to International Financial Corporation (IFC) and 
Brazilian standards.  The enthusiasm and willingness of the Government to improve the enforcement of 
environmental standards is commendable.  The Ministry of Cooperation and Environmental Affairs 
(MICOA) is clearly committed to environmental protection.  
 
However, implementation and stringent and transparent enforcement of the environmental law 
framework is often hindered by a lack of human, financial, and institutional resources.  All stakeholders 
recognize that increasing the enforceability and transparency of Mozambican environmental law and 
regulatory practices is a key step towards protecting the nation’s resources in both the long and short 
term.      
 
2.1 Investing in technical assistance for managing licenses, audits, and reports 
As industry and development increases in Mozambique, the number, size, and scope of projects 
requiring environmental licenses and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) will increase 
exponentially.  The need for increased technical assistance at the provincial level is especially urgent.  
MICOA requires a greater number of employees with the technical knowledge to properly assess 
environmental license applications, EIAs, environmental audits, and monitoring reports. Increasing the 
number of employees in MICOA, the National Directorate of Environmental Assessment, and in 
Provincial Directorate offices will help in this regard, but those employees must have the necessary 
technical knowledge to be effective.   Technical assistance could be transformative for the government 
entities charged with enforcing environmental law.  
 
The pooling of resources among stakeholders will be key to overcoming this challenge.  Collaboration 
between the government, private-sector partners, environmental NGOs, and the academic community 
will facilitate the increase of local technical and institutional expertise and guide the implementation of 
new policies aimed at the extractive industry. For instance: 
- Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale are large corporations with significant experience in 
environmental regulations and management in many jurisdictions. 
- Environmental NGOs in Mozambique, such as the World Wildlife Fund and Justiça Ambiental, fill 
important gaps in the environmental management system and are connected to a wide network 
of environmental experts, who may be useful either as contracted EIA specialists or training 
advisors. 
- The resources and expertise of the academic community of national universities (such as the 
University of Eduardo Mundlane) or of international universities (such as the Earth Institute at 
Columbia University) could also be mobilized to provide training and policy advice to 
government officials. 
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- The UNDP through its UNPEI initiative has also been highly involved in technical assistance in the 
region and could be an excellent resource for a large-scale training program. 
 
Both industry and civil society have been willing to use their resources to advise the government on the 
drafting of new laws; indeed, their comments on the draft “Megaprojects Law” were very useful in its 
development.  
 
In order to avoid charges of undue influence, however, stakeholders should understand that the 
partnerships forged between government and industry in the development of capacity must be carefully 
and transparently designed to ensure objectivity.   
 
2.2 Updating legislative and regulatory systems 
2.2.1 Environment standards 
While there is a relatively comprehensive environmental management system in place in Mozambique, 
rapidly developing industry, the progress of scientific knowledge, and changing climate and 
environmental conditions mean that these systems are stronger in theory than in practice.  The 
environmental standards of Mozambique are broadly formulated, are often not adapted to industrial 
processes and are suitable to multiple interpretations. The last ten years of implementation and 
observations of the applications of the law have revealed the weaknesses and loopholes in the law. 
 
All stakeholders will benefit from the continued effort to update and modernize the legislation and 
standards on an ongoing basis. In the meantime, as updating legislation can take time, in the event that 
a regulation does not provide specific standards governing industrial processes, operators should use 
the same high standards and best practices they adopt in other countries of operation.  There is some 
evidence that this is happening at the megaprojects in Tete Province.  For example, while Mozambican 
regulations monitor about 5 indicators in water quality, Vale monitors over 80 indicators, in keeping 
with its international practices.  In addition, although environmental auditing by the Mozambican 
government is rare, Vale carries out its own internal and external audits on a regular basis. 
  
MICOA could resort to these advanced audits to develop stringent national qualitative and quantitative 
pollution and emission standards that are increasingly critical with the growth in industrial development. 
 
2.2.2 Water concessions 
One area that stands out as a particular area in need of updating is the current system for water 
concessions.  The Government may want to consider limiting its concession to short-term concessions 
by law.  While long water concessions may allow a specific concessionaire to plan water resource 
management for the lifespan of a mine, it impedes the government from changing water resource 
allocations as other entities begin using the same resource or the water needs of local communities 
increase.  If megaprojects continue developing in Tete at the current rate, a water concession that 
seems reasonable today may not be environmentally sustainable in the near future.  In fact, the water 
availability per capita is expected to decrease by 20% by 2015 according to the USAID,238 and serious 
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water shortages already occur in Tete during the dry season in a number of sub-basins. An optimal 
revision to the regulations may be informed by a regular impact assessment of the accumulation of 
water concessions and its implications on sustainability, particularly considering land use changes, 
demographic trends and changing climate and hydrological conditions. 
 
2.2.3 Assurance bonds  
The assurance bonds (or “reclamation bonds”) that a corporation is required to post before construction 
begins on a project should be sufficient to fully cover the costs of reclamation once the mining activity 
has ceased. While low estimates of this cost might not have significant consequences for one mine, it 
becomes more problematic for a cluster of mine, such as the cluster developing in Tete. Here again, the 
cumulative assessment would be useful as a planning tool. Such assurance bonds could be assessed 
after the development of regional mine closure strategies such as those developed in South Africa. 
 
Since 2008, South Africa has developed Regional Mine Closure Strategies that are meant to address the 
impact that the closing of a mine had on local communities, industries, and infrastructure. The strategies 
are led by the Department of Minerals and Energy, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
Mintek, and the Council for Geoscience. 
 
2.2.4 Enforcement of the regulatory system 
Increased human and material resources in MICOA will also ensure the Ministry has the capacity to 
oversee the auditing process.  For now, with its limited resources, MICOA limits its environmental audits 
to situations where an environmental harm is obviously imminent or already occurring, and even the 
frequency of these audits is not sufficient. 
 
The enforcement of the environmental regulatory regime would be strengthened if: 
1) Mandatory environmental audits would be conducted prior to the renewal of environmental 
licenses, which would allow the government to keep track of the environmental impacts caused 
by mining operations. 
2) All extractive activities in the region would be assessed continuously to ensure the management 
of risks and potential hazards that might affect the environment.   
3) MICOA, through the National Directorate, would increase the scale of penalties, which are 
currently quite low, to deter violations of EIA procedure.  
4) Transparency was more enshrined in the system: 
a. To ensure the objectivity of the environmental assessment and environmental licensing 
processes, clear standards for the granting or denial of licenses should be formulated 
and made available to the public. Such a measure would avoid the potential for criticism 
that the government is too lenient toward the industry’s interests.  
b. The separation of the environmental regulatory and licensing agencies would be an 
important step in guaranteeing the objectivity of licensing procedures since getting a 
license is a pre-condition to getting the next license. 
c. Expanding the EITI initiative to incorporate transparency in environmental information 
and company reports.  
5) More systematic public participation in the environmental licensing and auditing process 
through public hearings, comment periods, and other such forums. Currently, the public’s 
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participation in the EIA process, mandated by law, can be satisfied by presenting the EIA to the 
public with little or no interaction or follow-up. 
 
Donors such as the African Development Bank and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) can 
supplement these efforts by ensuring that the projects they fund include the environmental terms of 
reference, provide minimum impact on the climate, participate in cumulative impact assessments, and 
undertake full public participation. The US Government has funded citizen monitoring efforts to increase 
its oversight of its nuclear sites.  While coal mining is certainly not nuclear, a similar process can be 
employed for environmental monitoring by citizens.239 
 
For instance, MCC requires public participation in the design of their projects both during the scoping 
phase, when it shares the timeline of the project, discusses potential implications, and asks for opinions, 
as well as after an Environmental Management Plan has been completed, when key impacts and 
mitigations measures are discussed.  “Focus group” discussions with women and/or specific cultural 
groups can help guarantee that underrepresented voices are heard.  This model is a positive example of 
the ways in which the public can be involved in decision-making.   
 
2.3 Adopting the cumulative impact approach at the ministry level 
Adopting a cumulative impact approach requires substantial coordination between public and private 
stakeholders as well as within the government ministries and agencies. Alberta, Canada, provides a 
useful example of the political and organizational difficulty that can be encountered in implementing 
such a strategy. 
 
Challenges of a multi-stakeholder association to assess the cumulative impacts 
In Alberta, the Cumulative Environmental Management Association (CEMA), governed by government, 
industry, environmental NGOs and indigenous groups, assists the government to manage environmental 
impacts of oil sands development. CEMA developed a conceptual framework for cumulative impact 
assessment as well as timelines for implementation.  CEMA is mostly funded by industry, and industry 
sets aside funding to facilitate the participation of indigenous and community groups.  Two difficulties 
have emerged: forming a consensus with such a diverse set of stakeholders, and the technical nature of 
the work forming a barrier to effective participation by indigenous and community groups.  The Alberta 
Government has announced that some of the functions of CEMA will now be handed by governmental 
agencies in order to speed things along.  
 
As showed in Alberta, cumulative environmental risk management will take on another dimension if it is 
supported at the central level of government and does not rely on voluntary initiatives of industries. 
With the support of the UNPEI, MICOA could set up an inter-ministerial commission endowed with 
analytical capacity to develop a framework similar to that in Alberta.  
 
This unit is important because it would allow:  
1) a strengthening  of the institutional linkages between MICOA and the national planning and 
policy-making processes  
2) a greater level of coordination and dialogue among MICOA, Instituto Nacional de Gestão de 
Calamidades (INGC) and the other relevant ministries and agencies at the provincial and 
national levels 
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3) a constant assessment of environmental impacts, mitigation, and resilience as a cross-cutting, 
inter-sectoral issue.  
 
The unit could benefit from technical support and the comparative international expertise of the 
Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of the report. 
 
3. Public-private cooperation to achieve climate-resilient development 
This section focuses on climate risks to development both from natural climate variability and from 
human activity related to climate change.  We include impacts of current climate variability (such as due 
to current extreme events and seasonal variations) and from climate change over the next 30 to 50 
years.  Mozambique and the Lower Zambezi Basin suffer from significant climate-related extreme events.  
Major droughts, floods and cyclones are frequent occurrences resulting in loss of lives and having 
considerable impact on economic activity. Risks vary by region, but are significant throughout.  The 
Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture notes that “the risk of losing harvests because of unfavorable 
weather conditions is over 50% throughout the areas of rain fed agriculture south of the Save River, and 
can reach 75% in the interior of Gaza province.”240  Table 3 provides a summary of impacts of climate-
related disasters in Mozambique between 1956 and 2011.241 As can be seen, while drought impacts a 
huge swath of population, the economic damages from drought is far less than from flooding. 
 
Table 3. Climate related disasters in Mozambique (1956-2011).  
  
 
The variability of climate (within a season and from year to year) also impacts development in climate-
sensitive sectors such as agriculture and water resources management.  In addition to risks from current 
climate, anthropogenic climate change is expected to have destabilizing impacts on livelihoods and 
economy of the Zambezi Valley.  According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
temperatures in the region have already increased by 0.5°C over the past 100 years. Rising temperatures 
are expected to lead to droughts, heat waves, and crop failures.  Rising sea levels are expected to impact 
seaports and coastal urban areas. An increase in severe weather events is expected to raise the 
likelihood of flooding along the Zambezi River, enhancing danger to human life and damage to 
agriculture and infrastructure (see 3.1). In addition, risk of diseases such as malaria and meningitis are 
likely to increase as droughts and floods create environments more favorable to mosquitoes. 
 
Climate risks, from both current variability and longer-term change, impact development, threatening 
hard-won MDG gains and creating challenges to investment.  Managing climate risks requires effective 
institutional and policy systems in three inter-related areas, discussed further below in section 3.1:   
(1) proactive management of disaster risks (such as from floods and droughts) in the short term;  
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(2) anticipatory risk management involving risk transfer (such as weather index insurance 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2), social safety nets and development programs in key sectors; and  
(3) planning and design of infrastructure and land use for adaptation to climate change.  
 
It is critical for the public and private sector to cooperate in developing the knowledge base and 
institutional frameworks to better manage climate risks and take advantage of climate-related 
opportunities.  The sub-sections below outline some key areas necessary to ensure that resource-based 
development in the Lower Zambezi Basin is both sustainable and climate-resilient.   
 
The relationship between climate change and development is not unidirectional; development activities 
are often correlated with an increase in causal factors of climate change such as deforestation and 
increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (see 3.4).  Therefore, sustainable development should seek 
to not only address the consequences of climate change, but also to help mitigate the drivers of climate 
change.  The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has recognized that sustained global 
action is required to combat climate change, and that public and private sectors must work together to 
in these efforts.  The final part of this section explores opportunities to strengthen policies and 
programs that promote both economic development and climate change mitigation goals. 
 
3.1 Mitigating climate risks and realizing opportunities: some key areas for action 
(a) Disaster risk reduction for climate-resilient development: 
Mozambique and the surrounding region are prone to highly damaging extreme climate events such as 
floods, droughts and cyclones.  Each type of event poses risks across many sectors.  For example, 
flooding can affect agriculture by destroying crops and exacerbating soil degradation; increase the risk 
of diseases such as malaria; damage transportation infrastructure and make road/rail impassable; and 
result in loss of biodiversity. Moatize Village, Tete, and other low-lying communities along the Zambezi 
are particularly vulnerable to flooding.  Similarly, droughts and cyclones can impact across sectors and 
scales (household-community-municipality-district-province-country-region). Such consequences 
impacts not only individuals and their livelihoods, they can significantly effect economic activity and the 
investment environment. Mozambique’s coastal region is a critical component of the country’s social 
fabric and economic success from tourism, fishing and transportation.  But it is also quite vulnerable to 
natural forces (e.g., tides, winds, and storm surges). Cyclones are particularly damaging, and the 
resulting storm surge, flooding, winds and erosion cause considerable damage to infrastructure, housing 
and commercial facilities.  Economic impact could be quite high with continued development of ports 
critical for trade and industry (e.g., Beira and Nacala).   
 
Climate-related disaster risks require a suite of planning and management activities.  Mozambique’s 
Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades (INGC) is tasked with managing natural disasters and 
preventing the loss of human life.  INGC coordinates disaster response between entities such as NGOs 
and other government agencies, ensuring information at the community level is communicated back to 
the provincial and central offices.  While their activities have been successful, INGC (including the 
provincial office in Tete) could benefit from enhanced training and capacity building.  MICOA’s National 
Adaptation Programme of Action and INGC’s Synthesis Report on Climate Change (2009) call for 
developing improved early warning systems for severe weather events.  Such a system can utilize 
meteorological stations of the Ministry of Agriculture and National Institute of Meteorology (INAM). The 
INGC previously worked with GTZ (now GIZ) and the Sofalal provincial government to launch local 
Disaster Management Committees and disaster warning radio programming in communities along the 
Búzi river.  The IFRC and local Red Cross branches have built upon and expanded these activities in their 
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community-based disaster preparedness project.  The UNDP is also currently enhancing early warning 
systems specifically for use in agriculture in Mozambique as part of their four-country “Coping with 
Drought and Climate Change project”. 
 
(b) Managing weather/climate risks and realizing opportunities for development: 
With almost all of its smallholder maize dependent on rainfall, Mozambique is particularly vulnerable to 
large season-to-season variation in production, as discussed in Chapter 1. Weather and climate 
anomalies impact critical sectors, while also effecting economy-wide productivity.  In addition to 
strengthening the EWS and improving disaster response, effective climate risk management would 
entail proactively creating systems that reduce vulnerability to weather and climate variations on the 
part of both the private and the public sectors.  This could include strengthening social safety nets, and 
developing crop and weather-based insurance mechanisms (as discussed in Chapter 1), in addition to 
building capacity of institutions to undertake anticipatory risk management.  Risks should be considered 
cumulatively across various spatial and temporal scales (see above sections).   
 
While extreme events can cause significant economic shocks, lesser magnitude variations that are more 
routine, such as dry spells and wet spells or late onset/early cessation of the rainy season can also cause 
significant economic impacts. For example, a rainy season might involve below average total volume of 
rain or may entail the entire seasonal average of rain in just a few intense wet spells. In both cases, 
crops can be seriously impacted, with critical growth phases having either not enough or too much 
water.  The farming communities in Mozambique currently do not have sufficient capacity to respond to 
these weather and climate variations. Systems need to be put into place to manage the risks from such 
weather and climate variability, as have been done in India and elsewhere (see example below).  
Advance knowledge of weather and climate conditions for the coming days and weeks (and longer) 
could be used to guide decision-making.  This would include responsive systems (in government 
agencies and private sector input providers) that are sensitive to farmers’ need for credit, fertilizers, 
pesticides, and market information, and thereby enabling farmers to effectively exercise options in 
managing weather/climate risk. A high priority of the Government of Mozambique, with the support of 
the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of the report, should be 
to design and implement a strategy to reduce rainfall-induced production variability. 
 
Using weather and climate information for agricultural risk management in India 
An innovative research and action initiative funded by the Ministry of Agriculture in India is aimed at 
improving climate information particularly for the Indian summer monsoon, and to demonstrate the use 
of this information to benefit agriculture/rural livelihoods.242 “The Extended Range Forecast System for 
Climate Risk Management in Agriculture in India project” integrates risk management and climate 
science research, involving leading institutions in India in climate research and agricultural management 
(including the Indian Meteorology Department, the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, and nine 
agriculture universities across the country).  
 
Using weather and climate information for agricultural risk management in India- continued 
The project adopts a demonstration approach, focusing on select districts (and sample villages) in nine 
states that face significant livelihood impacts due to climate variability. In addition to furthering climate 
knowledge base and developing tools to integrate climate information into decision-making, the project 
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focuses on the institutional and policy dimensions necessary to manage agriculture risks (e.g., 
government and private sector provision of inputs). The Earth Institute of Columbia University is the 
lead international partner for this project. 
 
Climate information and risk management activities can also be used to take advantage of opportunities 
afforded by climate conditions.  For example, managers at Cahora Bassa dam might be able to release 
more water for hydroelectricity if forecasts are for increased rainfall in the coming weeks.  The ability to 
smooth gains and losses due to climate variability requires improved climate information (see 3.3) and 
an institutional framework in which the public and private sector can act quickly and efficiently when 
provided reliable information (see 3.4).   
 
(c) Adaptation to longer-term climate risks: 
Over the long term, climate change is likely to increase the frequency of extreme events and shift 
patterns of variability (e.g., shift the normal start or end of the rainy season). Risks from a changing 
climate need to be considered for existing infrastructural investments (such as human habitation, 
transportation, communication, etc.) as well as for new infrastructure that is being planned. In both of 
the cases, it is critical to consider climate risks in the context of other ongoing changes such as from 
population growth and expansion, land use change, ecosystem function changes etc., and calls for 
enhancing the scientific, planning and policy capacities of key sectoral agencies/institutions (see 3.2 and 
3.3).  
 
Proactive climate risk management activities (such as those described above) may be able to support 
resilience when confronted by cyclones and flooding.  However, another serious consequence of climate 
change is the threat of sea level rise.  Rising sea levels not only significantly increase coastal erosion and 
lead to increased flooding and damage during storm surges, they can also inundate low-lying land. There 
remains a significant degree of uncertainty in sea level rise extent over the coming decades.  Limited 
data on the historical sea level along the coast of Mozambique makes it difficult to assess trends.  
Mindful of this uncertainty, the INGC Synthesis Report on Climate Change (2009) suggests that ports at 
Maputo and Beira would be vulnerable even under a scenario of low and gradual sea level rise in the 
coming decades.  A comprehensive and integrated coastal zone management system needs to be 
formulated for long-term infrastructure and urban investments.  Viewing the coast as a complex of 
ecological, social and economic systems and requiring the partnership of government agencies, 
community organizations and private companies, resource-based plans can be designed for climate-
resilient sustainability.  MICOA’s National Adaptation Programme of Action describes elements of this 
approach in the recommendation to address coastal erosion through participative rehabilitation 
techniques that emphasize actions to build coast resilience to sea level rise. MICOA also previously 
implemented an ICZM project in the Mecufi district of Cabo Delgado Province, with a focus on 
community education and intersectoral coordination.  Because of the nature of coastal management, 
activities should extend beyond an environmental focus and engage partners from across sectors as well 
as borders (see example below). Here again, the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group 
discussed in the conclusion of the report could work to design and implement adaptation strategies for 
high-risk regions of the country and region.  
 
A regional approach to sustainable coastal zone management 
With support from the Indian Ocean Commission and the European Union, The Regional Coastal 
Management Programme of the Indian Ocean Countries (ReCoMaP) supports integrated coastal zone 
management (ICZM) structures and processes in the coastal countries north of Mozambique as well as 
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island nations of the Indian Ocean.243  Through activities such as building or establishing national ICZM 
committees, facilitating multilateral dialogue, capacity building, and launching monitoring systems, 
RcCoMaP promotes sustainable coastal development planning and management.  The initiative helps to 
build 1) ICZM tools and approaches; 2) functional frameworks for stakeholders; 3) ICZM coordinating 
bodies at the national and local level; and 4) platforms for information management and exchange.  
3.2 Building science, information systems and capacity for climate resilient development 
Whether the goal is to address disaster risk, realize opportunities from favorable climate conditions or 
develop long-term infrastructure plans, critical elements of risk management include: 1) the quality of 
the climate and environmental information used; 2) integration of this information into design and 
decisions (such as in a decision support system), and 3) the ability of agencies/institutions to respond, as 
enabled by relevant policies, regulations, and institutional architecture (see 3.3).  A sound 
understanding of key environmental, social and economic processes is needed in order to design climate 
risk management systems.  For climate risk management, critical knowledge base can be conceptualized 
into three categories.   
First, a better understanding of current and long-term impacts of weather/climate on 
development in critical sectors (such as agricultural or hydropower production) This would include 
understanding of not only direct impacts, but also how weather/climate amplify (or mitigate) other 
development risks (such as population redistribution, loss of ecosystem function, etc.) in the short and 
long terms. The efforts could overlap with other related activities, such as the Beira Agricultural Growth 
Corridor (BAGC) initiative.244   
Second, a sound understanding of weather/climate processes, both historical and likely future 
from seasonal, inter-annual to many decades out. This would enable generation of seasonal and sub-
seasonal information based on the past climate record (extremely useful for agricultural planning, for 
example), as well as the production of forecasts over the longer term (useful for design of infrastructure 
systems, for example) based on a non-stationary climate. Data collection is critical and can be 
accomplished by expanding and improving the current network of weather stations in Mozambique and 
the region (INAM as well as regional agencies mandated by the WMO offering additional support). 
Additionally, climate information could be integrated with environmental data systems, such as the 
Globally Integrated Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS)245 described in Chapter 1. Beyond collecting 
data, an integrated information system can allow data and research findings to be stored, analyzed, and 
disseminated to the community of users.    
Third, a clear articulation of how agencies and institutions can utilize weather/climate 
information and effectively implement climate resilient development (for disaster risk reduction, climate 
risk management and longer term adaptation). Once stakeholders and decision makers have the 
necessary information, they must be able to understand and act upon it.  This requires capacity building 
and training, as well as decision support systems/tools, and relevant institutional architecture for 
effective climate-resilient development decision and policy-making.   
 
A research center for climate risk management in Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
Housed at the Bogor Agriculture University in Indonesia, the Centre for Climate Risk and Opportunity 
Management, Southeast Asia and the Pacific (CCROM) conducts research and training to enhance the 
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capacity of stakeholders in the region to understand the impacts of climate variability and change, and 
to better manage risks to improve human welfare and the environment.246  Research focuses on 1) 
climate impacts and vulnerability in agriculture, health, water resources, and livelihoods; 2) low 
emissions sustainable development; and 3) climate science and information for decision-makers.  As a 
collaborative institute of the Earth Institute, Columbia University, CCROM emphasizes the multi-
stakeholder approach to resource management, seeking to minimize risks and maximize opportunities 
for government agencies as well as the private sector (e.g., agribusiness companies). 
 
The expertise and experience of the Earth Institute can be leveraged to build capacity of national 
stakeholders in Mozambique across all three of these critical areas of climate risk management. For 
example, the Earth Institute has developed a suite of practical exercises and online training materials to 
help water resources professionals manage climate risks in reservoir systems, as discussed below.247  
Training materials could also be developed, in partnership with key line-ministries, for the practical 
training of planners and policymakers in using climate information in anticipatory decision-making and 
infrastructure design.  The Resource-Based Development Advisory Group discussed in the conclusion of 
the report could also help to design and implement a training and capacity building program, 
partnership with regional entities, on climate-resilient development effective across a continuum of 
temporal scales, from weather and seasonal-interannual to multi-decadal). 
 
Training water resources professionals in climate risk management 
The Earth Institute has developed resources to aid water resources managers in implementing a climate 
risk management approach to improve resiliency to droughts and floods, resolve multi-user conflicts, 
and contribute to the sustainable achievement of development goals.248  Through a training manual, 
practical exercises and an online portal, the materials provide a framework for integrating climate 
information into water resources management operations and decision-making to manage risks and 
take advantage of opportunities.  The risk management approach includes the following steps: 1) assess 
the hydroclimatic risk; 2) make probabilistic water supply projections incorporating climate information; 
and 3) determine a portfolio of options to manage the risks.  While the materials are largely technical, 
they also emphasize the role of policy and institutions and offer techniques for working with multiple 
stakeholders.  The training resources have been presented in multiple settings, including directly with 
water managers in the Philippines and in an international workshop for managers from Latin America.   
 
Another initiative that could support this endeavor is the Climate for Development in Africa Programme 
(ClimDev). This is a joint initiative by the African Development Bank, the African Union Commission, and 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa. With the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) as its secretariat, 
ClimDev aims to address the challenge climate change poses for Africa’s development objects by filing 
critical gaps in information, analysis and options for policy and decision-makers at all levels.  A Special 
Fund has been created for activities that address these gaps national and sub-regional institutions, and 
to support regional activities and climate centers across Africa.  The Government of Mozambique and 
partners in the region are well positioned to take advantage of this substantial emerging initiative to 
participate in capacity building activities, access climate and related information, and seek support for 
project implementation. 
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3.3 Policy, governance and planning for climate resilient development 
Section 2 above outlined guidance for strengthening environmental governance in Mozambique and the 
region. In the area of climate change, INGC is currently strongly proactive. The National Adaptation 
Programme of Action channels money through MICOA, and UNFCC249 efforts focus on MICOA as well.  
Despite this, MICOA remains underfunded and currently lacks relevant expertise.  The roles of INGC and 
MICOA in dealing with climate change initiatives need to be clarified and refined to complement each 
other, creating coordination for optimal results. Effectively managing climate risks for climate-resilient 
development requires broadening the focus beyond disasters and environmental 
management/regulation.  It requires a shift in decision-making away from reactive management to one 
that is science-based and builds upon an anticipatory risk management perspective.  
 
In the context of a changing climate as well as continuing demographic and land use changes, 
anticipatory, risk-based decision making is becoming increasingly important. Approaches such as 
integrated water resources management (discussed in Section 1.2.3 of this chapter), which explicitly 
acknowledge the interconnectedness of problems across multiple sectors and scales, are generally well-
suited to accommodate this.  Moving beyond climate variability to managing climate change- related 
risks also requires long-term planning, on multi-decadal scale. Other sections of this report offer 
additional guidance for planning across temporal scales (see early sections of Chapter 4), sectors, and 
stakeholders, particularly in pursuit of public-private cooperation (see examples in Chapter 2). The 
African Development Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) is “designed to demonstrate 
ways that developing countries can make climate risk and resilience part of their core development 
planning.”250 The PPCR, in line with the NAPA in Mozambique, helps to fund public and private-sector 
investments in climate resilient development plans, and could be a strong partner going forward. An 
inter-ministerial body, with the support of the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group (discussed 
in the conclusion of the report), could draft a strategic national plan, building on ongoing efforts, for 
achieving climate-resilient development, including the necessary costs, allocations, research needs and 
partners.  
 
Brazil: High-level institutional, policy and financial support for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation 
The Government of Brazil is using policy, institutions and funds to address the causes and projected 
consequences of climate change.  Brazil’s National Policy on Climate Change (2009) establishes a 
voluntary target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and outlines steps to achieve, monitor and verify 
emissions reductions, which will come largely from reducing deforestation as well as efforts across many 
other sectors.251  The policy was launched alongside Brazil’s National Climate Change Fund, which 
supports the country’s activities to reduce GHG and adapt to climate change impacts.   
 
Brazil: High-level institutional, policy and financial support for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation- continued 
The majority of the funds will come from concession fees paid to the government for companies to work 
in the country’s high production oil fields.  These funds will be shared between the National 
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Development Bank, which will provide credit for public and private projects on mitigation and 
adaptation, and the Ministry of Environment, which will focus on public sector initiatives through its 
Secretariat of Climate Change and Environmental Quality.  For 2011, the Fund’s approximately US$140 
million will be directed toward projects in agriculture, energy, steel, deforestation and the prevention of 
fires in critical ecosystems.  These priorities are informed by the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, a 
high-level government body that brings together representatives from a wide range of government 
agencies, Ministries, the private sector and civil society to help shape Brazil’s public policy and action on 
climate change. 
 
3.4 Climate change mitigation  
With the significant negative consequences of climate change both in the Lower Zambezi Basin and 
across the globe, there are strong incentives to encouraging activities that contribute to climate change 
mitigation.  Through reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the future consequences of climate change are 
expected to be mitigated.  Additionally, there are opportunities for developing countries and the private 
sector to benefit from global mitigation programs.  This is particularly true for Mozambique.   
3.4.1 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) 
In a 2009 submission to UNEP, Mozambique expressed concern about increasing deforestation.252 
Almost 70% of Mozambique is covered in forest and “other woody vegetation types,” but deforestation 
in Mozambique continues at a rate of approximately 219,000 hectares per year. Deforestation poses a 
serious threat to local bio-diversity as well as local livelihoods. Also, deforestation may lead to higher 
levels of soil degradation and erosion threatening agricultural productivity, in addition to contributing to 
enhanced levels of climate change-inducing GHG emissions.   
 
There are several potential partnerships that may be useful in combating soil erosion and deforestation 
while working to mitigate climate change.  Mozambique stands to benefit from the negotiation of 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), a mechanism designed to create 
financial value from the carbon stored in forests. In particular, MICOA is involved in South-South REDD, 
the Brazil-Mozambique Initiative for Zero Deforestation, a project that aims to prepare a national REDD 
strategy for Mozambique based on the Brazilian experiences of the Bolsa Floresta program.  The project 
is administered and supported by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).  
An endowment fund for REDD+ will be created within the Ministry of the Environment, and managed by 
a national private bank.  Input for the fund will come from three sources: market (commercialization of 
carbon credits from the projects), taxes, and donations.   
 
While this is a strong opportunity, Mozambique is regarded as being behind schedule in preparation of 
the logistics for REDD.253 These logistics include measuring forest cover, codifying the rights of forest 
communities, and making laws that address sustainable forest management more effectively.  These 
logistics require more funding to enhance the current partnership between MICOA and Mozambique 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Centro Terra Viva (CTV), University Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), the 
Sustainable Amazon Foundation, Indufor, and Justiça Ambiental (JA) to meet REDD’s requirements. 
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3.4.2 Reducing GHG emissions: updated standards and green technologies 
GHG emissions standards should be clearly enumerated by the government and respected by mining 
corporations.  Coal mining operations have the potential to emit huge quantities of GHGs such as water 
vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide in coal processing and drying, mining procedures, 
building operations, and transportation of coal.  GHG emission can be limited by maximizing gas capture, 
utilization of hydropower, using electric rail, and incorporation of “green” technology into mine 
operations. It is important to follow best practices and monitor, verify, and report carbon dioxide and 
other emissions.  Industry may find it best to consider government legislation as a baseline, while 
preparing for higher standards that may be incorporated into future regulatory schemes.   
 
Whenever possible, coal companies should prioritize clients that use clean coal technology to reduce 
emissions.  In a recent study by KPMG, 57% of mining companies surveyed indicated that they have not 
changed their structure or management to address climate change issues and also that they are not 
intending to take such initiatives.254  However, in South Africa a large number of mining companies have 
implemented “climate-friendly” practices.  These practices can be examined and implemented in Tete.  
In general, “green” technologies should be incorporated into industry activities from the outset to avoid 
future conversion/retrofitting costs.   
 
Industries can also be incubated to capitalize on the growing market for clean energy and technologies.  
A recent project by Mitsui in Gaza Province involved the construction of a solar-powered irrigation 
system for a resettlement community.  The system cost approximately $2 million.  The UNDP will be 
placing a specialist there to help the community market the system.  Such a project in Tete Province 
could increase power production, decrease dependency on coal-generated power, and provide a steady 
water source for local farms. 
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4. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Strategic cumulative 
impact assessment (CIA) 
study,  and monitoring 
program 
Joint initiative to assess cumulative environmental direct impacts of mining operations as actually 
experienced by local communities and stakeholders (water pollution and water resource 
management, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, soil and land degradation, and effects on 
biodiversity) 
Expanding the CIA to include competitive use of water and land to inform policy making related to 
water and land use, using GIS and to be coordinated at cross-border level, especially for cross-
border warning system for flood alerts and integrated water resource management plan (IWRM) 
MICOA, MPD, Min. of 
Agriculture 
 
AMDCM, 
Mining Companies, 
SDI unit 
 
UNEP, 
UNIDO, 
WMO, 
GSDI, 
ACWR, 
Impacto, Consultec 
Strengthening 
environmental governance 
Investing in technical assistance for government employees involved in environmental assessment 
and licensing at national and local level 
Updating the legal and regulatory regime, maximizing environmental protection while 
promulgating realistic guidelines (1) establishment of stringent emission and pollution limitations, 
2) assessment of water concession period and value of assurance bonds according to cumulative 
impacts of mines  
Designing enforcement mechanisms (1) audits before license renewal, 2) continuous monitoring of 
industrial activities, 3) applying significant penalties for environmental violations, 4) enshrining 
transparency in system and 5) ensuring better public participation and oversight)  
Adopting CIA at Ministry level (through an inter-ministerial unit in order to strengthen institutional 
linkage and assessment of environmental challenges as a cross-cutting issue) 
MICOA 
 
Industry, 
Government, Civil 
Society 
Organizations, 
National 
Universities 
UNDP, 
UNPEI, 
Earth Institute/ 
Columbia 
University 
Public-private cooperation 
to achieve climate-resilient 
development 
Mitigating climate risks and realize opportunities through 1) disaster risk reduction; 2) managing 
climate risks with systems reducing vulnerability, with an emphasis on strategies to reduce rainfall-
induced production variability; and 3) adaptation to climate change, with a focus on high-risk areas 
and sectors 
 
Building science, information systems and capacity with a focus on 1)  impacts of weather/climate 
on development; 2) climate processes and science, including forecasting; and 3) techniques for 
integrating climate information into decision and policy-making 
 
Making the climate risk and opportunity management approach an integral part of development 
policy, planning, and governance with an emphasis on public-private cooperation and multi-
stakeholder engagement 
 
Mitigating climate change by 1) pooling resources to fund improvements in the logistics of 
operations required by the implementation of REDD; and 2) GHG emissions standards enumeration 
by the government,  respected by mining companies (technical solutions to incorporate green 
technology into activity industries or carbon-offsetting programs) 
MPD partnering with 
MICOA, 
INGC, 
Min. of Agriculture,  
National Institute 
of Meteorology 
(UNAM), NAPA, 
Other Ministries, 
Private sector 
(including 
insurance/finance 
industry, 
agriculture supply 
chain, etc.) 
REDD partnership, 
UEM, Civil Society 
Organizations 
UNFCC, 
AfDB, 
IIED, UNDP, , Earth 
Institute, the 
African Centre of 
Meteorological 
Applications for 
Development 
(ACMAD), WMO, 
IGAD Swiss Re, 
IFRC, WB, CLIM 
DEV, Forum for 
Agricultural 
Research in Africa 
(FARA), ENDA.   
   
Chapter Four: Resource-Based Development Planning and Revenue 
Management 
Introduction 
The manner and extent to which the anticipated benefits of large investments in natural resources 
actually accrue to host countries depend heavily on the government’s capacity to plan for the upstream 
and downstream linkages and to manage the revenues according to sound fiscal and development 
policies. If properly planned for and managed, the resources in the Zambezi Valley can have a rapid and 
direct impact not only on generating revenues, but also on regional infrastructure, job creation, 
agricultural productivity, health, and Mozambique’s progress in achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. If mismanaged or not properly planned for, Mozambique could 
miss the opportunity to reap the benefits of resource extraction, or worse, suffer from the “resource 
curse” in which resource extraction fails to contribute to national development and even results in 
adverse development consequences. The challenge, therefore, is to determine the proper development 
framework to turn resource wealth into effective and sustained economic development. Taking into 
account the reality of resource depletion puts an added premium on finding the right policies to 
maximize the development impacts. 
 
A government strategy for managing resource revenues and facilitating linkages includes long-term 
development planning tools that define the needs and priorities for public-sector investments over the 
long, medium, and short terms; tools to properly model and anticipate revenue flows, including from 
the extractive sector; budgetary and planning tools to link plans and budgets in the short and medium 
terms; proper monitoring and evaluation systems to measure the results of public investment programs; 
and improved coordination among the various stakeholders involved in planning, including line 
ministries, the Ministry of Finance, the private sector, the donor community, provincial and municipal 
governments, and civil society. 
 
Each country has its own unique system for managing its revenues and strengthening its planning and 
budgetary processes for improved development outcomes. There are, however, basic elements that can 
be adapted to all contexts, including Mozambique, for resource-based development planning: 
 
 Clear and consistent National Development Plans over various time horizons that 
include a medium-term public investment strategy (prioritizing key areas for investment), 
annual targeted plans and projects, and strategies for leveraging extractive industry investments 
 Transparent budgeting tools that are tied to a strong medium-term expenditure 
framework and are driven by development needs and costed investment programs, as well as 
tools to improve budget execution 
 Financial modeling of anticipated revenue flows and expenditures over the medium and 
long terms, especially of resource revenues which should be based on various anticipated 
scenarios and pricing models 
 Inter-ministerial coordination under the leadership of a coordinating minister, setting 
policy priorities and serving as a strong partner for counterparts in the private sector, donor 
community, and civil society 
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 A strategy for the use and/or distribution of resource revenues over time and among 
various populations. 
1. Medium- and long-term planning for resource-based development 
The mega investments in natural resources in the Zambezi Valley provide an important opportunity for 
Mozambique to translate the region’s subsoil assets into fiscal revenues, infrastructure, employment, 
training, and other benefits in a manner consistent with its long-term development goals. However, as a 
recent publication noted, “it seems to be simply taken on faith that growth and revenues will produce 
these benefits.”255 For decades, developing countries have been advised that encouraging foreign 
investment in their natural resource sectors would have a natural multiplier effect on an economy and 
would attract further foreign direct investments in key supporting sectors, including infrastructure, ports, 
downstream industry, and telecommunications.  
 
As a result, these countries have been advised to focus on improving “doing business” indicators to 
attract investors to the natural resource sector, without emphasizing the need for a more complex 
supportive environment of policy, regulation, long-term planning, and a public investment program to 
complement the private investments. Indeed, in Mozambique, the mega-projects have been supported 
based on their promise to create employment and to support local small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  However, the results of this market-led approach to resource-based development, both in 
Mozambique and elsewhere, have not been as promising. To date, job creation from the mega-projects 
remains well below expectations,256 and with few exceptions, the mega-projects have not effectively 
integrated with local SMEs. 
 
In practice, avoiding the resource curse and maximizing development outcomes of investments in 
resource extraction requires a strong public sector and long-term government planning that addresses 
how the natural resources will factor into the country’s long-term development objectives. Specifically, 
when anticipating a surge in investments in oil or mining, governments should concretely and 
concurrently plan for: 
 
• shared infrastructure opportunities 
• coordinated investments in local supply bases for goods and services to the industry 
• vocational training related to the industry’s employment needs 
• maximizing local and national tax and royalty revenues 
• resource management and allocation strategies 
• present and future domestic needs for the resource itself (whether oil, coal, minerals, or metals) 
• exchange rate fluctuations and other macroeconomic implications 
• cumulative environmental risks and impacts, with a focus on climate risks and opportunities 
 
Unfortunately, to date, most planning documents of resource-rich countries, including those developed 
in partnership with the traditional donors (such as the World Bank Country Assistance Strategies and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), have not focused on the particular opportunities (and risks) of 
resource-based development, including “how mining will, in specific terms, fit into a broader 
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development strategy for a given country… [creating] a situation in which the linkages to the rest of a 
country’s economy are simply assumed rather than clearly articulated.”257 This has been true in 
Mozambique as well. The PARPA II specified that the government should create an investment 
framework that attracts mining investments, but no mention was made (nor strategy included) about 
how such investments could be incorporated into the medium-to-long term development strategy, nor 
how revenues from the sector would be allocated in line with the development priorities. 
 
The section immediately following the short “mining” section in PARPA II treated the petroleum sector 
slightly differently; in terms of petroleum investments, the PARPA’s strategy included “ensuring rational 
and efficient use of production and transportation infrastructures; ensuring the development of the 
domestic market for natural gas, condensed natural gas, and other oil products; ensuring the education 
and training of Mozambicans to participate in all stages of oil operations, including the provision of 
goods and services to the oil sector; fostering regional cooperation with neighboring countries and 
ensuring the unitization and exploitation of common resources in a coordinated manner; the 
development of an efficient regional natural gas market, the use of common technical standards…”258 
The discrepancy between this slightly more detailed strategy and the lack of a strategy for integrating 
mining investments may be due to the timing of the PARPA II drafting, in 2006-7, when the mining 
sector was still nascent. However, the goals articulated in the PARPA II for the petroleum sector should 
be extended to the mining sector as well, including for coal (energy) and phosphates (fertilizer), and in 
both cases (petroleum and mining), the policy objectives should be translated into concrete actions, 
regulations, public investment programs, budgetary allowances and development targets. Moreover, 
the plans for both sectors should articulate how resource revenues will be allocated in line with these 
overall objectives. The PARP 2010-2014 is shorter than the previous PARPAs, and no mention is made of 
either the mining or the petroleum sector in the PARP 2010-2014, finalized in May 2011.  
 
1.1 The benefits of long-term planning in resource-rich countries 
Long-term planning is particularly important in resource-rich countries, since extractive industry 
activities often have time horizons of several decades or more. Each stage of the project life-cycle of 
extractive industries—exploration, construction, production, beneficiation, closure—has distinct 
implications for the host country and community, both in terms of impact (environmental, economic, 
and otherwise) and opportunities for spill-over benefits (infrastructure expansion, training, etc.). 
Accordingly, governments need long-term planning tools to anticipate and correspond with the various 
stages of the project, including, for instance, coherent, multi-sectoral development strategies, a costed 
medium-term public investment program with adequate budgetary support, and a strategy for the 
management and allocation of revenues. In light of the anticipated scale-up of extractive industry 
activities in Mozambique, there is already national momentum to implement long-term planning 
mechanisms that anticipate the long-term time horizons of the extractive industry activities. There are 
many benefits of this type of long-term planning in resource-rich countries:  
 
First, given the inherent instability of resource prices as well as the eventual depletion of the resource, a 
national macroeconomic strategy and budgetary framework is necessary to preserve both short-term 
stability and long-term solvency in an economy heavily dependent on commodity exports.   
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Second, public planning can help to avoid “Dutch Disease,”259 by using revenues from the resource 
economy to support a supply-side response of both non-tradable sectors—such as education, health, 
and social security—as well as non-resource export sectors—such as agriculture—through public 
investments in infrastructure, technical training, and business development.  
 
Third, medium- and long-term public investment programs can complement private-sector investments, 
thereby maximizing the benefits accruing to the host country and even increasing the profitability of the 
private investments. For instance, a public investment framework that includes strategic investments in 
key infrastructure, education and training, and human capital can facilitate private investment not only 
in the extractive sector but in complementary sectors as well.  
 
Fourth, the stability of large, long-term investments relies to an extent on its ability to deliver 
development benefits to the local population. The private sector, therefore, has an interest in ensuring 
that its payments to the government are channeled into strategic public investments with notable 
development results for the local community. Thus, long-term development planning is not at the 
expense of an enabling environment for private investment; to the contrary, a strategic planning process 
can help ensure that the basic building blocks are in place to both attract quality private investment and 
to ensure that the benefits of the investment flow to the population. 
 
While economic development undoubtedly requires private-sector investments and participation, it also 
depends critically on the provision of core public goods; therefore, Mozambique’s overarching priority is 
to create a public investment plan that will “enable the economy to meet basic needs (food, safe 
drinking water, essential health services, basic education) and to put in place the infrastructure (power, 
irrigation, roads, ports, telecoms, the Internet) for private-sector-led economic growth.”260 Through 
targeted public investment strategies, natural resource revenues can be used to improve productivity 
and economic growth alongside the natural resource sector.261 
 
A major challenge for those who favor strategic resource-based development planning is the reality that 
many developing country governments lack the technical expertise and tools to undertake a rigorous 
assessment of the public investment gaps of the country, especially at sub-national or supra-national 
(regional) levels, or to prepare a costed public investment program to address those needs in the near 
and medium terms. Therefore, the opportunities to support Mozambique’s planning process are 
discussed below. 
 
2. Coherence of planning tools 
Mozambique has several planning and budget documents, prepared by various units and covering 
different time horizons (see Box 1 for an overview of the main planning documents at the central 
government level). The dozens of planning documents in Mozambique at the central government 
level—and even more at the provincial and municipal level—outline the main priority areas, plans, and 
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costs for government programs and spending over the short (PES and State Budget), medium (PARP, 
PQG and sector strategies) and long term (Agenda 2025). The national planning and budgeting exercise 
is coordinated by the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) and the Ministry of Finance, 
respectively.262  
 
Planning and Budget Documents in Mozambique
263
 
2025 Vision: The 2025 Vision, concluded in 2003, reflects the long-term vision of the country. 
Five-year Government Plan (PQG): This document is prepared by each new administration and outlines 
the government’s key objectives and priorities during its term (five years). 
National Poverty Strategy (PARP or PRSP): The medium-term plan, which includes priority objectives to 
reduce the poverty rate. The new PARP, to be completed in April 2011, attempts to operationalize the 
PQG.  
Medium-term Expenditure Framework (CFMP or MTEF): The MTEF theoretically guides the planning 
and budgeting process and defines budget ceilings. It is updated annually for a three-year cycle.264 
Sector and Provincial Plans: These are medium-term strategic plans for each ministry or province, which 
contain priorities for a five-year period. 
Economic and Social Plan (PES): This annual plan, included within the state budget each year, translates 
the government’s overall development plans (PQG and PARP) into annual activities linked to its sectoral 
plans.  
State Budget (OE): The annual budget outlines the funding sources and costing of activities in the PES. 
  
2.1 Aligning the key objectives, priorities, and actions of each of the planning documents 
The planning documents are intended to be interlinked; indeed, the priorities, strategies, plans, actions, 
and budget should be internally consistent and increasingly operational (as the time horizons get 
shorter) in order to maintain coherence for the public investment strategy and to enable a transparent, 
predictable, and accountable budgeting and reporting process. However, in practice, partly because of 
the different administrative units that are responsible for their drafting, the plans lack coherence, 
consistency, and analytical context (for identifying and prioritizing public investment strategies) that 
would facilitate their implementation, appropriate budgetary allocations (both from national revenues 
and donor support), and effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E). For instance, while the PARP is 
prepared through intensive discussions between the MPD, line ministries, and development partners, 
the annual PES (which should be an annual operational tool for the medium-term goals) is prepared on 
the basis of a series of proposals from central level and provincial level directors that are consolidated at 
various points and ultimately sent to the MPD. The MPD further consolidates the submissions and 
presents the final consolidated PES to the National Assembly without final review by the submitting 
ministries at the central or provincial levels.265 
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Several options and recommendations for improving the efficacy of the planning and budgeting process 
are discussed below, but two central observations could usefully be made here. First, as Mozambique 
concludes the third PARP for 2011-2014, there is an opportunity to streamline the government’s 
planning process to focus on the priority strategic issues, with a medium-term time horizon, in line 
with the ambitious but achievable targets of the MDGs. Sectors could be encouraged to bring their 
own strategic plans in line with the PARP objectives and priorities for the same time-period,266 and the 
PES should refer to the specific priorities outlined in the PARP, ensuring coherence in strategic priorities, 
policy objectives, budgets, and annual milestones.  
 
Second, the new PARP could create an institutional framework for strategically engaging traditional 
and non-traditional donors, the private sector, and the various sectors in a coherent, comprehensive 
development strategy. As the World Bank recently noted, “more comprehensive, multi-sector 
investment planning methods which are capable of exploring, identifying and effectively mobilizing 
synergies within and across geographic areas (national and regional), economic sectors, and socio-
economic groups have become today essential methods in the poverty reduction ‘tool box’ in 
developing countries. While such comprehensive methods… are more complex and expensive to 
undertake, they invariably yield much higher and more sustainable benefits to the local, sub-national, 
national and regional communities.”267  
 
In this context, a Public Investment Program (PIP) could help to identify public investment projects of 
key strategic importance—such as those necessary to achieve the objectives of the PARP—and to 
determine the available and desirable means of financing those priorities over the medium term, 
including through the budget, off-budget project support from traditional donors, assistance from 
non-traditional donors, public-private partnerships, or borrowing (at concessional or non-concessional 
rates). The PIP could then serve as the basis for discussion and engagement with donors and the private 
sector, ensuring that the donors and private sector are supporting the Government’s plans and priorities 
rather than dictating them. The PIP would be a key component of an enhanced and meaningful medium-
term expenditure framework (discussed in depth below). 
 
2.2 Streamlining monitoring systems 
A streamlined planning process should be based on and should reflect a robust and coherent monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) system that enables transparent monitoring of outcomes and results.  
 
Currently, the M&E tools and oversight is fragmented in Mozambique, reflecting the various actors 
(donors, central government, sectors, sub-national governments, private sector) and types of planning 
documents and activities. At the national level, there are at least three systems for reporting on the 
results of the various plans for public expenditure: 
1) the Balanco do Plano Economíco e Social (BdPES), which reports on the execution of the annual 
Economic and Social Plan, and is presented to Parliament and discussed in a plenary session, 
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2) the Annual Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), a set of 40 indicators defined by the 
main donors, which is prepared annually with the donors in working groups, and is presented to 
the development partners (not to parliament),268 and   
3) the PARP strategic matrixes, which are annexed to the BdPES, submitted to Parliament, 
summarizing key monitoring aspects in priority areas. 
 
In addition, there are myriad M&E and reporting tools used by the sub-national governments and by 
individual line ministries, many of which have their own indicators. Even some of the technical divisions 
within a ministry have their own indicators. When line ministries receive direct funding from donors, 
either bilaterally or through Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) or common funds, often the 
Memorandum of Understanding will contain additional indicators and reporting requirements, which 
can run parallel to national systems and processes. Often, the ministries will align their M&E and 
reporting priorities according to the donors’ requirements, to ensure continued funding, rather than 
with the national systems. Not only does this undermine national level reporting, but information 
collected and reported for donors is often compiled simply to meet requirements, meaning that “little 
effort is put into analyzing the information collected or applying analysis to policy making.”269 
 
M&E activities at each level of government (district, provincial, sector, and central) are often divided 
among several directorates within the same body. When one agency or sector is required to submit 
consolidated indicators, often the indicators are consolidated in the same way as the PES—by 
accumulating and consolidating indicators from a number of different sub-units, which often results in 
misinformation or dropped data.  
 
At the national level M&E activities are divided among several directorates within the Ministry of 
Planning and Development (MPD), including the National Directorate of Planning, the Directorate of 
Policy Studies and Analysis, a new National Directorate for M&E, and the National Statistics Institute 
(INE). Not only are the current M&E processes administratively burdensome, but the fragmented system 
exacerbates disparities among development plans and activities (including those of donors and the 
private sector), and weakens the ability of any of the development actors to rely on accepted outcome 
and process data and fixed targets, or to use them meaningfully to inform policy.  
 
Moreover, this fragmentation is exacerbated by widespread difficulty in linking budget and fiscal 
information with outputs and indicators. This is in part because of the institutional separation between 
the administrative units responsible for budgeting, planning, and M&E, resulting in the lack of 
information-sharing, but it is also due to the lack of accurate unit-cost estimates that allow for budget-
outcome analysis.270  
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Unit-costs are the cost per targeted investment; for instance, the cost to train one teacher, or the cost 
to build a clinic. Unit-cost estimates are necessary to be able to accurately cost public investment 
programs and also to be able to evaluate the impact per cost of specific public investments. 
 
Both the development partners and the private sector have an interest in strengthening the M&E 
system in Mozambique, in order to base development programs and activities on agreed targets, 
metrics, and policy outcomes, and to enhance their own reporting on development initiatives. Therefore, 
it could be useful for the private sector, civil society, government representatives from the MPD as 
well as from the sub-national directorates, and the donor community to increase the meaningful 
acceptance and use of M&E systems and data for policy and outcome analysis, streamline the M&E 
process, take joint steps to increase the rigor of statistical data collection and analysis, and then 
standardize M&E indicators and processes in line with the development priorities, to improve the 
coherence of the development activities and reduce redundant reporting and administration. And 
indeed, strengthening and clarifying the linkages among levels and types of M&E and between M&E and 
planning, as well as strengthening the analytical ability to relate public policy with results and outcomes 
was a key objective of PARPA II and is included in PARP 2010-2014.271 
 
3. Aligning the budget with development plans 
The success of Mozambique’s development planning relies on the strong coordinated development of 
the public financial management (PFM) system. The IMF noted in its 2008 Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability report (PEFA) report that, in general, the last decade was characterized by 
substantial improvements to Mozambique’s PFM system. Perhaps most notably, the Government 
introduced a single treasury account (CUT) and a new electronic integrated financial management 
information system, e-SISTAFE, that have substantially improved the public financial management 
system. Other important improvements include a new financial management law with accompanying 
regulations, a more functional classification system for the budget, and the incorporation of off-budget 
revenues and donor-funded expenditures into the budget, among others.272 Steps are still being taken to 
improve these processes, in close coordination with the IMF, World Bank, and other development 
partners.  
 
3.1 The usefulness of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) 
The complex landscape of planning instruments and procedures in Mozambique could benefit from 
increased integration in a multi-year budgeting process, which would facilitate the policy coherence 
and planning capacity of the different planning units. Medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) 
can “create a useful bridge between planning and budgeting,” and should be at the core of medium-
term policy making and decisions about development priorities and resource allocation.273  
 
An MTEF is used to “forecast the overall resource envelope [based on fiscal targets, estimated revenues 
and financial obligations], and to allocate spending among sectors for the medium term according to the 
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policy priorities set out in the five-year plan and the PARP.”274 MTEFs allow multi-year budgeting and 
planning, which almost all major public investment strategies275 require, both for their design and 
implementation, and for their success. The objectives of an MTEF are highlighted in the box below. 
 
The Objectives of an MTEF
276 
• Improved macroeconomic balance, especially fiscal discipline 
• Greater budgetary predictability for line ministries 
• More efficient use of public resources 
• Greater political accountability for public expenditure outcomes through more legitimate 
decision-making processes 
• Greater credibility of budgetary decision-making (political restraint)  
 
In order to be credible and meaningful, the MTEF should be integrated into both the planning and the 
budgeting process. The first step would be to think about an integrated sectoral strategy for realizing 
the priorities as established in the PARP, and determining which public investments are necessary to 
achieve the objectives. Those public investments should then be costed, to determine the necessary 
resource allocation (both by sector, and between capital and recurrent expenditures) over a medium-
term time frame. A similar costing exercise should be undertaken in the other sectors as well, since all 
sectors have multi-year strategies that a) can be costed, and b) would benefit from a multi-year resource 
allocation that is in line with real estimated costs.  
 
Based on these costed plans, the government would then determine sectoral allocations, which in turn 
become both the guide and the budget ceilings for the sectors’ programs and budgets over the medium 
term.277 The annual budget would effectively be the first year of the MTEF, and the outer years of the 
MTEF would guide the budget allocations in subsequent years. Not only does this bring coherence to 
the planning and budgeting process, but it would make budget allocation decisions more accountable, 
transparent and predictable. 
 
Currently, the MTEF in Mozambique operates tangentially to the planning and budgeting process, and is 
not yet institutionalized as a meaningful planning and budgeting instrument. The MTEF was not used in 
the preparation of any of the medium-term plans, nor are the priorities as articulated in those 
documents reflected meaningfully in the MTEF. The sectors do not present a cost analysis of their 
programs for the MTEF, but rather present proposals on their total sector expenditure; those proposals 
are moreover de-linked from the list of activities submitted for the annual PES, which, in turn, is often 
unrelated to the sectors’ own strategic plans. Put another way, there is no clear connection between 
the priorities outlined in the PARP, the sectors’ own medium-term strategies, the overall expenditure 
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proposals submitted by the sectors for the MTEF, the list of activities proposed for the annual PES, 
and the costs submitted for the annual budget allocation. In fact, each of these plans or budgets is 
often created by a different department within ministries. 
 
At the central level in Mozambique, the PES and the annual budget take priority over the MTEF; the 
annual budgetary ceilings for the annual budget are more linked to the PES than to the budgetary 
ceilings defined in the MTEF (though, in fact, more accurately, the budget ceilings have tended to be 
based on incremental additions to the budget of the previous years rather than on the basis of any plan). 
As a result, “there is no real medium-term dimension to the budget in Mozambique, neither for 
revenues nor for expenditure.”278 Both requiring and assisting sectors in submitting meaningful medium-
term budgeted proposals, based on their strategic plans and the overall priorities of the PARP, would 
strengthen the usefulness and coherence of the MTEF, and would be an important step toward aligning 
the various development strategies, objectives, action items, and budgets.  
 
Importantly, the costing for an MTEF should encourage the Government and development partners to 
think about what expenditure should be to realize development objectives; although maintaining 
macroeconomic stability is certainly important, there are a number of resources that may be 
mobilized to support necessary expenditures that may not be anticipated in a fiscal framework. Once 
necessary expenditures are costed, the MTEF should be used to connect the necessary expenditures to 
financing options, including projected revenues, donor support, private-sector investments, and 
concessional and non-concessional borrowing, on an annual and multi-year basis.  
 
It should be noted that in addition to meaningful costing estimates in line with sectors’ strategies and 
government priorities, an effective MTEF relies also on other important aspects of budget 
management:279 
 
Consistency between budget submissions, allocations, and execution: If budget allocations differ 
significantly from the budgets prepared for submission, then the budget preparation process loses 
credibility and incentive. This is reportedly the case in Mozambique, where budgets approved are 
different from the budgets submitted by ministries and other sub-national units. Moreover, if actual 
expenditures differ from the approved budgets, that further undermines the predictability and 
accountability of the budgeting process. Finally, this becomes true of the MTEF process as well if there is 
no coherence between the allocations and the MTEF submissions, which is currently the case in 
Mozambique.    
 
Comprehensiveness of the budget: The budget and the MTEF should account for all public expenditures, 
including donor funds and other off-budget financing. If the budget and MTEF are not comprehensive, 
then their usefulness is minimized.  
 
MTEF approval process: In order for the MTEF to be meaningful, it should be approved by the cabinet 
and parliament, ideally as part of the budget presentation and adoption.  
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Ultimately, Mozambique’s ability to link its development plans within an effective and meaningful 
MTEF, and subsequently to annual budgets, is decisive for economic diversification, poverty reduction 
and sustainable development. Several development partners have assisted Mozambique with public 
financial management reform, including the MTEF process, since 1997; at times, this support has been 
centralized either in common funds (such as the UTRAFE common fund for budget reforms) or around 
key budget priorities (the establishment of a unified treasury account, program budgeting, etc…). 
Additional coordinated technical assistance could now be useful to strengthen the MTEF as a 
meaningful connector between the budgeting and planning systems.  
 
Because detailed costing of sector activities is a difficult undertaking, development partners could help 
support the costing of the PIP, which should reflect the priority PARP objectives (as described above), as 
a pilot project. This pilot MTEF-support initiative could include support for a rigorous costing of the PIP 
(including distinguishing between capital and recurrent expenditures), determining the relevant sectoral 
allocations, and then working with the Ministry of Finance and other development partners to align 
existing projects and resources with the expenditures and identifying other possible revenue streams.  
 
A simultaneous priority is to establish institutional arrangements that facilitate communication and 
coordination between the MPD and the Ministry of Finance vis-à-vis the MTEF, and the planning and 
budgeting processes more generally. The IMF, World Bank and other partners could usefully bring 
comparative experience of other countries with separate ministries responsible for planning and 
budgeting, such as Turkey, to help improve the planning and budgeting coordination in Mozambique. 
Moreover, development partners should commit expenditures in line with MTEF priorities, which would 
yield substantial returns on the Government’s development planning and allocation of resources. 
 
3.2 Strong leadership and inter-ministerial coordination  
The Ministry of Development Planning and the Ministry of Finance have taken important steps to 
coordinate their respective responsibilities in planning and budgeting to promote consistency, but there 
remain opportunities to harmonize the planning process further, both between the MPD and Ministry of 
Finance and between the provincial governments and the central government. In terms of coordination 
between the provincial governments and the central government, efforts are needed both to ensure 
consistency of planning and strategy among the different levels of government and to ensure that sub-
national resource allocations result in efficient and effective service delivery at the field level.280 
 
Several efforts are already underway to improve coordination between ministries and among the 
different levels of government, so they will not be addressed again in depth in this report. An additional 
reform that could usefully be implemented would be to create an inter-ministerial planning 
commission, tasked with supervising the PIP (identifying priority investments, and overseeing a 
costing exercise for public investments in those priority areas); overseeing a fiscal and statistical 
analytical unit; ensuring internal consistency among the planning tools (including, and especially, 
between the annual budget and the MTEF), and beginning the process of streamlining the various 
planning documents and tools at the central level (including with long-term development priorities 
and among the sector plans). Such a planning commission could mobilize the diverse expertise of the 
Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion of the report, to support 
strategic policy making, financial modeling, and data analysis at a high level. Moreover, the commission 
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could serve as a coordinating body for high-level discussions among the line ministries, private sector, 
and donor community—especially as they relate to the mega-projects and capital investments of the 
public investment program. Currently, the MPD is undertaking a mapping of the National Planning 
System. This is a critical first step toward establishing such a commission, and the efforts of the MPD in 
this respect should be supported. 
 
4. Effective management of resources for sustainable development  
The first steps toward preparing a robust MTEF are modeling the available resources, including 
disaggregated accounting of and modeling of tax and other revenues, donor support, extra-budgetary 
funds and quasi-fiscal activities, such as private-sector expenditures. The broad medium-term 
macroeconomic projections (based on transparent and realistic assumptions), aggregate fiscal targets 
and major fiscal risks should also be transparently reported and explained in the MTEF.281   
 
Quasi-fiscal activities include investments in infrastructure, human capital or training, special 
development funds, or corporate social responsibility projects. 
 
4.1 Anticipating and managing resource revenues 
Revenue management is a huge task for all governments, and extractive resources add an additional 
level of complexity, given the volatility of the revenues and their non-renewable nature. The volatility 
and uncertainty about future production makes yearly budgetary planning more difficult, and the 
exhaustibility of the resources makes the management of revenues more important. For Mozambique, 
for which the natural resource sector will increasingly represent a larger portion of Mozambique’s 
economy with corresponding implications for public accounts and budgetary resources, it is critical for 
the fiscal framework to include both disaggregated reporting on the resource revenues (to allow for 
transparent accounting of the payments and expenditures of resource revenues) and transparent and 
robust projections of future revenues from the extraction of these resources.  
 
Full disclosure of projected and actual resource revenues and how the revenues will be allocated 
reduces the risk of mismanagement of the revenues and improves confidence in the budget process. In 
fact, industry may be more willing to contribute more to the budgetary system (through taxes and 
royalties) and spend less on quasi-fiscal expenditures if they have confidence that the resource revenues 
will be managed soundly and invested in national and regional development priorities. Confidence in the 
budgeting process and the allocation of resources toward national development priorities may also 
increase the portion of aid that development partners allocate to general budget support. 
 
4.1.1 Disaggregated reporting of resource revenues 
The fiscal flows from natural resource extraction should be clearly identified, described, and disclosed in 
the budget documents282; these include not only royalties and taxes, but also interest earned on funds, 
quasi-fiscal expenditures by international companies, and incentives and deductions afforded to the 
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industries.283 Reporting disaggregated fiscal flows is important for four main reasons: 1) the different 
forms of revenue flows have different degrees of volatility, risks, and macroeconomic implications, so 
their effects on macroeconomic models varies; 2) it allows for the identification of discrepancies more 
easily between company-reported payments and government revenues284; 3) it allows for specific 
earmarking of certain types of flows for certain purposes, if desirable; and 4) different divisions and 
directorates may be responsible for overseeing or auditing different aspects of the fiscal flows. 
 
Currently, according to the IMF, the budget documents “allow for the identification of the Tax on 
Mining/Petroleum Production (Royalties) and Land Tax, and the earmarked and own revenues (Taxas de 
Prestação de Serviços) of the Mining Development Fund.285 However, the budget documents (proposal, 
law, etc.) do not make it possible to identify either the corporate income tax revenue from mining and 
hydrocarbon companies, or the funds obtained from mining concession revenues. Improving the 
disaggregated reporting of resource revenues should not be difficult for Mozambique, as the budget 
classification systems allows for the identification of revenues according to their source. 
 
4.1.2 Modeling future revenue flows 
To date, resource revenues in Mozambique have been quite modest, especially as some of the large 
extractive projects have only recently begun production, and others are still in the exploration stage. 
However, revenues are set to increase significantly as existing projects are expanded, companies 
exhaust the tax depreciation of their initial development costs, and additional mining and natural gas 
projects come online.286 For a country anticipating significant resource revenues, such as Mozambique, 
the medium- and long-term budgetary framework will depend to a large extent on the rate of 
exploitation of the natural resources, the fiscal terms of the contracts and laws, and the expected 
revenues (of all types) from the extraction. These factors should be considered alongside Mozambique’s 
overall fiscal and economic objectives over the medium and long term.287 
 
Presently, the potential and anticipated resource revenues are neither estimated nor disclosed.288 
However, Mozambique’s development planning, and especially the MTEF, could benefit tremendously 
(if not, instrumentally) by anticipating the revenue streams that are likely to come on line over the next 
decade, including forecasting their expected values, time horizons, risks, and volatilities.289 These 
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estimates and models should be publicly available, and regularly revisited and revised, given the 
frequency with which the assumptions (price, production costs, project size, etc.) change and the 
uncertainties surrounding each.290  
 
Modeling Resource Revenues
291 
The IMF has recommended several elements of a robust modeling of resource revenues necessary to 
underpin a medium-term fiscal framework, including:  
• Specification of the fiscal regime (including any exemptions) applicable to each field or mine. In 
Mozambique, the transparency of the sector and the manageability of the funds could be 
improved with improvements to the fiscal regime. For instance, pre-production costs are 
calculated on a contract-by-contract basis, rather than specified and applied generally by law.292 
Some of these are addressed in Chapter 5 of this report.  
• Detailed analysis of project-by-project production estimates, based on the technical production 
characteristics of each project (periodically checked against actual company production 
numbers). The operation costs of the extractive industries affect the profit declared, and 
therefore, the ultimate tax paid on the profit. Currently, in Mozambique, production costs are 
determined solely by the mining companies. The 2011 Mozambique EITI report recommends 
that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Mineral Resources conduct studies to establish 
their own benchmarks for the cost of operation at the mines to verify the costs reported by 
companies (auditing is discussed at length in Chapter 5). 
• Baseline price assumptions (acknowledging measurement difficulties, uncertainty over physical 
volumes and prices, and the lack of current standards even for advanced countries). The 
Mozambique EITI report recommended improvements in the current valuation method for the 
resources, such as addressing the issue of hedging in determining the value of minerals sold and 
a mechanism for confirming the quality provided by the mines.293  
• A sensitivity analysis to show likely changes in asset worth as a result of changes in key 
parameters, such as baseline oil or mineral price. 
Publishing this information will help the public understand the contribution of the sector to the 
government’s budgetary resources, as well as the implications of the government’s fiscal policies.294,295 
 
The MTEF (and underlying resource revenue model) should comprehensively address the various fiscal 
implications of the natural resource sector, meaning that in addition to revenue streams (taxes, royalties, 
bonuses), the model should also account for fiscal incentives, deductions, and other benefits that affect 
the revenue streams; quasi-fiscal activities of the companies (including corporate social responsibility 
projects, investments in infrastructure and human capital, and special development funds established); 
any equity ownership or participation in the projects of national resource companies; and other aspects 
of the resource extraction that implicate budgetary or extra-budgetary resources. Currently, these are 
not comprehensively calculated, published, or otherwise available in Mozambique.  
 
                                                 
290
 Sachs, Jeffrey D. "How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth." Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia UP, 
2007.  
291
 Chapter 5 of this report discusses the usefulness of modeling resource revenues to evaluate the fiscal terms of the law and 
of contracts for extractive activities to ensure that the government gets a “good deal” for its resources. 
292
 Mozambique EITI report. 
293
 Ibid. 
294
 IMF guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. 
295
 Mozambique EITI report. 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
114 
Quasi-fiscal activities by resource companies are rarely incorporated explicitly in resource revenue 
models (or other budget documents or development plans) in resource-rich countries, but an explicit 
consideration of these fiscal implications of resource extraction would be beneficial for at least three 
budgeting and planning purposes. First, several activities of resource companies, especially during the 
exploration phase of a project or social development activities, are cost recoverable or tax deductible, 
meaning that simply basing revenue flow projections for budgetary planning purposes on the fiscal 
code for mineral or hydrocarbon extraction will overlook these “costs” in forgone revenue.296  
 
Second, several resource companies agree in their negotiations with governments to implement social 
development or infrastructure projects (schools, clinics, roads, etc.) either as a condition for the 
concession or license, or in return for tax deductions. These are important both for the implications of 
the forgone taxes, but also, because these are extra-budgetary spending on social and infrastructure 
programs that complement the government’s budget for these activities. As a result, both companies 
and governments have an interest in the transparent and public accounting of these activities: “for 
governments, reporting on such quasi-fiscal activities demonstrates higher spending on development 
than is reported in the actual budget, and for companies, such public reports are evidence of corporate 
social responsibility and pro-development spending, in addition to taxes.”297  
 
Third, tracking these quasi-fiscal activities, including both the costs and results of fiscal incentives and 
company-funded development programs, is important to help inform future policies toward 
incentives and corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects.298 Tracking the costs, outcomes, and 
quality of these investments can help governments assess whether the public sector, private sector, or a 
public-private partnership is best positioned to make certain investments. In addition to supporting the 
planning and budgeting process, this type of fiscal modeling of fiscal and quasi-fiscal investments of the 
extractive industry is necessary to design an appropriate fiscal regime and regulatory framework for 
such investments. This use of fiscal modeling is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
As of mid-2011, Mozambique does not have an established sovereign wealth fund or resource-revenue 
fund, though reports indicate that such a fund is under consideration. The pros and cons of such a fund 
are discussed more below. However, in the context of revenue forecasting and modeling, it should be 
mentioned that in the event a fund is established, the accounts and transactions of the fund should be 
incorporated into the overall model of resource revenue streams, and subsequently integrated into the 
MTEF, so that they are administered consistently with the government’s overall fiscal and expenditure 
policies and framework. Moreover, such funds ideally operate within the budgetary framework to 
ensure consistency with overall budgetary goals and to ensure efficiency, transparency, and 
accountability in the fund’s management and use.299 
 
4.2 Improving the efficacy of donor and private-sector support 
Mozambique’s development partners, the so-called Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), provide 50% of 
their overall support to Mozambique through general budgetary support. Nevertheless, despite 
substantial improvements over the past several years, there remains an opportunity for donors to 
improve the alignment of their support, both among the donors, and with the government’s own 
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development processes and systems. There are at least three major ways in which donors could 
support the government’s planning process more effectively: increasing the transparency and 
predictability of donor allocations over a medium-term time horizon; coordinating donor support 
among the donors and around the government’s identified priorities; and channeling more donor 
support through the government’s own systems. Moreover, private-sector development programs and 
activities should be aligned with government priorities and reflected in the MTEF, as well.  
 
4.2.1 Transparency and predictability of donor support 
As discussed above, the purpose of a robust and comprehensive MTEF is to help the government set 
priorities, determine activities and public investment plans to meet the development objectives, and 
then to allocate the available resources toward those activities and investments efficiently and 
transparently. It is therefore important that the MTEF account for all of the budgetary resources, 
including donor support, both on- and off-budget. MTEFs should allow the government to plan more 
than a year in advance, which is necessary for the design and successful implementation of almost all 
public investment strategies. That means that, at the very least, there should be predictability about 
donor aid and commitments for the time horizon of the MTEF (3-5 years). Lack of predictability about 
the resources available in the medium term makes such budgetary and development planning 
difficult.300  
 
It has been pointed out that “donors’ lack of capacity to provide credible medium-term estimates of 
their support to various areas of government intervention is …contradictory …[since] on one hand, 
donors insist on government putting together three-year spending projections, while on the other they 
are not able to do that themselves.”301 Aid flows have been estimated to be 40 times more volatile than 
tax revenues, making fiscal and expenditure planning especially complicated for aid-dependent 
countries. Moreover, the IMF suggests that a rising share of budget support, as has been the trend in 
Mozambique, “can aggravate aid volatility because of the inability of donors to make long-term 
commitments for budget support.”302  
 
In the near term, the MTEF could include contingency financing scenarios for the most critical sectors, in 
the event that donor disbursements are withheld or delayed. However, a more effective solution is for 
donors to make binding, reliable multi-year commitments, in line with MTEF priority sectors, to ensure 
predictable and reliable funding for public investments. In fact, international donors have pledged to 
provide more predictable and multi-year commitments, though these commitments have not been 
uniformly implemented.303 Currently, only DFID and Dutch Cooperation have rolling multi-annual budget 
support agreements304; most of the other donors have multi-annual agreements, but there is no 
predictability about whether and to what extent the agreements will be renewed.305  
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4.2.2 Coordinating donor support among donors and with government priorities 
One of the challenges of donor support in any developing country is that each donor is guided 
substantially by “headquarters,” meaning that they are constrained to a large extent by the priorities, 
procedures, and politics of their home governments. As a result, the in-country development partner 
representatives do not have the complete flexibility to adapt their support to the Mozambican 
Government’s changing needs and priorities nor to think creatively about untraditional forms of support. 
Moreover, the development partners do not always align their programs even with the other 
Programme Aid Partners. The World Bank recently noted that the “current ad hoc project-by-project 
approach in development partner financing has led to fragmented planning, volatile and uncertain 
financial flows, and duplicated efforts.”306  
 
The donors have taken steps over the past several years to align their programmatic support with each 
other. For instance, in addition to the coordinated budget support, the donors have established several 
common funds, such as those for health (PROSAUDE II), agriculture (PROAGRI), budget reform, and 
support for the Administrative Court and rural water and sanitation programs, among others. These 
joint funds streamline the donor assistance to enhance the aid effectiveness in each sector, and many of 
them use national budget execution procedures and publish their commitments a year in advance, 
which are all positive steps.307 However, these common funds for directed sector support can also 
undermine government reporting and budgeting processes. In several cases, “planning, budgeting and 
reporting mechanisms were often set up [at the sector level] that were not synchronised or compatible 
with similar mechanisms in place at central level, or designed without taking into account ongoing 
central reform efforts.”308  
 
Donor support for the sectors skews the incentives of the sectors to take seriously government planning, 
strategies, budgeting, and reporting procedures—both because processes at the sector level may be 
different and incompatible, and also because the direct funding for the sector depends on adhering to 
the sector-specific plans, budgets, and reporting guidelines. One source describes how the health sector 
prioritized its short- and medium-term sector strategies (which included mainly donor-funded activities) 
over the PARPA and PES, leading to policy incoherence.309 These sector strategies often reflect donor 
preferences for specific programs that may not be in line with national strategies; for instance, the 
global trend has been that donor support for certain infectious diseases (with high mortality rates) has 
increased substantially, while allocations for basic health proportionally declined.310 
 
Further steps could be taken to ensure that the development partners’ support is in line with and 
supports national strategies and reporting guidelines, and is coherent in the sectors in which there is 
not currently a common fund. In addition to improving the coherence of the donor programs among 
each other and with the government’s own plans, “coordinated action by development partners will 
also reduce the unit costs of increasing access, by achieving economies of scale in implementation.”311 
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Until the systems evolve to be more compatible, the development partners can strategize with the 
government about how best to adapt the available means of support to the government’s needs. For 
instance, given that the government and the development partners recognize the need for technical 
assistance with both development planning and the implementation of development plans, the 
donors could support a planning and implementation workshop, bringing in international expertise to 
support the process of development planning and the design of institutions and processes to improve 
the translation of the plans and priorities into actionable programs. Improved planning and 
implementation capacity would benefit both the government and donors, who are trying to align their 
available support with the government’s own plans and priorities. 
 
4.2.3 Channeling donor support through government systems 
Although 50% of donor support to the government comes as budgetary support, that leaves half of all 
foreign aid that remains project support, and the majority of the project support is either not included in 
the annual budget or is included in the budget but with the funds managed by the donors.312  
 
Despite requests by the Ministry of Finance for donors to channel more project support through the 
Single Treasury Account (CUT), which would make the funds predictable for budgeting and planning 
purposes, one source estimated that only 5-10% of all project support by donors is currently channeled 
through the CUT.313 The IMF’s 2008 PEFA also concluded that: “What is needed is a system, through 
which the sectors inform the National Treasury Directorate (DNT) of the expected flow of the projects. 
This can only be done in an effective way by increasing pre-visibility of the external project 
disbursements and by increasing the use of the CUT.”314  
 
In addition to facilitating planning, channeling aid through government systems can help to 
strengthen the government systems and to bring them in line with international best practices in 
public financial management. Moreover, using the country systems enables the government and civil 
society to monitor how the project support is being spent. When donors do not use government 
budgetary systems, reporting, procurement or auditing processes, it “makes it all but impossible for the 
government, parliament or civil society to monitor clearly how this money is being spent.”315  
 
There is significant variation among the donors in terms of their use of Mozambique’s budgetary 
systems. The United States, the largest donor to Mozambique in 2009, does not channel any of its 
support through the government’s systems, and the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and 
Portugal also reportedly bypass the majority of the government’s systems.316 Some donors, such as the 
World Bank, require separate procurement and audit procedures from the government’s own systems. 
Moreover, many donors, including for instance, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
have distinct disbursement conditions, monitoring and reporting criteria, and financial execution 
procedures, creating additional levels of overlapping reports, inconsistent criteria for evaluation, 
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unpredictability with respect to the flows, and many added layers of bureaucracy and administration.317 
In 2009, DFID hired a consultant to adapt the DFID systems to the government systems, in order to make 
them compatible and to maximize the use of the national management systems. This exercise could 
usefully be replicated or shared with other donors in similar situations.318  
 
Of course, channeling project support through government systems is a mutual responsibility of both 
donors and the Government, requiring respective commitments, transparency, and accountability for 
the management of the funds. As donors and the government build trust for the management of project 
support funds in the public systems, donors should at least start to report on their aid and projects in a 
manner consistent with the budget classifications of the e-SISTAFE system, to enable integration in 
the MTEF even of off-budget projects. Moreover, donors should distinguish between capital 
expenditures and recurrent expenditures to facilitate the government’s medium-term planning.319  
 
In conclusion, improving public financial management (medium-term planning, strategic allocation of 
resources, proper use of budgeting and reporting tools, etc..) is integral to improving the efficiency of 
spending in Mozambique, shifting spending toward priority areas, reducing waste and misappropriation 
of funds, and realizing development outcomes.320 The “lack of transparency and coordination, a 
multiplicity of implementation and reporting mechanisms, and high levels of volatility and 
unpredictability” of donor support can all have a substantially negative impact on Mozambique’s efforts 
to improve these integral planning and budgeting processes.321 
 
The group of development partners have all committed to improving the efficiency of their aid by 
adhering to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). 
Steps have been taken to improve information about the aid flows, including the quantity, the projects 
and the results, such as through an online database (ODAMOZ, www.odamoz.org.mz), where donors 
record their commitments and expenditures on individual projects. Reportedly, however, there is room 
for improving the data entry on ODAMOZ to ensure that the information is accurate, and more 
importantly, to connect ODAMOZ to the government’s own financial management system, e-SISTAFE.322 
 
4.2.4 Private-sector development activities 
Several major investors in Mozambique, including in the Zambezi Valley, have committed substantial 
resources to community and regional development, including infrastructure investments (roads, schools, 
clinics), training programs (for SMEs and vocational schools), agricultural development, environmental 
programs, and the like. In some cases, the specific projects are agreed upon with specific government 
officials or government agencies, either during negotiations or in the investment contract. Rarely, 
however, is the investor familiar with the government’s medium-term development priorities, public 
investment program, or sector-specific strategies, and private-sector development programs are never 
reflected in the MTEF. As a result, the private-sector programs are developed in parallel to existing 
initiatives rather than developing programs that supplement and bolster existing programs and 
initiatives, and allow the government to plan complementary public investments.  
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Coordination of private-sector activities and development priorities could be done at the municipal or 
provincial level (for instance, in cases of mining companies catering to the specific development needs 
of a local community) or at a national level (in the case of planning large infrastructure investments or 
establishing development funds, such as the fund established by Vale for regional development projects). 
Many of the tools suggested throughout this report would help the private sector align its investments 
and activities with those of the government, such as joining business alliances (Chapter 1), supporting 
the creation of an aspirational infrastructure map (Chapter 2), committing to cumulative environmental 
risk management programs (Chapter 3), and coordinating with an inter-ministerial committee tasked 
with overseeing the public investment program (Chapter 4), among others. Streamlining the planning 
documents and strategies, harmonizing monitoring and evaluation tools and reporting guidelines, and 
facilitating discussion about national priorities, such as through the National Observatories, would all 
help the alignment of public and private activities as well. 
 
There are a number of benefits for the private sector in ensuring that their programs are in line with 
regional or national development priorities: the company could attract additional funding (public, NGO, 
or donor) or in-kind support (such as publicly trained teachers for new schools) to leverage the 
company’s own investments, increasing the size and impact of the project; the company can use existing 
metrics and reporting tools and systems to measure and report on results, rather than developing 
parallel tools; the continuity of the project past the investment lifecycle is more likely if the program is 
already a government priority;  and there is a greater likelihood that the program will have a meaningful 
impact if the project has been identified as a regional or national priority. 
 
5. Strategy for resource revenue allocation 
One of the most critical policy decisions for governments of resource-rich countries is how to allocate 
the resource revenues. It is important to remember that resource revenues can raise a country’s GDP 
without having any development impact. In order to ensure that the revenues benefit the country, in 
addition to adding to GDP, a national strategy should ensure that the revenues are managed 
transparently, that the benefits are shared among the population, and that the resources are 
strategically invested accordingly, in line with the PARP priorities and MTEF expenditure lines.  
 
Companies, too, have an interest in ensuring that their payments to the government are translated into 
development benefits for the local and national communities that are impacted by the investment (and 
who therefore expect development benefits from the presence of the company), and that the citizens 
affected by the investment (both locally and nationally) can track the benefits of the company’s 
payments through strategic public investments. Articulating a plan for the transparent use of the 
resource revenues in line with development objectives will therefore build trust both with the 
companies and communities, and will create a platform for a more operational discussion about how 
the benefits and responsibilities of the extractive activities will be shared among the stakeholders.  
 
There are a number of (sometimes competing) priorities facing policymakers in determining how 
revenues should be allocated: 1) the population of the host country should benefit from the extraction 
of resources owned by the state, either directly or as beneficiaries of a public investment program; 2) 
since resource prices and markets are highly volatile, revenues from extraction should be used to 
smooth consumption and ensure fiscal stability in the short and long terms; and 3) since the resources 
are non-renewable, the benefits of resource extraction should extend to future generations. 
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Legal and institutional frameworks for the allocation and use of resource revenues vary significantly 
among countries. In some countries, revenue streams are collected in the central treasury account and 
are administered as any other form of revenue. In other cases, either a portion or all of the revenue 
streams are managed separately; either allocated back to the region of production, transferred to the 
population in the form of cash transfers, or managed separately in a resource fund.323 One could 
imagine that decisions about the optimal allocation and management of revenues will depend on the 
local impacts of the extractive activities, the capacity of the sub-national governments, the extent to 
which the budgeting process is decentralized, and the levels of poverty and the wealth disparities 
among the population, among other factors. 
 
Resource revenues can be allocated either through the general budget (in the case of a robust budget 
that was in line with the development priorities), through a transparent, earmarked budgeting process, 
or through the creation of funds that are specifically targeted for key public-sector investments. 
Earmarking resource revenues has been more successful in some cases than in others. In Chad, the 
World Bank supported a petroleum revenue management law that specifically earmarked petroleum 
revenues for investments in health, education, and other sectors. However, shortly after the law was 
passed, parliament controversially changed it, increasing access to the revenues for discretionary use. In 
Botswana, however, mineral revenues have been consistently reinvested in infrastructure and human 
capital development in accordance with the Government’s National Development Plans, and is widely 
considered an example of successful resource management. And in Timor-Leste, in 2010, the 
Government created two funds, an Infrastructure Fund and a Human Capital Fund, to specifically 
earmark funds from the Petroleum Fund for strategic public investments in line with development 
priorities. 
 
Ultimately, the strategy for managing and allocating the resources should both reflect the priorities of 
the development plans and, in turn, be reflected and incorporated into the development plans and 
MTEF as well. Moreover, now is the best time for Mozambique to consider its strategy for managing 
and allocating resource revenues, since current revenue streams are still small; stakeholders can have 
a genuine discussion about the optimal management and allocation strategy with less political pressure 
than often exists when revenue flows are high. 
 
6. Monitoring and supporting the national development planning process 
One of the greatest criticisms of either market-led or government-led development, from both ends of 
the spectrum, is that personal and institutional interests, limited institutional capacity, and the 
complexity of the development challenge mean that even well-articulated policies (corporate or public) 
do not necessarily translate to positive outcomes. In the worst case, of course, systemic corruption (or 
even the corruption of a few leaders) undermines any well-designed law, policy, or national 
development plan. Short-term interests and personal gain trump national development opportunities or 
visions. Even in the absence of corruption or fiscal mismanagement, effective national planning and 
revenue management can be undermined by the complexity of the processes, the multiple players 
involved in public financial management (including tax collection, revenue management, budgeting, and 
spending), poor data accessibility and reliability, the lack of coordination within a cabinet or between 
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the cabinet and other stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and development partners), 
the lack of transparency over key documents and processes, and other challenges.324  
 
Any effective allocation of resource revenues requires transparency and accountability mechanisms to 
allow the public to track the resource spending and monitor its contribution to development. If the 
necessary information is transparent and available, local and international civil society organizations can 
play an instrumental role in assuring integrity of the processes and data. One of the most assured 
mechanisms for ensuring transparency would be to create a “Transparency Portal,” akin to the portal 
recently established by Timor-Leste (see box), to centralize information about the government’s budget 
processes and execution. 
 
Timor-Leste’s Transparency Portal 
In March 2011, Timor-Leste’s government announced a Transparency Portal, allowing its citizens and 
the broader international community to monitor public expenditure online, with information updated 
daily. Specifically, the Transparency Portal allows users to see “how the budget is being executed, what 
is being spent in each Ministry, Department and Directorate and on what category of items.” In 
announcing the Portal, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao said that “[f]or a Government that is committed 
to broad development throughout the country, it is important that the public has access to this 
information,” and he noted the particular importance of this transparency given the recently established 
Infrastructure Fund and Human Capacity Development Fund, through which the government plans to 
channel resource revenues toward strategic investments. Prime Minister Gusmao called on “all 
Timorese to be involved in the very operation of public administration and, in as much as possible, 
participate in Government decision making.” 
 
There are some international initiatives that allow for the population and civil society to track the 
spending of the resource revenues. The International Budget Project (IBP), for instance, has worked 
since 1997 to promote budget transparency and accountability in low- and middle-income countries. 
The IBP produces an Open Budget Index (OBI) to monitor and measure the comprehensiveness and 
accessibility of the information provided about the central government’s budget and financial activities. 
Mozambique scored quite low on the Index in 2010 (earning a 28 out of 100), indicating that the 
government provides minimal information to the public on the central government’s budget and 
financial activities during the year.325 However, Eneas da Conceicao Comiche, former Finance Minister 
and current head of the Plan and Budget Commission of the Mozambican parliament, noted that the 
wording of the survey is not as applicable in Mozambique, and that some of the “missing” documents 
for which Mozambique received a low score in fact do exist but are called by different names. Others 
have backed his criticism of the OBI in the Mozambican context as well.326 In any event, there is certainly 
room for improvement in budget transparency in Mozambique, in part because much of the information 
that should be made public is still not systematically analyzed or produced in Mozambique. It should be 
noted that budget transparency can also benefit countries financially, since countries with transparent 
budgets and budgeting processes often have better access to international financial markets and to 
low-cost loans. 
 
Other well-established multi-stakeholder initiatives and transparency mechanisms, discussed more 
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extensively in Chapter 5, focus on the revenue collection process, including through EITI, Publish What 
You Pay and some home-grown oversight commissions that monitor and publicize the payments of 
governments and the revenues of governments. There has been some discussion among these 
multilateral stakeholder groups, including EITI++ and the Public What You Pay networks to track the 
spending of governments on a regional or international basis through a “Publish what you spend” 
initiative, though no mechanism has yet materialized. The EITI initiative was initially established “to 
improve upon development outcomes from payments made by Extractive Industries to 
governments.”327 There are several ways, therefore, in which MEITI could be enhanced to meet that goal. 
First and foremost, the MEITI report could go beyond simply tracking the payments and revenues, and 
address the allocation of the resource revenues. In the best case, the report would “track the spending” 
through the budgetary processes, to enable monitoring and auditing of the development spending. 
MEITI could also report on community and infrastructure expenditures by the private sector, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. In the short term, the MEITI could at least publish and disseminate the national 
strategy for the use of the resource revenues, so that there is clarity among the stakeholders, including 
local populations and companies, about how the resource revenues are being allocated for development 
purposes. 
 
In Mozambique, there are a number of initiatives to oversee the planning and budgeting processes. 
Particularly noteworthy initiatives include the national and provincial Observatories, a consultative 
forum where the range of stakeholders (civil society, donors, private sector and government) discuss 
policy priorities. There are some noteworthy civil society groups that actively participate in the policy 
dialogue, including the Mozambique Debt Group (GMD), the Center for Public Integrity (CPI), and the 
Community Development Foundation (FDC). In March 2011, CPI began to publish 2010 public 
expenditure reports for 15 districts in five provinces, under its Budget Monitoring, Expense Tracking and 
Social Audit Program, which seeks to increase budget transparency and the effectiveness of public 
expenditure in Mozambique. 328 Further private-sector and donor support for these organizations could 
significantly improve their capacity to promote transparency and to participate in the government’s 
development process by overseeing and participating in decisions about budgeting, prioritization, and 
resource revenue allocations. 
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7. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Recommendation Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
Planning for resource-
based development 
Medium-term development plans should include resource–based infrastructure, linkages, revenue 
management, domestic resource needs, and cumulative environmental risks 
 
Creating an inter-ministerial commission 1) to supervise the PIP, 2) to oversee statistical analysis, 3) to 
ensure consistency of planning tool, 4) to begin streamlining various development plans  
MPD Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments 
Development 
Partners 
 
Aligning and 
operationalizing key 
objectives, priorities and 
actions of development 
plans 
 
Streamlining central and sector planning documents to focus on priority issues in line with MDG targets  
 
Creating an institutional framework for engaging line ministries, donors, and private sector   
 
Designing a PIP to identify and cost strategic public investment projects and align with financing options 
 
Streamlining M&E indicators and processes, reducing redundant reporting and administration, and 
increasing rigor of statistical analysis.  
 
Convening a planning workshop  for MPD and line ministries 
MPD, 
Min. of Finance 
Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments, 
Private Sector 
Development 
Partners 
 
Preparing a robust MTEF Reconciling the budget process with the MTEF    
 
Aligning and costing key development priorities (such as the PIP) in the MTEF 
 
Modeling available resources (tax and other revenues, donor support, extra-budgetary funds and quasi-
fiscal activities, such as private-sector expenditures) 
MPD, 
Min. of Finance 
Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Provincial 
Governments 
IMF, WB 
 
Improving efficacy of 
donor support and private-
sector development 
activities 
 
Increasing the transparency and predictability of donor allocations over MTEF time horizon  
 
Coordinating donor support among the donors and around the government’s identified priorities 
 
Channeling more donor support through the government’s own systems and reporting all according to 
budget classification 
 
Aligning private-sector development activities with government’s priorities and systems 
 
MPD Other 
Ministries, 
Development 
Partners, 
Private Sector 
Development  
Partners 
Monitoring the national 
development planning 
process 
 
Improving Budget Transparency (such as through enhanced MEITI)  
 
Supporting civil society and private-sector engagement in planning and monitoring processes 
MPD, 
Min. of Finance 
 
MEITI, 
Debt Group, 
FDC, 
CPI 
Development  
Partners, 
Private Sector 
   
Chapter Five: A Transparent and Mutually Beneficial Legal Framework 
for Extractive Industries 
Introduction 
A predictable, durable, and equitable legal framework, implemented by strong government, corporate, 
and societal institutions, is the foundation of a mutually beneficial mining sector.  When the rules for 
company, government, and citizens are widely known, investments can operate smoothly, governments 
can manage them effectively, and citizens can monitor how the benefits of the investment—fiscal and 
non-fiscal—are allocated.  A transparent, mutually beneficial legal framework will not prevent 
exogenous shocks and other potentially negative effects like accidents, but it facilitates mitigation and 
adaptation.  Since these are long-term and multi-faceted relationships, a balanced and transparent 
contractual and fiscal relationship will underpin an efficient and fair sharing of the resource wealth, both 
between the company and the government, and between the government and its citizens.   
 
In addition to jobs, capital, infrastructure, and technology, as discussed in Chapter 2, Mozambique’s 
natural resources can and should generate substantial fiscal revenues for the government. Mineral 
revenues could provide a significant expansion of the state budget, which needs funds to provide 
essential public services to the country and end extreme poverty, as described in Chapters 4 and 1, 
respectively. Since the resources are nonrenewable, the importance of ensuring that their extraction 
translates into revenues and public investments in development is especially great. 
 
There is currently a vibrant dialogue in Mozambique about the future of the country and how the new 
mining boom can contribute to accelerated growth for the country and the larger SADC region.  There is 
broad recognition that the country is at a pivotal moment.  Several megaprojects have been active for 
several years, such as Mozal and Sasol.  A small number of mining companies are in production, and 
most are scheduled to come into production in 2011, including Vale and Rio Tinto/Riversdale.  Other 
companies have signed concession agreements and will be moving to production in the coming years.  
Numerous exploration activities are proceeding in the country, as well.   
 
Reflecting on the mechanisms to ensure maximum benefit of the extractive sector for all stakeholders is 
particularly relevant for Mozambique at this moment: the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM) is 
currently reviewing the country’s mining laws and model mining contract. This is an opportunity to 
learn from past experience in Mozambique, as well as comparative international experiences, to 
implement innovative solutions for the future. For instance, there are currently gaps in the fiscal regime 
that could be addressed through revisions such as implementing a resource rent tax (RRT) to capture 
windfall profits and implementing capital gains taxes to capture the benefit of the sale of mineral 
deposits from one company to another. These are discussed in more depth below. 
 
Amid this review by MIREM, there are currently calls by some members of society and government to 
update contracts in several sectors, including mining, in order to ensure mutual long-term gains on both 
sides. Financial modeling of existing contracts would ground the discussion about updating the contracts 
in a deeper understanding of the costs and benefits of mineral fiscal policy.  For the mining sector, 
contract disclosure and open discussion about the costs and benefits of current contracts, as well as 
anticipated benefits of future contracts, are centrally important. 
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The focus of this chapter is on the regulatory and fiscal regime for the mining sector. Not every law that 
is of great importance to the sector is discussed.  Health, safety, labor, human rights, and land rights are 
all areas that require legislation and robust institutions to ensure that communities benefit from mining 
activities. 329   Mining companies need general commercial laws like banking, property, contract, 
investment, and taxation to operate smoothly. Environmental laws and regulations are addressed briefly, 
though not comprehensively, in Chapter 3. These, and many other laws and regulations, while not 
discussed in this chapter, are integrally important for ensuring the mutual benefits of the extractive 
industries to the public and private sectors and to local communities. 
 
Given the central importance of the fiscal benefits from the mining sector and the current revisions of 
the mining law and model contact, the focus of the first part of this chapter is on some of the most 
pressing reforms the country might consider during this process.  The second part of the chapter focuses 
on how to ensure that money owed to the government is actually received. Financial auditing and 
enhancing the EITI process to monitor the fiscal benefits more completely would ensure that tax-
dodging, poor accounting, or simple mistakes do not result in great financial loss to Mozambique. 
 
1. Revising the model contract and mining law 
Mozambique’s plan to revise the mining code and model contract present an opportunity to implement 
a fiscal framework, reflective of Mozambique’s current investment climate, which ensures that the 
benefits of the extractive industries are shared among companies, communities, and the national 
population. While revising laws and contracts too often creates uncertainty, when done carefully and 
with a view towards long-term partnerships, a new legal framework that furthers the goals of the 
country and its partners is more durable and can be a source of stability. This can improve investor trust, 
allow for better enforcement of the law by government, and maximize the benefits of the industry for 
the citizens.   
 
When a country undertakes such a process, several critical questions arise:  What would be a fair deal in 
the current market?  What should go in the law versus the contract?  And what should be done with the 
contracts that have already been signed?  Can they be brought into the new system without 
undermining the country’s investment environment?  These questions are the subject of this section. 
 
1.1 Achieving a fair deal: the importance of financial modeling 
Financial revenues are one of the most important benefits a country receives for the extraction of its 
non-renewable natural resources.  A deal that is equitable for both the country and investors will be 
more durable than those that are too generous to either side.  A push to update the contracts will come 
from the investors or the citizens if deals are, or are perceived to be, too asymmetrical.  Independent 
financial modeling of revenues is critical for determining what a fair deal might be.  MIREM has financial 
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models provided by the companies; thoroughly vetting these and sharing them with the public is vital 
for public trust and management of the sector. 
 
Knowing what constitutes a fair deal is, however, an enormously difficult task.  First, “the deal” is in fact 
an imprecise term.  A “$2 billion dollar deal” reported in the media or announced by government and 
company officials could represent any number of calculations or estimates—how much the company 
plans to invest, what total returns of the project are estimated to be, or what the government is 
estimated to receive, among others.   The “deal” also depends on the price of the commodity, capital 
and operational costs (which includes transportation costs, financial costs, labor, the prices of 
consumables that are necessary to ship the project’s commodity to market), and other variables that 
will change over time, making any such number an estimate. Different assumptions about these 
variables can change the profitability of the mine for the investor, and in turn, how much the 
government will receive. What the government will receive is called the “government take” in mineral 
taxation literature.  
 
Government Take is the total share of revenue that a host government receives from the extraction of 
oil, gas, or mining resources. This share can include taxes, royalties and government equity shares, or 
other alternative taxation instruments, like resource rent taxes or production share of the resource, 
according to those in place in a given country. (See Figure 5 for an illustration of this calculation for a 
hypothetical coal mine). The Effective Tax Rate is used as a proxy to estimate the government take.  
 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is defined as the undiscounted value of all amounts paid to the government, 
divided by the undiscounted value of the before-tax cash flow of the project.  
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the discount rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all cash 
flows (both positive and negative) from a particular investment equal to zero. It is used to measure and 
compare the profitability of investments; a project is undertaken if the project’s IRR is greater than the 
cost of capital.  An investor’s IRR of a given project can also be calculated. 
 
Determining a ‘fair deal’ requires an estimate of the government take, as well as the project’s IRR and a 
comparison with other similar projects (discussed more below).  Financial modeling can be used to 
estimate the government take and IRR under various assumptions; such a model can be instrumental in 
determining desirable terms for new legislation and for model contracts to ensure that the government 
take is fair.  
 
Non-fiscal benefits like infrastructure, schools, linkages, and training programs are not captured in the 
government take.330  These benefits can be significant and need to be considered when assessing the 
benefits of a project, but quantifying and calculating these benefits can be challenging.  Other fees from 
ancillary infrastructure could also provide a separate revenue stream for the country.  For example, 
Botswana’s Selbi-Pikwe nickel-copper mine has been described as “sub-economic” and “rarely paid any 
tax or royalties (royalties were calculated on operating profits, not sales) and is said to have been a 
“springboard for development, paying for critical parts of the national infrastructure through user 
fees.”331   
                                                 
330
 Otto, James et al, Mining Royalties: A Global Study of their Impact on Investors, Government, and Civil Society (2006). 
However, to the extent that these non-fiscal benefits are tax-deductible, they are included in the calculation of the government 
take. 
331
 Hartley, Julian and James Otto, “Managing Mineral Resources: From Curse to Blessing.”  On file with authors. 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
127 
 
The optimal mix of fiscal benefits from the resource, ancillary infrastructure, and non-fiscal benefits is an 
important policy decision that relies on difficult calculations.  Financial models are critical to getting a 
clearer picture of the fiscal and non-fiscal benefits accruing to the country from the resources. In 
addition, when there is more dialogue among citizens, governments, and companies, these complex 
decisions are more durable in the long run; without it, countries may feel the constant political pressure 
to change the legal framework, causing cost and confusion for all stakeholders.  
 
1.1.1 The main elements of government take: royalties and taxes 
In mining, royalty and tax systems prevail as the predominant method for governments to receive fiscal 
benefits.  Royalties and taxes are at the “heart of the deal” and represent the largest cash streams for 
most governments, although other streams like import/export duties, value-added tax (VAT), and 
signature bonuses exist as well. 
 
A royalty is generally favored by governments because they are payable irrespective of whether the 
mine is making a profit or losing money.  It represents a payment for a non-renewable resource that has 
value, even if the company extracting the mineral is not making a profit from it.  Taxes, on the other 
hand, are levied on profits, so they will accrue to the government only when the company is making a 
profit from the mine.332  Though not universally true, royalties and taxes are generally set in law, as 
encouraged by the minerals literature. Mozambique has already done this in its minerals fiscal 
legislation. 
 
The general view is that unless a government urgently needs revenues in the near term, it is better off in 
the long run obtaining the majority of its share of production or revenues (or rent) with back-end-loaded 
elements like taxes or government participation (i.e. equity shares). However, there is no one-size-fits-
all answer; it all depends on what society seeks in return for its resources.  And, this may change over 
time, too.  With several large contracts soon coming into production under regressive royalty/tax 
regimes in Mozambique, now is the time to consider adding an additional progressive fiscal 
mechanism to capture more financial benefit, but on a longer time-horizon in future contracts. 
 
Progressive system: as the profitability of resource exploitation increases, there is a progressive 
increase in the government take. The profitability increases once the fixed costs incurred at the 
beginning of the project are all recovered and only the operating and other variable costs remain.333 The 
higher the prices, the shorter the investment recovery or payback period is. This tax system allows 
flexibility to extract the different rents actually generated by deposits under dynamic price and costs 
conditions. 
 
Regressive system: the inverse of a progressive system, i.e., as the profitability of resource exploitation 
increases, the government take is stable or actually declines. 
 
Fiscal mechanisms like bonuses and royalties334 will ensure that some of the government take comes 
earlier in the life of the project. However, the government is likely to end up with less in total if the 
                                                 
332
 This is an introductory explanation of mineral taxation concepts; not all royalties or taxes function as described in this text. 
333
 Operating and other variable costs are typically low compared to revenues. 
334
 These fiscal mechanisms are commonly referred to as regressive in the fiscal literature. Regressive taxation instruments are 
generally those where the government does not receive as much of the upside benefit when profits are higher.   
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system is too heavily front-end-loaded with these forms of revenue streams.335  Regressive elements 
also keep the country from benefitting from higher profits, as demonstrated in the Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Progressive and Regressive Taxation
336
 
 
Under regressive systems, countries do not benefit as much when prices are higher or costs are much 
lower.  This result led many governments to seek renegotiation during the boom in commodity prices in 
2007-2008 and has led to renewed interest in progressive taxation mechanisms. These mechanisms are 
discussed further below, in the specific context of MIREM’s work to update the mining law and model 
contract; the current fiscal package in Mozambique is regressive and could be made more progressive. 
 
1.1.2 Illustration of fiscal regime through a model of a copper mine 
Figure 5 shows an example of a 
financial model, in this case of Kamoto 
copper mine in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
illustrating how a model can be used 
to calculate the government take of a 
particular project. This model was 
prepared by Columbia University in 
2007. Inputs into the model include 
publicly available information about 
long and short term copper and cobalt 
prices; the relevant taxes from the 
DRC’s fiscal regime; specific 
production values; capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) and operating 
costs; and other terms agreed in the 
contract. Moreover, a number of other 
factors could affect the government 
take and IRR, such as the quality of the 
ore and the processes needed to 
extract it. 
 
                                                 
335
 Israel Hydrocarbon Fiscal Analysis and Commentary 15 November, 2010, Daniel Johnston. 
336
 Land, Bryan, “Resource rent taxes: a re-appraisal” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems, and 
Practice IMF (2010) at Appendix I, p. 259. 
Figure 5. Estimate of the government take of Kamoto copper mine in DRC 
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Based on the assumptions in this model, the government take was estimated to be around 56%; the 
underlying model also showed an unusually high internal rate of return of the project of 64%. In addition 
to the assumptions described above, Government take may also be affected by confidential tax benefits 
arranged between the parties, or transfer pricing (see box below) 
 
Designing a similar model for Mozambique’s mines would require access to actual project numbers 
and variables and contract terms, including any agreed tax breaks, which are currently confidential.  
 
Transfer pricing refers to transactions among related/affiliated companies for goods, services, or the 
use of property.  The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines state, “Transfer prices are significant for both 
taxpayers and tax administrations because they determine in large part the income and expenses, and 
therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises in different tax jurisdictions.”337   
 
Transfer pricing can result in losses to a country if not monitored carefully.  Costs, prices, and other 
charges may not be at “arms-length,” as they would be among independent enterprises.338  Examples 
include: debt financing provided by related parties at above-market rates; above-market fees for 
technical services, consulting, or intellectual property charged between related parties; and the sale of 
minerals at lower-than-market value to low tax jurisdictions. Since global mining companies often run 
vertically integrated operations that rely on multiple related corporate entities, there are many 
transactions in which transfer-pricing could occur.   
 
In Mozambique, there is a law on transfer pricing, but it has been described by accountants in Maputo 
as “extremely short and weak.”  A recent report calculated potential losses due to transfer pricing as at 
least $23.48 million in lost revenues for Mozambique between 2005 and 2007, though this was not a 
minerals-specific calculation.339 
 
In general, a complete financial model requires information about the relevant laws, actual project 
numbers and contract terms. However, the fairness of a fiscal regime is best assessed relative to a group 
of peer countries, as discussed in the next section. 
 
1.1.3 Methodology for a rigorous assessment of fiscal regimes 
Government take, in itself, is not enough to assess the fairness of a deal.  It is useful only to the extent 
that it allows comparison with a peer country group that presents similar risk and potential and where 
companies have similar profitability.  For the purpose of comparison, the government take does not 
address timing and the time value of money, which varies among countries. Depending on the 
development needs of a country, front-loaded revenues may be necessary for critical public investment, 
whereas other governments may prefer more continuous flows over time. Other considerations, such as 
the political economy, may affect the time value of revenues flows as well. 
 
The government take indicator allows a country to see if its position in this group is close to the average 
or far off.  Too far off in one way or the other is detrimental for the government and the company.  If 
                                                 
337
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2309111E.PDF. 
338
 The arms-length principle was developed by OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to guide how transactions should be priced 
among related units of a multinational enterprise.   
339
 McCaughey, Sorley.  Tax of Life: How Tax Dodging Undermines Irish Support to Poor Nations.  Christian Aid (May 2010). 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
130 
the government take is far below average, there will likely be a push to renegotiate the contract, and if 
the government take is far above average, it risks losing future investment in its mining sector or 
abandonment of a project that is underway.  The government take is only a tool to compare the fiscal 
benefits of one project to another, not a comprehensive indicator of all benefits nor a tool to compare 
non-fiscal benefits among projects.  
 
As an example, a study that was published in Israel in January 2011 that led to a reform of Israel’s fiscal 
regime and the renegotiation of the gas contracts based its argument precisely on low government take 
relative to its peer group (see box).340 
 
A rigorous approach to assessing the fairness of a fiscal regime 
An Israeli Commission in charge of assessing the fiscal regime defined its peer group as follows: 
1) gas prone, (2) deepwater, (3) somewhat risky beyond ordinary geological risk, (4) relatively remote 
with respect to logistical centers, and (5) experienced with respect to the international market for 
exploration acreage and projects. The commission then assessed that the government’s take has been, 
since 1952, at 30% whereas the average of the peer group is around 65%.341 
 
Mozambique’s peer group of countries would be: 
 Rich in coking coal 
 Open-pit mining   
 Aged or absent infrastructure in need of 
rehabilitation and upgrading or Greenfield 
development of this infrastructure 
 Weak business-enabling environment 
 
To date, no known study has produced a benchmarking of 
the government take and IRR of coal mining in various 
countries, which would usefully allow Mozambique to assess 
its fiscal regime relative to its peer group. For copper mining, 
James Otto and the Colorado School of Mines carried out such 
a benchmarking in select countries.342  Otto et al used a 
standardized copper mine model and applied all applicable 
royalties/taxes for each country in that model to compare the 
outcomes. (See Figure 6) 
 
They obtained an average government take (estimated by the ETR) of 49.2% for an IRR that are all below 
or equal to 15%. Since then, these averages have been used as a rough benchmark to assess the fairness 
of copper mining contracts. This benchmarking suggests that if a copper mine in a specific country yields 
a government take of significantly less than 49% for an IRR of 15% or more, then the country’s governing 
fiscal regime is below the world average; in such a case, the mine is sufficiently profitable for an updated 
tax policy that would align government take with the international average and ensure that the profits 
of the mine are shared over the long-term. Recall that the DRC Kamoto mine model yielded a 56% 
government take (ETR), which would indicate an above average take.  However, the IRR for the Kamoto 
mine (64%) far exceeded the range of what is considered a normal rate of return (12-15%) by the 
                                                 
340
 Carried out by Professor Eytan Sheshinski, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel  
341
 Daniel Johnston, Israel Hydrocarbon Fiscal Analysis and Commentary, 15 November, 2010.  
342
 James Otto et al., Mining Royalties, A global study on their impact on investors, government and civil society, WB, 2006. 
Figure 6. IRR and ETR for a Model Copper 
Mine in Selected Countries (Source: 
James Otto, 2006) 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment  
A Joint Center of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Columbia Law School 
 
Draft for consultation- June 2011 
 
131 
industry; this suggests that the company is collecting a “rent.” Rents are excess profits over the 
minimum rate of return which is required to justify investment. Taxing this rent increases the 
government take (See section 1.2.1).  
 
Importantly, government take, while a useful indicator, also does not indicate how progressive or 
regressive a fiscal regime is.  For instance, the model of DRC’s Kamoto copper mine above shows that 
the government take does not increase in periods of very high profitability, such as when world prices 
surge beyond expected price levels. Graphing the government take over time, along with the project 
and investor’s IRRs, can illustrate the progressivity of the regime. For instance, figure 7 shows that the 
project’s IRR and investor’s IRR rise considerably with price increases while the government take tends 
to decrease, reflecting a regressive regime. 
 
Figure 7. Financial model illustration – Impact of different long-term copper price scenarios on project, 
investor’s internal rate of return and government take 
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1.2 The difficult dilemma: law or contract?  
If the financial modeling exercise justifies increasing the government take or adding progressivity into 
the fiscal regime, where might such new taxes go: the revised law or model contract?  And what other 
aspects should be changed and where?   
 
Countries around the world have varying practices on the degree to which fiscal benefits and regulation 
of the sector is enshrined in contract or law.  Some countries rely very little on contracts, while others 
use contracts almost exclusively.  As a general rule, those that use contracts the most tend to have few 
mineral resources, making the effort to create legislation more costly than it is worth.  Countries with a 
history of industrial mining tend to have more detailed legislation and rely less on contracts. 
 
The benefits of including more provisions in the legislation are many: First, it makes regulation of the 
sector much easier for the government.  There are fewer differences in the taxes and royalties that need 
to be calculated and all companies are operating under the same rules for submission of key documents 
for government approval, such as annual work programs, environmental plans, and others.  For a 
government that is still building capacity to regulate its mining sector, favoring legislation simplifies 
the task. 
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In addition, legislated regimes save costs.  Creating new negotiating teams to negotiate over many 
variables diverts resources away from other important activities in terms of long-term benefits, such as 
tax collection, developing more geologic knowledge, or building technical expertise in the sector.  Finally, 
legislation that has been created with public participation creates greater long-term security by 
preventing successive changes driven more by politics than publicly supported policy. 
 
Despite these benefits, countries have laws and systems in place that cannot be easily and quickly 
modified, and may be more difficult to undo than adapting to the existing legislative framework.  The 
decision about when and how to reform the laws and contracts is no simple task.  On the one hand, the 
global economy, and macro-economic and political picture of Mozambique are changing quickly, and 
indeed many of the assumptions that were made five or ten years ago about political risk and 
commodity prices, among others, have changed significantly.  On the other, investors tend to disfavor 
regular changes to legislation.  The challenge is to put in place a durable legislative framework through a 
thorough, transparent, and credible process.  
 
Since approximately 2002, Mozambique has been creating a more robust legal framework for mining 
investments in the country.  The country has steadily adopted a series of laws and regulations to 
manage the industry, with the assistance of development partners and with the insights and input of 
industry, citizens, and international experts.343  In some ways, the legal framework governing the 
exploration, extraction, and taxation of mineral resources is generally in line with mineral legislation 
around the world. Most recently, Mozambique adopted fiscal laws and regulations in 2007 and 2008.  
Changing these again in 2011 could be perceived negatively by investors, especially if done hastily.  One 
strategy could be to use the adoption of a model contract as a way of updating current policies without 
re-writing all existing legislation, especially the fiscal regime.  Nevertheless, some fiscal elements might 
be better placed in law rather than contract.  
 
1.2.1 Updating the mining law 
There are several provisions MIREM could consider updating and revising to strengthen Mozambique’s 
legislative framework.  This section highlights some of the most important modifications to the law that 
might be desirable. 
 
1) Getting better fiscal benefits: sharing windfalls, receiving capital gains, clarifying royalty base, and 
limiting stability 
 
a)  Sharing windfalls 
There are several fiscal tools that can allow a country to share in commodity price increases and high 
profitability from a mining project, often referred to as “windfall profits.”   
 
Windfall profits tools are different from royalties and taxes, which will tend to limit the government’s 
ability to share in times of high commodity prices or extraordinary profitability of a particular mine.  
These tools allow the government take to change with increasing returns and thus allow the 
government to garner differential rents for above-average ore grades and windfall profits.344 These tools, 
called “progressive” as defined in the box above, allow the government’s share of resource rents to 
                                                 
343
 Law no. 14/2002 of 26 June (the “Mining Law”); Decree no. 62/2006 of 26 December (the Mining Regulations”); Law no. 
11/2007 of 27 June (the “Tax Regime for Mining”); Decree no. 5/2008 (the “Regulation of Tax Regime for Mining). 
344
 Jourdan, Paul. The Utilisation of Mineral Wealth for Development Purposes in South Africa. Draft (unpublished), 2010. 
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increase along with the companies’ profits. These tools “build flexibility into the tax system so that it can 
accommodate changes to economic circumstances that fiscal rigidity could not cope with. By reducing 
the likelihood that a change of fiscal terms would be imposed unilaterally, such flexibility would reduce a 
perception of risk.”345 
 
Among these progressive tools, a resource rent tax (RRT, see box) is more tied to the profitability of the 
project than other progressive taxes on profits. 
 
A resource rent tax (RRT) starts after a certain amount of payback of the investment
346 or after a pre- 
defined rate of return.347 Therefore, the investor is relieved from this tax until the project reaches a 
satisfactory return. 
 
As shown by Figure 8 below, a well-designed RRT will only capture resource rent and will not impact the 
return required by the investor to undertake the project.  
 
Figure 8. Mining project breakdown: costs, taxes, rent and return
348 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main advantage of the resource rent tax is its “neutrality.” A company’s calculation of a project’s 
profitability (which in turn influences the decision of whether to invest) discounts future cash payments 
more heavily than early payments; therefore, RRT payments that would be made many years after the 
initial investment have only a minimal impact on calculations of profitability, and thus does not divert 
the investor from the investment. 
 
For these reasons, fiscal regime literature has often urged the use of an RRT and its use may be on the 
rise (see box on Israel below).  Few governments and companies have confidence in what commodity 
prices and costs may be in the future. In royalty/tax systems, the country bears the risk of price swings; 
but developing countries are not generally well-equipped to bear these risks, while companies with a 
diverse portfolio are better placed to do so.  An RRT can mitigate this adverse consequence of a normal 
royalty/tax system. Liberia recently adopted resource rent taxation in its legislation and successfully 
auctioned an iron ore contact with an RRT.349  The RRT did not apply to contracts currently in force, 
however. 
                                                 
345
 Land, Bryan, “Resource rent taxes: a re-appraisal” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems, and 
Practice IMF (2010) at Appendix I, p. 259. 
346
 These are referred to as R-Factor systems in the minerals fiscal literature. 
347
 These are Rate of Return or RoR systems in the minerals fiscal literature.   
348
 Adapted from Land, Bryan, “Resource rent taxes: a re-appraisal” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, 
Problems, and Practice IMF (2010) and Jourdan, Paul, presentation for UNDP RBA Regional Project, 2010 
349
 Land, Bryan, “Resource rent taxes: a re-appraisal” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems, and 
Practice IMF (2010) at Appendix I, p. 259. 
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Israel’s New Resource Rent Tax 
In the recent amendment to its hydrocarbon regime, Israel has established a type of resource rent tax350 
kicking in when the company has recouped 150% of its investment. The tax starts at 20% and moves up 
linearly to 60%, the level at which the investment is recouped by 230%. To make its case with the 
investors, Israel also showed that with the exception of the UK, in the peer group, Israel offers the 
most attractive terms of this group and is clearly competitive under the new regime. 
 
The disadvantage of the RRT is its complexity in terms of assessment and monitoring. The administrative 
cost of maintaining a Resource Rent Tax largely depends on the capacity of the host country to monitor 
mine output and to audit the companies’ accounting.   
 
However, the Revenue Tax Administration of Mozambique (ATM) has been recognized for its 
improvements in tax collection over the last 3 years, with a 15% increase in domestic tax revenues. This 
tax office has showed its capability of imposing income tax on businesses. With additional skills and staff, 
it may be able to administer an RRT.  As such, this could be a good option for Mozambique’s new mining 
law. 
 
b) Receiving capital gains  
Another important fiscal tool for Mozambique to consider is capital gains taxation.  Highlighted in the 
circulated draft of Mozambique’s first EITI report, this tax is of particular importance for countries with 
relatively nascent oil, gas, and mining sectors.  The oil, gas, and mining industries are structured such 
that smaller exploration companies (“junior miners” or “wild catters” in oil) often take the risk of doing 
exploration work while the “super majors” generally conduct the large-scale commercial exploitation of 
these resources.  Smaller companies sell their shares or transfer their licenses to these larger companies, 
often at a great profit.  A profit is appropriate and a part of the risk/reward calculus of exploration.  
However, some amount of this profit is generally considered to belong to the state and should be 
captured through capital gains taxes.351   
 
Mozambique presently has exploration companies searching for new commercially viable resource 
deposits, and will likely have more in the future.  A clear policy on capital gains taxation will provide 
investors with security regarding their risk/reward calculus and provide the government with additional 
tax revenues from its resources when these transfers occur.   
 
c) Clarifying royalties 
The 2002 mining law states that the Council of Ministers determines royalty rates.352  Subsequently, 
various royalty rates were set in the 2007 minerals fiscal law. The rates vary according to the mineral.  
Coal is 3%, for example, while diamonds are 10%.353    
 
While the royalty rates have been set by law, the basis on which the royalty rates are calculated has 
been the source of significant negotiation with mining companies.  The 2002 minerals law provides: 
 
1. Production tax is based on the value of mining products resulting from mining activity undertaken in the 
national territory, of which a percentage shall be destined to local services where the undertaking is 
                                                 
350
 The type of resource rent tax adopted is an “R-Factor” tax. 
351
 Myers, Keith “Selling Oil Assets in Uganda and Ghana: A Taxing Problem” Revenue Watch Institute (24 August 2010). 
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 Article 28(4). 
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carried out in accordance with the terms to be defined through regulations, with the aim of influencing 
local development. 
 
2. Production tax is also based on the value of mining products: 
a) Sold or; 
b) Used for any commercial or industrial purpose other than construction in accordance with the terms of 
number 2 of Article 40, in any area subject to a mining title.
354
 
 
Clarifying the base of royalty calculations could eliminate these negotiations and the potential for 
companies to negotiate a lower royalty base, which would reduce government revenues. 
 
d) Limiting stabilization guarantees 
Stabilization guarantees—generally in the form of a legal guarantee by a government to freeze the law 
or fiscal regime applicable to a project as of the date of the contract—have come under scrutiny in the 
past decade.355  Countries that are still developing robust legal frameworks—including Mozambique—
are essentially guaranteeing companies an incomplete legal framework for the duration of a 
company’s contract, which can last several decades.  This serves neither companies nor governments 
well: when companies are exempt from the current legal regime, there can be confusion, allegations of 
corruption, inefficiency, and often requests that projects be integrated into the same legal framework as 
others.  On the other hand, companies that invest early in a risky area do require commensurate reward.  
Finding this balance is delicate.  
 
Mozambique’s 2002 Minerals law provides the following stabilization guarantee: 
 
2. The State ensures that, once the exploration license, mining concession or mining 
certificate has been issued and is recognized as a foreign or national direct investment 
project, the applicable fiscal regime to the mining activity in force at the time of 
issuing the above-mentioned title shall never be altered, unless the act is to the benefit 
of the withholder of the mining title.  […] 
 
4. When more than ninety days have elapsed without a solution to any complaints 
submitted in writing to an authorized entity thus resulting or having resulted in 
financial damages as a consequence of immobilization of invested capitals or of 
change of the mining fiscal regime or any other provision of the mining legislation, 
the respective investors shall have the right to a fair indemnity for the damages 
incurred on exclusive liability of State institutions.
356
 
                                                 
354
 Articles 28 (1) and (2). 
355
 See Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, IFC and UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (11 March 
2008) available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf 
356
 Article 33, “Investment Guarantees.”  The rest of the article reads:  
1. The State ensures the safety and legal protection to property of the goods and rights, including industrial property rights 
within the context of the authorized and realized mining activity investments under the terms of the mining title issued 
pursuant to this Law and other applicable legislation.  […] 
3. The expropriation of private property goods and rights within the context of the mining title can only occur owing to public 
interest and shall be subject to the payment of a fair indemnity. […] 
5. The evaluation of good or expropriated rights as well as of financial damages suffered by the investors due to explicit State 
liability, for the purpose of determining the amount of indemnity as outlined in numbers 1 and 3 of this article, shall be made 
within ninety days, by mutual agreement, by a commission specially established for this purpose or by a recognized fit, 
competent auditing firm. 
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According to companies, these stabilization guarantees are sought to secure financing and insurance. 
While it is understandable that shareholders and investors would want to ensure a secure revenue 
stream that is not subject to the whims of politics, an indefinite stabilization guarantee such as that 
found in Mozambique is excessive and should be repealed in the mining law reform process. 
 
In particular, a country need not offer further benefits to the company by having an asymmetrical and 
one-sided guarantee that offers the company the right to opt into legislation that favors it (see the 
bolded text in paragraph 2 above).  Stabilization can be limited to just core elements of the fiscal regime 
and for a limited period of time.  
 
More circumspect clauses, such as the article from the mining law of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(see box below), allow investors to secure funding, allow governments to build credibility as a stable 
investment environment, and do not put companies above the law indefinitely, which is both 
contradictory to public policy and often offensive to the citizenry. A more reasonable guarantee can 
better align the interests of all parties.  
 
Sample stabilization article: Democratic Republic of Congo  
Article 276: Guarantee of stability
357
 
The State guarantees that the provisions of the present Code can only be modified if, and only if, this 
Code itself is the subject of a legislative amendment adopted by Parliament. The rights attached to or 
deriving from an exploration licence or mining exploitation licence granted and valid on the date of the 
enactment of such a legislative modification, as well as the rights relating to or deriving from the 
exploitation licence subsequently granted by virtue of such an exploration licence, including among 
others, the tax, customs and exchange regimes set forth in this Code, remain acquired and inviolable for 
a ten-year period from the date of: 
a) the entry into force of the legislative modification for the valid exploitation licences existing as of that 
date; 
b) the granting of the exploitation licence subsequently granted by virtue of a valid exploration licence 
existing on the date of entry into force of the legislative modification. 
 
2) Aligning the regulation on confidentiality with the country’s transparency policy 
In addition to modifying the fiscal provisions, the Government should also consider modifications to 
regulations on confidential information.  The Government of Mozambique has stated its dedication to 
transparency in many fora.  Most recently, President Guebuza recommitted the country to transparency 
at the EITI Global Conference in Paris on March 3-4, 2011. 
 
As the country updates its Mining Law and Regulations, the confidentiality provision in the regulations 
can be reformed in line with this commitment.  Currently, this provision states: 
 
1. The information contained in reports submitted by the holder of the mining title under the Mining Law, 
these Regulations, or other rules applicable to mining activities shall be considered confidential, and shall not 
                                                                                                                                                             
6. The payment of the above-mentioned indemnity shall be made by a competent State agency and shall take place within 
ninety days, or other mutually agreed time-frame, starting from the date when the decision was taken by the commission or 
when the report by the auditing firm was presented, based on the evaluation made under previous number. The duration of 
appreciation for the purpose of decision-making about the evaluation undertaken and presented to authorized State agency, 
shall not exceed forty-five days from the date of handing over and receiving the evaluation file. 
357
 Democratic Republic of Congo Law no. 007/2002 Code Minier 2002. 
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be divulged for a period of six months from the date of extinction of the mining title, unless by prior consent 
of the respective titleholder. 
2. The technical information submitted with the application for mining concession or mining certificate, or any 
extension shall always be maintained confidential, except in case of consent from the respective title -holder. 
3. Prohibition of disclosure under the previous numbers shall not be applicable: 
a) To the Minister or other government entity in the fulfillment of obligations imposed by law; 
b) When connected to any judicial or arbitral procedure; 
c) When connected to the definition of the obligations of the title-holder in relation to payments 
owed to the State. 
4. It shall not be considered disclosure of confidential data whenever there is evidence that the disclosed data 
were already known by the public before its disclosure.
358
 
 
These broad confidentiality provisions have been the norm in the industry.  As countries like 
Mozambique implement EITI and companies and governments increasingly disclose information to the 
public, these clauses are quickly becoming outdated.  Clauses like the following reflect current 
confidentiality needs more accurately: 
 
Confidentiality: 
(1) Applicants for Mineral Rights and Holders thereof may request the confidential treatment of technical, 
geological and mining information submitted to the Ministry of Mines and Industries. Such information may 
be treated as confidential by the Ministry of Mines and Industries until expiration or termination of the 
relevant Mineral Right. After this period, such information may be made available to the public. 
 
(2) Prior to the expiry of the period of confidential treatment, such information may be used by the Ministry 
of Mines and Industries for purposes of compiling public records, data and statistics, which may be published 
without disclosing the confidential parts of the information.
359
 
 
Obligation of transparency: 
The Ministry of Mines and Industries shall collect, not less than annually, and publish reports concerning State 
revenues and other direct or indirect economic benefits received by the State from Mineral Activities in 
accordance with internationally accepted norms respecting transparency in the extractive industries. The 
Ministry of Mines and Industries shall be authorized to, for the purposes of preparing such reports, require 
Holders of Mineral Rights and all State or public agencies and public officers to, not less than annually, submit 
data, including production, financial data, and other direct or indirect economic benefits received by them and 
all amounts paid by them in connection with Mineral Activities.
360
 
 
As an EITI-implementing country, similar clauses for the new law would be appropriate for Mozambique. 
 
1.2.2 Revising the model contract 
Model agreements are very efficient tools for governments.  Instead of making changes in the law, new 
negotiating parameters can be defined with model agreements, limiting the number of variables in a 
negotiation.  This is particularly true when the model agreement is passed into law or regulations and 
negotiations are limited by law to a narrow set of fiscal benefits and other non-fiscal benefits specific to 
a particular industry and project.   
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1) Add a biddable RRT  
If Mozambique uses bidding systems for some of its projects, a model contract could be used to create 
competition to drive up the fiscal benefits for the country through competitive bids. Bidding allows 
competition among investors to determine the true value of the resources.361  Bidding on one or more 
elements of an RRT could be used to enhance fiscal benefits, without requiring a change to the royalties 
and taxes in the current law. In Namibia, although the main elements of the petroleum RRT are 
stipulated by law, two higher RRT rates are biddable.362  Peru’s relatively young hydrocarbons sector 
moved to public auctions with a biddable royalty with considerable success at achieving higher royalty 
rates.363   A modified version of this process could be used in Mozambique.  Future contracts could have 
the current fiscal regime as a base, with a biddable RRT used to determine the winner of a concession. 
 
2) Consistent capital allowances and depreciation 
In addition to an RRT, Mozambique may be able to capture more fiscal benefits with uniform rules for 
capital allowances and depreciation schedules (see box). 
 
Capital allowances enable a company to reduce tax payable on profits by allowing some of its capital 
expenditure to be offset against taxes owed.  
 
Depreciation refers the allocation of the cost of assets to periods in which the assets are used.  Like 
capital allowances, depreciation allows for offsets against the payment of taxes for a particular year.   
Thus, while not lowering the tax rate, both capital allowances and depreciation lower the taxable 
income per fiscal period. 
 
Currently, Mozambique has negotiable rules on depreciation and capital allowances.  These are areas 
where the country loses revenues.  These issues could be dealt with by adoption of consistent standards 
in the model contract. This would eliminate the need to pass new laws or regulations; however, 
previously signed contracts would not be included in the streamlined system, unless they were 
renegotiated accordingly.   
 
3) Revise the confidentiality clause and provide the contracts to the public 
Mining contracts have historically been kept confidential from the public—even from 
parliamentarians and other ministries in extreme cases.  Contracts signed often have 
confidentiality clauses in them that read like this, with minor variations. 
 
2005 Mineral Development Agreement, Mittal Steel and Liberia  
Section 1.  Confidential Information 
All information exchanged between the Parties hereto in the context of this Agreement shall be 
considered and treated as confidential information, subject to Article VII, Section 2 of the MDA. The 
Parties hereto hereby agree not to divulge such information to any other Person without the prior 
written consent of the other party, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and/or delayed. 
However, the foregoing shall not be applicable to CONCESSIONAIRE’s or the GOVERNMENT’s bankers, 
advisors and all those who are, in a special way, connected with the Operations. 
                                                 
361
 Land, Bryan, “Resource rent taxes: a re-appraisal” in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems, and 
Practice IMF (2010) at Appendix I, p. 259. 
362
 Ibid 
363
 See http://www.perupetro.com.pe/wps/wcm/connect/perupetro/site and analysis conducted by Columbia Law School 
Human Rights Clinic, on file with authors.   
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2005 Mineral Development Agreement, Mittal Steel and Liberia  
Section 2.  Public Information 
The obligation of confidentiality set forth in Article VII, Section 1 above shall not apply either to 
information exchanged between the Parties hereto which is in the public domain or to information 
exchanged by the Parties which the CONCESSIONAIRE is required to reveal to any other Person by law 
applicable to it.364 
 
There is increasing evidence that disclosing contracts, particularly biddable contracts, increases the 
benefits to the government.  In the absence of collusion, it creates a race to the top instead of a race to 
the bottom.  In the Peru bidding example cited above, since the country adopted a transparent, public 
bidding system with disclosure of winning hydrocarbon contracts, the royalty rates bid by the companies 
has consistently been on an upward trend.  Disclosure of contracts already signed has resulted in 
significant gains, too. 
 
Liberia: Contract Disclosure to Leverage Bargaining Power and Gain Investor Interest 
In Liberia, the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf Administration quickly stated that one of its immediate priorities 
was the renegotiation of contracts signed by the previous transitional government.  The first contract 
renegotiated was the 2005 Agreement signed with Mittal Steel for the former Lamco iron ore mine.  The 
government sought and achieved return of control of key infrastructure, such as the rail line from the 
Lamco mine to the port of Buchanan and the port itself.  The government also increased its financial 
take from the contract, eliminated tax holidays, and closed tax loopholes that could have allowed the 
company to transfer offshore the returns to the Government in the original contract.365 
 
One of the drivers of this successful renegotiation was the disclosure of the original contract with 
Mittal Steel.  Groups in Liberia as well as abroad criticized the contract for being out of line with good 
practice in the mining industry.  It significantly bolstered Liberia’s ability to renegotiate the contract 
since it had national and international support, including the support of the international donors, who 
have historically been reluctant to support renegotiations.  A group of experts from various disciplines 
was put together to review all contracts and make recommendations about whether they needed to be 
renegotiated, cancelled, or kept in the current form.  
Following this successful renegotiation, which included provisions for many best international practice 
standards on transparency, social, and environmental standards, the Government passed new 
legislation and regulations for the mineral sector using the renegotiated contract as a model.366   
 
Today, the Government of Liberia publishes all of its contracts in all natural resource sectors—oil, gas, 
mining, timber, agriculture, and others.
367
  It has not deterred investment.  Since renegotiating its 
contract with Mittal Steel, several more multi-million dollar mining contracts have been concluded.  The 
Johnson-Sirleaf administration has concluded US$16 Billion dollars in investment since taking office and 
beginning to publish the investment contracts.  
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Oil, gas, and mining companies possess far more resources, knowledge, and experience in all aspects of 
their industry, including the negotiation of contracts, than their government counterparts.  They have 
access to contracts and fiscal regimes around the world through either their own network of experts and 
databases or external databases, consultants and law firms that regularly do mining work and use those 
agreements as templates for negotiations.  Companies can compare and undermine government 
bargaining power with these resources.   
 
Some companies have requested contracts be disclosed, particularly when citizens are demanding it and 
failing to disclose risks disruptions to the operating environment.   
 
Uganda: Failure to Disclose Breeds Resentment and Mistrust, and Inhibits Operational Performance 
Uganda is said to have oil contracts that provide a good rate of return for the country according to 
various independent analysts.368  However, the government has consistently refused to disclose the 
contracts, and calls for renegotiation grow amid mistrust of both the government and the company.369  
At least one company in Uganda has expressed its desire that the government disclose these contracts.  
Uganda’s oil is on-shore oil and will be susceptible to community attacks, much like that in the Niger 
Delta. 
 
Mining investments are also at risk of these sorts of attacks.  Citizens in Liberia started dismantling a 
mining railroad when the company’s sub-contractor refused to pay appropriate wages.  Mozambique 
and mining investors could face similar disruptions in the absence of transparency and dialogue with not 
just the communities around the mine, but along all major mining infrastructures.  
In a sector that sees its contracts renegotiated more than any other sector, disclosure can help bring 
the stability that investors seek, which cannot be guaranteed by law alone.
370  Disclosure can also help 
companies attain the so-called “social license to operate.” 
 
Disclosing contracts poses few risks.  Governments can seek consent from companies to disclose their 
previously signed contracts and can require disclosure in future contracts.  While contract disclosure is 
not yet standard practice, a number of countries have disclosed contracts: the United States, Liberia, 
Timor-Leste, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, and Sierra Leone, for example. 
 
 
Mongolia: Parliamentary Passage and Disclosure of Contracts Provides Stability and Investor Interest 
Mongolia, much like Mozambique, has untapped world-class mines of vital commodities.  The country 
requires parliament to ratify contracts with its foreign investors for these valuable and non-renewable 
resources.  It also publishes these contracts in their parliamentary record.  Mozambique does not 
appear to have such a law, but it might consider including such a policy in the future.   
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Mongolia: Parliamentary Passage and Disclosure of Contracts Provides Stability and Investor Interest- 
continued 
While negotiations have been long and hard, with parliamentary hearings capturing the Mongolian 
national interest, investors gain greater stability as a result of the public debates and the government 
has greater leverage, backed by the clear demands of the public and parliament. The country recently 
negotiated the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine with Ivanhoe Mines and Rio Tinto, and investors continue to 
show great interest in the country.371   
 
To date, neither Mozambique nor its extractive industry investors have disclosed its contracts, though 
we understand that calls for disclosure and updating of the contracts are growing.  If this situation 
remains, there is significant risk that the issue will become more politicized than at present, making a 
relatively amicable and mutually agreeable outcome less likely. 
 
Finally, disclosure helps with enforcement of contracts.  Too often, ministries do not effectively share 
information or have insufficient knowledge sharing mechanisms, leading to poor enforcement and 
regulation.  A few of the ministries that may need access to natural resource contracts include: Ministry 
of Finance for tax collection; Ministry of Planning and Development for forecasting the industry’s future 
contribution to the budget; and the Ministry of Cooperation for Environmental Affairs, for ensuring 
compliance with its legal framework.  Much can be gained by making these contracts publicly available, 
so all ministries can play their role in regulating the sector and citizens groups can assist in providing 
expertise, monitoring implementation, and participating in the development of the sector. 
 
Adoption of the confidentiality clause in the draft 2007 model mineral agreement would mandate the 
disclosure of contracts. 
 
Draft Model Mineral Development Agreement for Mozambique 
Article 25, Confidentiality 
25.1 Agreement not confidential.  This Agreement is not confidential and a copy shall be made available 
by the MIREM at its central office for inspection by the general Public during normal office hours. 
 
Making the contracts available to the public online and provided to local communities would improve 
this language even further.  Adoption of this clause or a similar one will provide greater stability for 
future investors.   
 
1.3 Current contracts and legal reform processes  
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of any legal reform effort is whether and how to bring old contracts 
into the new system.  This is true even when a country is revising a model contract—that too will create 
a new and old system, with some contracts having unique fiscal regimes and various other obligations 
while new contracts signed with the model will be much more uniform. 
 
Companies tend to resist bringing existing contracts into compliance with new laws, preferring to keep 
the original deal agreed to, while Governments and citizens generally prefer to see all projects evolving 
with the country instead of remaining behind.  Countries can attempt to mandate compliance with new 
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systems, but they may receive considerable resistance from companies with arguments based on 
stabilization agreements or claims for compensation under international investment law. Companies 
may abandon their operations or stall them to pressure the government. When prices are high, 
companies may agree to negotiate, as the assets in the ground and sunk costs in immovable productive 
assets are worth retaining.  In fact, in some countries, companies have agreed voluntarily to come into 
new legal systems. 
 
When a country revises any part of its legal framework that regulates the extractive sector, it may find 
itself in the position of choosing whether to update contracts that are under old regimes if they 
included stabilization guarantees.  Assessing the bargaining power that the country has to bring older 
contracts into a new system is difficult without accurate knowledge about the fiscal benefits the country 
will receive and whether it is similar to its peer group.  To make this assessment, a high level and 
broadly representative Commission is advisable, which could benefit from the international expertise 
of the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, discussed in the conclusion. Once bargaining 
power is understood more by such a technical exercise that includes financial modeling and a projection 
of non-fiscal benefits, Mozambique will know more about its leverage vis-a-vis current investors. Several 
paths could be taken to ensure all parties have durable, mutually beneficial contracts through a well-
planned reform and streamlining of the mining sector; the recent experiences of Liberia, Israel, and 
Mongolia, discussed above, can be instructive. 
 
1.3.1 Mining policy commission: an example from Tanzania  
A high level commission led by Judge Mark Bomani, a well-respected figure in Tanzanian society, was 
tasked with reviewing the mining sector—including contracts—in Tanzania.372   Tanzania faced a 
situation potentially similar to that of Mozambique: investments appeared to be generating few fiscal 
resources for the government.  The Commission looked at the fiscal and non-fiscal benefits of contracts, 
and many other aspects of the mining sector, including infrastructure, small business, and local 
communities. With respect to the fiscal regime, the Government drafted a new mining law, which 
included a number of measures to increase fiscal benefits. These included increased royalties, 
authorization for the Minister of Mines to use a model Mineral Development Agreement (or model 
contract) and changing the base on which royalties are calculated—all issues Mozambique is considering 
as well.  According to parliamentarians that were a part of the rulemaking process, several mining 
companies voluntarily agreed to adopt the new rules.373 For instance, some gold mining companies 
agreed in 2007 to forgo 15% annual investment allowances on unredeemed capital, bringing forward 
the likely date at which income tax would start being paid.  
Mozambique’s Commission could also coordinate with the Southern Africa Development Commission 
(SADC) to bring comparative experience and approaches.  One of SADC’s goals is to harmonize the 
approach of the region to tax incentives, eliminating discretion and ensuring that existing tax incentives 
are effective. Such a process will “endeavor to avoid harmful tax competition” according to the SADC.374  
Regional cooperation on such matters can drive a race to the top by companies and bring a consistent 
and level-playing field throughout the region, a goal of the AU Mining Vision as well. 
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1.3.2 Reviewing current contracts 
The International Finance Corporation is in the process of changing its policy on contract disclosure. 
According to a recent draft of its Performance Standards, the IFC would ask for full contract disclosure 
from all extractive industry investments it makes, both current and future.  Instead of requiring the 
immediate disclosure of current contracts, the draft requests that governments and companies do this 
in two years, giving the Government and investors time to thoroughly review their contracts and 
improve upon any areas they wish before the disclosure.   
 
Mozambique could approach its investors and explain that it needs to disclose its contracts by a 
certain date, particularly as calls for updating the contracts grow. The potential for increased attacks at 
the current contracts, de-stabilizing existing investments and resulting in an unnecessary politicization of 
the contracting process, is only growing.  It is in everyone’s interest to disclose these contracts as soon 
as possible.  
 
Here too, this independent and well-respected commission could review the various aspects of the 
contracts.  If some contracts demonstrate a need for stricter standards to protect human rights and the 
environment or to prevent tax avoidance, then amendments or riders to the contracts may be 
considered.   
 
Regardless of which option is feasible and ultimately chosen, the proposed Commission could bring 
together the views and concerns of government, companies,
375
 citizen groups, and Mozambican 
society more broadly; the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group could provide support, such as 
with comparative research, technical analysis, and financial modeling.  A Commission like this provides 
credibility not only to investors, but more importantly, to the citizens of Mozambique. It is necessary 
to understand Mozambique’s current fiscal regime, ensure the public understands the costs and 
benefits of different policies, and whether the contracts should be updated to ensure long-term mutual 
gains by the contracting parties. 
 
Ideally, companies would voluntarily come into any new mining law recommended by such a 
Commission; and further, companies could voluntarily adopt as a rider any provisions in the new model 
contract that were either absent or contradictory to their existing contracts.  Such good-faith 
reconciliation by companies would be of tremendous benefit to Mozambique and provide a solid 
foundation for the long relationships that mining inherently involves well into the future. 
 
2. Using the EITI as a springboard for better resource revenue results  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or EITI is a multi-stakeholder (companies, government, 
and citizens) forum promoting dialogue about the benefits of oil, gas, and mining resources through the 
publication of payments made to governments from companies and receipt of these revenues by 
government.  Launched in 2003, the EITI now has 35 countries actively implementing the initiative, 
ranging from Afghanistan to Norway to Zambia.  It has wide support from numerous companies, 
governments, and citizens around the world.376  Critically, the initiative seeks to support countries in 
realizing more benefits from their natural resources, not by raising taxes or royalties, but by providing a 
mechanism to improve management and oversight of the sector. 
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2.1 “MEITI” - EITI in Mozambique  
Mozambique became an EITI candidate country in February of 2008.  In accordance with EITI procedure, 
the MEITI (Mozambique EITI) multi-stakeholder group has facilitated the EITI process, and the country is 
currently conducting its first EITI report. The first report focuses on six companies’ payments and 
government receipts for 2008.  The six companies reporting in this report are Sasol, HAMC, Kenmare 
Moma, Vale, Compania Moz Hidrocarbenetos, and Rio Tinto.  In the first round of information gathering, 
these companies reported paying approximately US$6,799,174 (at exchange rate of 30 meticais to the 
dollar), while government recorded receipts of US$3,076,655. 377  Subsequent drafts reduced this 
discrepancy from nearly half to only 3%.  Such steps—of locating, organizing, and analyzing information 
are critical first steps to better administration of the mining revenues and of the sector more broadly. 
This reconciliation process is the foundation of effective tax collection and revenue administration.  
 
2.2 EITI can be shaped and designed to fit the individual implementing country’s needs 
There is undoubtedly much gained by bringing diverse stakeholders to a common room to discuss issues 
about revenues reportedly paid and received; this is the core of the EITI and is in itself useful exercise for 
countries.  But EITI can go well beyond its basic form of disclosure of aggregate payments and revenues, 
as Mozambique has already chosen to do.  Countries have expanded and modified the EITI in many ways. 
 
EITI: Tailored Programs 
Liberia – adopted an EITI law that includes disaggregated revenue transparency in the forestry sector in 
addition to the oil, gas, and mining sectors.  All contracts are also disclosed on the Liberia EITI website.378  
Nigeria – has an EITI law that goes well beyond disaggregated reporting by an aggregator.  The country 
does audits, which means it uses a certified professional in auditing.  The country conducts not only 
financial audits of the revenues, but also physical and process audits to ensure the country is actually 
getting what it is owed.  It has since learned that while companies reported what the government 
receipts showed, there were leakages in other areas.  The process audit showed that the reported 
production-based taxes did not always match what was actually produced.  On profits-based taxes, the 
audit showed that the Nigerian Government was relying on the companies’ own numbers; the 
Government was not doing any independent assessment to see if the reported profits-based taxes 
matched the companies’ real profits.379   
Timor-Leste – does not have an EITI law, but it too has made its contracts available to the public as a 
part of its comprehensive transparency goals.  It also recently launched a transparency portal for its 
budget, so that citizens can see real time information about how the country’s resource revenues are 
being spent (for more, see Chapter 4).380 
2.3 Possibilities for MEITI 
Mozambique has already adopted disaggregated reporting of major revenue streams, meaning that 
each material revenue stream will be disclosed for each reporting company.  These payments to 
governments will be disclosed, and governments will disclose what they receive. This is already above 
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the most basic form of EITI, and is showing its value.  In the early drafts of the first MEITI report, 
discrepancies were identified.  It should be stressed that this is not prima facie a bad thing. Countries 
regularly find discrepancies, both through EITI and otherwise.  The later drafts reduced this gap 
significantly; it is exactly this process of accountability that is the significant benefit of EITI.  Since it is a 
widely supported and funded global initiative, EITI allows countries that may not otherwise have the 
resources to reveal differences in accounting methods, mineral valuations, and legal loopholes it may 
not have known it had.  Nevertheless, there is significant room for expansion of MEITI. 
 
2.3.1 Increase the coverage of companies reporting 
The first report covered only six companies when the country has many more in various phases of 
project development, including exploration.  In future reports, this could be expanded to cover more 
investments that are clearly material for the country, such as the upcoming Rio Tinto/Riversdale project 
in Tete. 
 
2.3.2 Expand to cover financial and process audit 
To continue with the goals of multi-stakeholder dialogue and partnership, Mozambique and its investors 
could leverage the EITI to ensure that the country receives the maximum benefit the investors have 
legally promised to provide. There can be misunderstandings and different interpretations of fiscal 
responsibilities and obligations that can be resolved amicably and in a way that gains trust instead of 
charges of theft or corruption.   With the normal or basic EITI process, only a “reconciler” is used to find, 
collate, and analyze data.  It is not as robust as a full audit by an accountant.  While reconciling data will 
lead to important information and some answers, it will not lead to as many answers as auditing. 
 
Nigeria’s full financial, process, and physical audits allow the country to answer the question: are we 
getting what we are entitled to?  Where, specifically, is there loss due to miscalculation, theft, or 
inefficiencies? Financial audits review the books of governments and companies to ensure what is 
claimed is accurate; process audits ensure that the money is not lost in the process of making 
payments and receiving them; physical audits assess at what price the commodity was sold and 
ensures that the claimed production for calculation of royalties or production share is correct.381   
 
Such robust auditing, when combined with contract disclosure and financial modeling discussed below, 
produces real information that all parties can use to understand the full picture of the extractive sector 
and what costs and benefits it is bringing to all parties and what can be improved to strengthen the 
benefits of the sector for all stakeholders.  
 
2.3.3 Include CSR expenditures 
Since Mozambique is relying on considerable corporate social responsibility (CSR), linkages, training 
programs, and infrastructure benefits from its mining mega-projects, its EITI program could be expanded 
to include these, too.382  While not yet a standard in EITI, several other countries relying considerably on 
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CSR programs and linkages are considering including these investments in their EITI.383  Mongolia and 
Liberia include social and community payments, for example.  Mozambique could be a part of a 
pioneering effort to include reporting of quasi-fiscal benefits. 
 
2.3.4 Include contract transparency 
Several countries are already including contracts in their EITI, and even more countries disclose them.  
EITI can be an easy way and good place for countries disclosing contracts to house this information, both 
in-country at the national EITI secretariat office and online.  
  
2.3.5 Link to budget transparency 
The EITI covers the money flowing into a country, but it does not cover how it is spent for development.  
Highly transparent countries like Timor-Leste have introduced transparency portals so that citizens and 
companies can be assured that resource revenues are spent for development.  This is covered in much 
greater depth in Chapter 4 of this report. 
 
2.3.6 Adopt an EITI law 
Currently, there is no EITI law in Mozambique. It is not required by the EITI, but can provide the 
opportunity to expand the EITI beyond its present scope with suggestions like the above.  Alternatively, 
as Mozambique revises its mining law, it could include a chapter on EITI. 
 
In conclusion, the EITI can help countries increase their revenues from natural resources, without 
changing their fiscal laws or contracts—simply by getting what they are already owed more effectively.  
Companies can demonstrate the core form of corporate citizenship, being a timely and honest tax payer.  
All parties gain mutual trust through the discussion that the EITI engenders.  An expanded EITI and EITI 
law could deepen the benefits for all stakeholders. 
 
3. Strengthen implementing institutions  
A World Bank trust fund for building civil society capacity to engage in EITI is scheduled to support civil 
society groups in Mozambique to deepen their knowledge and involvement in the EITI.  This and other 
programs to build a knowledgeable citizenry are valuable investments for governments, companies, and 
donors.  Citizens and lobby groups are better able to understand difficult policy choices and corporate 
strategies when the complexities are known by all involved. 
 
Moreover, MIREM can continue to deepen and strengthen its programs for contract negotiation in its 
capacity building programs for ministry staff.  Building on a UNDP regional program on investment 
contracts, MIREM has been and is planning to increase training for young members of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                             
training centers, but had not provided the recurrent expenditures necessary to make these structures operational over the 
long-term. Even this perception could be problematic, regardless of the underlying arrangements. For CSR policies to have their 
intended effect--compensatory benefits to local citizens and so-called “social license to operate” for companies--such confusion 
can turn well-intended programs into sources of conflict, undermining their purpose. Even more importantly, ensuring the long-
term benefits of these programs requires a solid, transparent understanding at the start.  The draft model contract 
contemplates community benefit agreements to be signed between companies and communities.  This would provide clarity 
for all parties on expectations, involve the community, and ensure the benefits were those desired by the communities. 
383
 Discussions with EITI stakeholders, March 2011. 
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ministries to negotiate contracts, and is interested in longer training programs on this topic.  There was 
also interest in strengthening the coordinated approach to tax collection by MIREM and the Ministry of 
Finance, particularly as more mining projects go into production.  The IMF is quite active in Mozambique 
on natural resource sector fiscal governance, and may be able to provide additional assistance through 
its technical assistance programs, as might other donors, such as Norway.  The Government is very 
interested in using independent economic models for negotiating contracts and regulating the sector.  
The UNDP regional program on investment contracts has provided some expertise in this regard and 
may continue to do so.  Universities and think tanks, international and domestic, would make natural 
partners for all of these activities.  Such partnerships have been considered successful in the past in 
areas like macroeconomic modeling.384   
 
Finally, the private sector can play an extremely important role by living up to the law and going beyond 
it, even when the capacity of the other players to do so is still forming.  Many of the companies 
operating in Mozambique have great technical expertise, and discussions in Mozambique indicate that 
they are working to build the knowledge of the government as well, for example by providing 
comparative international experience with laws and regulations. This dialogue is a good start, and 
working to ensure it involves citizen groups and experts will ensure this dialogue is in society’s best 
interest.  The multi-stakeholder Zambezi Valley Resource Policy Forum, suggested in the Conclusion, the 
Commission suggested in this section, and MEITI are natural places for these discussions to occur.385 
                                                 
384
 Interviews, March 2011. 
385
 Ibid. 
   
4. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Recommendations Main Features Led by Stakeholders Technical 
Assistance 
A commission to lead 
comprehensive review 
and updating of legal 
framework and assess 
grounds for upgrading 
contracts 
This commission could: 
 1) Review current contracts and legal framework, ensure lessons are learned and assess whether and 
how current contracts might merge into the new framework.  In particular, the commission could focus on 
reviewing the fiscal and non-fiscal benefits of existing legislation and contracts, and the possibilities for (1) 
implementing resource rent taxation, (2) implementing capital gains taxation, (3) clarifying the royalty 
base, (4) limiting the currently overly-broad stability guarantee, (5) reforming confidentiality provisions 
to reflect government policy of transparency, and (6) streamlining depreciation schedules and capital 
allowances. Other mineral policy aspects, not dealt with in this report, could also be included in the 
review, such as resettlement policies and artisanal and small-scale mining, among others, similar to the 
Tanzanian Bomani Commission. 
 
 2) Reflect the diversity of Mozambican society and include a wide-array of expertise to have 
international and national credibility.  It could also usefully rely on the many pro bono and international 
perspectives from SADC colleagues, the Resource-Based Development Advisory Group, and others. 
 
 3) Provide updated Mining Laws and Regulations and an updated Model Contract  
 
 4) Plan for independent financial modeling to be conducted for all future contracts after the Commission 
has completed its work 
MIREM 
 
AMDCM, 
PPP, and 
Concession 
Holders, 
Civil Society 
Organizations 
(CSOs) 
WB, 
IMF, 
AfDB,  
UNDP,  
SADC,  
IFC,  
Academia 
 
Training scale-up for 
implementing 
institutions 
Building on trainings in contract negotiations from UNDP with deeper and longer trainings for all relevant 
ministries, with a focus on skill-building such as financial modeling and mock negotiations 
 
Scaling up auditing training, particularly if more complex taxation mechanisms are included in an updated 
law (like the suggested RRT) and/or model contract 
MIREM, 
Min. of Finance 
 
Min. of Finance, 
MPD, MTC, 
AMDCM, 
CSOs, Academia 
UNDP, AfDB, 
IMF, 
WB, Academia 
Deepened and 
strengthened EITI 
Deepening the EITI to include (1) more companies (2) financial, physical, and process audits (3) contract 
disclosure (4) infrastructure and CSR expenditures and audits and (5) link to budget transparency  
 
Using an EITI law to implement these innovations  
MIREM and MEITI  Multi-Stakeholder 
Group 
World Bank 
Trust Fund for 
EITI, AfDB 
 
   
Conclusion 
This report has attempted to outline a vision for a holistic, regional approach to resource-based 
development, highlighting both the need and opportunities for multi-stakeholder collaboration. The 
report reflects some promising initiatives that are already underway as well as the shared sense in the 
region that further coordination and support are necessary to truly leverage the natural resource sector 
for high and sustained growth rates, equitable benefits, and widespread, environmentally sustainable 
poverty reduction in the region.  
  
This holistic approach, outlined in this report, is certainly ambitious; however, we believe that with 
adequate support and pooled resources, many of these opportunities are indeed within reach. 
Resource-based development is unique: the fact that the resources are non-renewable means that 
depletion is a core reality that must be planned for, and the opportunity to leverage resources for 
development is a one-time opportunity. Once depleted, these non-renewable assets can no longer be a 
driver of growth, unless the groundwork is laid early for a sustainable transition to a “diversified, vibrant 
and globally competitive industrializing” economy, as described in the AU Mining Vision. 
 
The goal of this report is to support existing initiatives and propose new ideas to ensure that a resource-
based development strategy is implemented meaningfully in the region. This draft is a consultative 
draft. Although every opportunity and idea in this report reflects conversations and information 
accessed in the region, the VCC will now consult widely with this report: (1) to seek guidance on 
whether this report accurately reflects the vision of the stakeholders, and (2) to work with 
stakeholders to develop a road map for implementation.  
 
Mozambique is particularly rich in institutions focused on and advancing key priorities of resource-based 
development, including several ministries that are at the forefront of developing policies for equitable 
and sustainable development in the region. Therefore, a useful starting point for an implementation 
plan could be to establish a Zambezi Valley Resource-Based Development Coordinator, based in the 
office of the President or Prime Minister, who could support and coordinate the various stakeholders 
working toward the development of the Nacala and Beira corridors. The Coordinator could provide key 
support to the relevant ministries, facilitate communication and collaboration among the various 
stakeholders and institutions in the region, and liaise with the international Resource-Based 
Development Advisory Group, discussed below. 
 
The first initiative of the Zambezi Valley Resource-Based Development Coordinator could usefully be to 
map out existing institutions and initiatives, and then to help devise a realistic process for 
communication and collaboration among those institutions. To begin this exercise, the VCC has 
identified several existing institutions that could be at the core of a resource-based development 
implementation strategy (Figure 9). The VCC has also mapped new entities, suggested throughout this 
report, to bridge possible institutional gaps. As one might recall from the methodology for this report 
described in the introduction, this report does not address several aspects of development that regional 
stakeholders may want to consider in this mapping exercise—namely, those institutions addressing 
gender and labor rights, resettlement, land rights, and artisanal mining, among others. Also, as 
mentioned in the introduction, although this report does not address the role of the hydrocarbon sector 
in the resource-based development strategy, hydrocarbons are also a non-renewable resource that 
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should be integrated in a broad resource-based development strategy, and should be integrated in this 
approach in later steps. 
 
Figure 9. Network of existing and suggested institutions, key to resource-based development  
 
 
  
 
This mapping is not comprehensive but is illustrative of the connections and coordination that are both 
possible and necessary. This figure also does not include key stakeholders such as community groups, 
civil society organizations, development partners, regional bodies, and academic institutions that have 
important roles to play in implementation. A more complete mapping of key stakeholders and 
institutions should be a priority for the Resource-Based Development Coordinator. This mapping of 
existing initiatives will yield tremendous returns, if widely supported by committed stakeholders willing 
to coordinate their activities to take advantage of their synergies.  
 
In addition to the local and regional institutions and stakeholders, there are also many international 
partners that are committed to Mozambique’s growth and development. Many of these partners have 
expertise and international perspective that could support the resource-based development strategy in 
Mozambique. These partners too often fail to communicate and coordinate their actions—not out of ill 
will, but because they lack a designated space and resources to do so.  To this end, as indicated in figure 
6, a Resource-Based Development Advisory Group could usefully be assembled, composed of 
international and regional individuals with a range of perspectives and expertise that can assist in the 
planning and implementation of a resource-based development strategy. This group could include 
experts in taxation, transport logistics, engineering, development practice, agriculture, water resources, 
financial management, environment, climate/meteorology, geology, and other relevant disciplines, that 
are committed to Mozambique’s development and would support the Government and other 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis. 
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In its early years, this group should meet at least twice a year, of which one meeting would be 
concurrent with a Zambezi Valley Resource Policy Forum.  Such a Forum, convened at least once per 
year, would bring together all stakeholders to assess needs and opportunities, monitor progress, and 
plan for the future. The Forum would also provide a credible interface between extractive industries and 
governments, to align the respective needs and interests of industry and society, and to focus on the 
special challenges and opportunities for extractive industry companies. Indeed, missed opportunities for 
better coordination of all stakeholders (often due to a lack of open and consistent communication 
throughout the life of a major project), can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust, and consequently 
suboptimal returns on a project for all involved. 
 
The first part of the Forum could be a closed-door summit between the government (local, regional, and 
national) and investors (local leadership and headquarters), followed by a summit of all stakeholders, 
including domestic and international civil society, donors, regional development banks, diplomats, 
future investors, and representatives from other industries (agriculture, for example).   
 
The Zambezi Valley Resource Policy Forum would: 
• Be a regular space for discussion, monitoring, evaluation, and planning  
• Create a space for open and consistent communication between government officials and 
corresponding mining companies’ departments (e.g., Ministry of Mineral Resources with 
project management, Ministry of Transportation and Communication with spatial strategy 
executives, Ministries of Health and Education with social program managers, Ministry of 
Environment with risk mitigation executives.…) in a coordinated fashion, as opposed to 
company-by-company discussions 
• Allow effective regulatory partnerships at all government levels (local, regional, and national) 
and among government ministries (mineral resources, environment, education, science and 
technology, transportation and communication, agriculture, etc.)  
• Highlight areas in which mining companies can help build capacity in relevant governmental 
sectors (at national and sub-national levels) 
• Allow the government and industry representatives to hear directly from the communities, and 
for communities and civil society organizations to share experiences and concerns 
 
This Forum would not only allow the extractive industries to engage in national and regional 
development policy, but could also help set best practices for the regional and global investment 
community with respect to supporting sustainable development. The Policy Forum could be facilitated 
by the Zambezi Valley Resource-Based Development Coordinator, with the support of international 
partners, such as the VCC, to facilitate preparation, effective discussions, and dissemination of outcomes. 
 
Thus, the final recommendation of this report is to create a process for implementation of a holistic 
resource-based strategy, as outlined in this report, by supporting the establishment of a Coordinator, 
Advisory Group and Policy Forum.  
 
Resource-based development is challenging, but the opportunities to leverage the resources for 
sustainable, inclusive growth are substantial and within reach. Recognizing the opportunities and 
including them in a widely-supported resource-based development plan will create a platform for 
Mozambique’s partners to pool resources and activities to support the government to achieve 
meaningful and sustained benefits from its resources. 
